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ABSTRACT 
CLASS AND ETHNICITY INTERACTION: KURDISH QUESTION AND 
TRADE UNIONS IN TURKEY 
 
Hazal Altunkulp 
Program of European Studies, M.A Thesis, 2014 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayşe Betül Çelik 
Keywords: working class, ethnicity, Kurdish question, trade unions, class identity 
This study aims to contribute to the discussion of class and identity politics through 
highlighting the interaction of the two dimensions of identity: class and ethnicity. More 
specifically, it intends to underline the intertwined nature of class and ethnic oppression 
through analyzing the views of the economically oppressed on the ethnically oppressed. 
The two trade unions, Petrol-Iş and Hava-Iş, are chosen as data in order to explore how 
the members of these class-based organizations interpret an ethnic conflict: the Kurdish 
question. The main conclusion of the interviews with the union managers and the 
workers is that class identity may help to interact with other forms of oppression in the 
socialization processes. These processes are differently experienced by the members of 
the two trade unions. While the Petrol-Iş workers’ individual politicization processes in 
line with the unionist movement are influential in being emphatic to the oppression of 
Kurds, the Hava-Iş workers’ mobilization with the Turkish Airlines strike plays a 
determining role for the formation of the class identity and developing an empathy to 
the oppression of Kurds. Moreover, our findings show that workers who have not 
experienced these politicization and mobilization processes, and those workers lack the 
class identity possess discriminative attitudes to the demands of the Kurds and the 
Kurdish movement.  
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ÖZET 
 
SINIF VE ETNİSİTE BAĞDAŞIMI: TÜRKİYE’DE KÜRT MESELESİ VE 
SENDİKALAR 
 
Hazal Altunkulp 
Avrupa Çalışmaları Programı, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2014 
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Ayşe Betül Çelik 
Anahtar Kelimeler: işçi sınıfı, etnisite, Kürt Meselesi, sendikalar, sınıf kimliği 
Bu çalışma sınıf ve etnisite kavramlarının bağdaşımına ışık tutarak, sınıf ve kimlik 
politikaları tartışmalarına katkı sağlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu doğrultuda, ekonomik 
olarak ezilmiş kesimin etnik ezilmişliği nasıl yorumladığı analiz edilmiştir. Data olarak, 
sınıf örgütleri olan Petrol ve Hava İşçi Sendikaları seçilerek, bu iki sendika işçilerinin 
Kürt Meselesi’ne nasıl baktığı incelenmiştir. Sendika yöneticileri ve işçileri ile yapılan 
görüşmeler sonucunda, temel olarak, işçi sınıfı kimliğinin diğer yapıdaki ezilmişliklerle 
etkileşim halinde olabileceği görülmüştür. İşçilerin bu etkileşimin bilincine varması 
çeşitli sosyalleşme biçimleri ve süreçleri doğrultusunda olduğu saptanmıştır.  Petrol-İş 
işçilerinin Kürt’lerin ezilmişliğiyle bir empati kurmasında, sendikal hareketin de bir 
parçası olduğu, kişisel politikleşme süreçleri etkili olmuştur. Hava-İş işçileri ise, Türk 
Hava Yolları grevi ile birlikte mobilize olarak, hem sınıf kimliği oluşturmuşlar hem de 
Kürtler’in ezilmişliğine empati geliştirmişlerdir. Ayrıca, sınıf kimliklerini vurguladıkları 
halde bu sosyalleşme ve politikleşme süreçlerinden geçmeyen ve/veya sınıf kimliği 
edinmeyen işçilerin Kürt hareketine ve taleplerine ayrımcı bir tutum sergiledikleri 
görülmüştür. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
 “Like beads and Che Guevara berets, class is passé”. Quoted from the book of 
The Death of Class by Pakulski and Waters (1996, p.1), this argument has been pretty 
fashionable in the academic realm. It is supported by the claim that the new 
dimensions—gender, ethnicity, sexual orientations—in the social strata and politics 
have taken the place of class. It is explained by the argument that class boundaries have 
been blurred through new self-identifications, which are mostly fed by occupations, 
educational levels, sexual or ethnic identities. Accordingly, new social and political 
movements have begun to be based on these identifications. It is clear that the majority 
of the civil conflicts in the post-Cold War era have been classified as ethnic, fighting for 
ethno-national autonomy or independence (Scherrer, 1994). Thus, it is inevitable to 
acknowledge the significance of these ‘new’ associations. However, a social 
dimension’s popularity in a period of time does not necessarily eliminate another’s 
importance. This fallacy has led class to be ignored, causing insufficient explanations of 
identity politics, including ethnic conflicts. When they are deeply analyzed, it is seen 
that ethnic conflicts which are generally caused by social inequalities are in relation to 
class conflicts. It is due to the fact that the cultural suppression of ethnic minorities 
mostly coincides with the economic suppression, or vice versa. In other words, the 
geographies which are classified as uneven developed are also culturally oppressed 
ones.  
Approaches on class have different arguments for the interaction of class and 
ethnicity. On the one hand, the classical approach on class, led by Marxism, strongly 
argues that the most important form of oppression is based on economy. On the other 
hand, some other scholars (Gibson-Graham, 2001; Özselçuk, 2006; Althusser, 1979) 
who believe in validity of class in the recent social, political and economic conjuncture 
suggest that class may have multiple subjectivities which are in relation with each other. 
Even, relations of these different identities/movements can support one another. Flexing 
the definition of class, this contemporary approach in class deserves an attention to 
understand class and ethnicity interactions which find a significant place in the ethnic 
conflicts. 
1 
 
 
In the case of Turkey, the Kurdish question is worthy to analyze with its class 
and ethnic based dimensions. The Kurdish identity could not create a space for itself 
since the beginning of the Turkish Republic. In the 1960s, the rise of socialist 
movements—including unionist movements—paved a way for the discussion of the 
Kurdish question. In this era, the discussion of the issue was based on its both ethnic 
and class nature, in parallel with the Kurdish movement which had a socialist line in 
addition to identity awareness. By the 1980s, the Kurdish movement began to sever its 
ties with the left of Turkey—which went towards a classical approach on class—
through emphasizing more of the Kurdish ethnic identity. The stances of the left and the 
Kurdish movement are not very different in today’s political environment. However, it 
is problematic to consider the Kurdish question as a mere ethnic problem in accordance 
with the neoliberal logic, or within the frame of nationalism, as classical Marxists do. It 
is due to the fact that both approaches are likely to give insufficient explanation for the 
question itself, and for its resolution. 
In order to observe these relations between class and ethnicity, trade unions—
class based organizations—can provide valuable data. The ties between the left and the 
Kurdish movement in the 1960s can be considered as relevant for the relations between 
the trade unions and the Kurdish movement. By definition, being involved in the left-
wing political arena, the trade unions of Turkey were used to be concerned with the 
Kurdish movement in the 1960s. However, after ideological divisions between the 
Kurdish movement and the left, the trade unions’ concern on the Kurdish question has 
been blurred. Today, analyzing the reflections of these ideological divisions through 
exploring the views of trade unions about the Kurdish question can shed a new light on 
both class and the Kurdish movement. 
In this study, therefore, we aim to answer the question of “How do members of 
trade unions—as class based organizations—interpret the Kurdish question in 
Turkey?” in order to understand what kind of a relation can be made between class and 
ethnic identities. In addition, we want to analyze how theoretical discussions find a 
place in practice, by questioning: 
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• how do unions and their members define the working class in terms of its 
position in economy, society and politics, and who fits into the working 
class? 
• how do they position unionism in class movements? 
• how do they consider the evolution of class concept and unionism? 
• how do they compare class movements with identity movements? 
• how do they define the Kurdish question in terms of its causes and 
consequences? 
• how do they consider everyday practices of Kurds in the working place 
and the union? 
In doing so, we chose two trade unions in Turkey; Petrol-Iş and Hava-Iş, which are the 
similar cases in terms of their unionist stance. Paying regard to effects of the strike of 
Hava-Iş, we want to understand how similar unionist stance/class definitions reflect on 
their interpretation of the Kurdish question to learn whether class identity is capable of 
interacting with other forms of oppression; the oppression of Kurds. If it is not, we want 
to understand how lack of self-identification with the working class reflects on the views 
on the Kurdish question. In order to answer these, several interview questions are asked 
to the union managers and the members.  
 At the theoretical level, the study, firstly, seeks to analyze the approaches on 
class, the arguments on failure of class, and class and ethnicity interaction, in the second 
chapter. The third chapter gives a historical background of the unionism and the 
Kurdish question in order to provide an understanding about the overlapping points. The 
fourth chapter analyzes the findings of the conducted research, while these findings are 
analyzed within the theoretical framework in the conclusion chapter. Through touching 
on mostly forgotten dimensions of unionism and the Kurdish question, the study will 
hopefully provide a space for new discussions of class and ethnicity together, both in 
theory and practice.  
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
It is debated by many social scientists that the limits of socio-economic classes 
have been blurred by the emergence of identity politics, and accordingly, the role of 
class in politics has become less significant (Dunn, 1998; Freidman, 1994,; Melucci, 
1985, 1996). These social scientists agree on the idea that the importance of class 
identity, class consciousness and class movements has substantially decreased since the 
middle of the 20th century. It is argued that class’ being an obsolete factor of social 
change has gone parallel with the increase of identity-based social movements (Hall, 
1989; Pakulski & Waters, 1996).  
Not surprisingly, the idea that class politics has been replaced by identity politics 
is criticized by other social theorists by the claim that class still matters in today’s 
politics (Edgell, 1993; Goldthorpe & Marshall, 1992). Nevertheless, this Marxist claim 
has different approaches to identity politics. On the one hand, the classical perspective 
refrains from recognizing identities based on ethnicity, religion, or sex which are 
thought to be factious for class struggle. On the other hand, it is suggested that class 
includes some other identities in itself. In recent politics, identity cannot be reduced to a 
single class identity, but contains different elements which can be grounded on 
experiences and subjective positions.   
Many non-Marxist ideologies which believe in outdate-ness of class in addition 
to supporting identity politics suggest that ethnicity, one of the forms of identities, has a 
central role in politics. This idea can be supported by the fact that ethnic conflicts are 
one of the most widespread conflicts in the post-Cold War era. Thus, it is essential not 
to deny the existence and significance of the ethnic conflicts which are fed by the 
clashes of different ethnic identities. In doing so, it is also important to analyze whether 
ethnic identity suppresses class identity or vice versa. Besides, at the point that defines 
class as suppressing other identities, it is worthy to examine the relations between class 
and ethnic identity, and whether they are interacted or not. To do so, this chapter aims to 
give a theoretical base concerning class and identity politics, and the arguments on the 
points they separate and overlap.  
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2.1. The Classical Approach on Class 
The Communist Manifesto, written by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1888, p. 
14), states that “the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class 
struggles”. As what they theoretically call historical materialism, those struggles have 
always had an economic base, dividing a society into two groups; namely, the oppressor 
and the oppressed. The ones who hold the means of production have become the 
oppressor while the ones who only sell their labor in order to live have been the 
oppressed. Historically, this system has created new names for the clashing groups, 
maintaining the class antagonisms, but establishing “new classes, new conditions of 
oppression and new forms of struggle” (Marx & Engels, 1888, p.14). While these 
groups were feudal lords, vassals, guild-masters, journeymen, apprentices, and serfs in 
the Middle Ages, Marx and Engels suggest that the era of industrialization in the 19th 
century has brought a new dimension in the society; the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. 
According to them, that dimension has created a sharper split in the society, creating 
two hostile camps.  
 On the one side, as the modern capitalists, the bourgeoisie who are the owners of 
the means of social production and employers of labors on wage, have developed by the 
industrial development, they have gained a cosmopolitan character in production and 
consumption in the world. Through the capitalist systems’ spread to all nations, the 
bourgeoisie have introduced its ideology, naming it as ‘civilization’. In doing so, they 
have gotten benefit from political centralization with the help of laws, governments and 
systems of taxation. In other words, the bourgeoisie has created another network 
through non-productive relations—political, judicial and religious means—(which is 
defined as superstructure), in order to strengthen its position in the economic base. 
Thus, Marx, in the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy 
(1876) states that “the mode of production of material life conditions the general 
process of social, political and intellectual life” (para.6).  This explanation of the 
Marxist tradition, therefore, explains the close relationship between economics and 
politics through underlining the effects of economy on social and political dynamisms.  
On the other side, while the capital has grown, the proletariat whose survival 
depends on the demand for labor, which makes them vulnerable to the competition and 
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fluctuations of the market, has developed in the same proportion. Concerning these 
social, political and economic circumstances of the 19th century, Marx and Engels 
(1888) argue that the growth in number and the growth in exploitation have led the 
proletariat to be concentrated in masses, being more powerful against the bourgeoisie. 
They have begun to form organizations—trade unions—in order to struggle against the 
harsh working conditions and be prepared for some revolts. The Communist Manifesto 
(1888) considers trade unions as a vehicle to organize workers for a bigger worker 
union which would eventually carry out the proletarian revolution. Keeping up the rates 
of wages or enhancing the working conditions are not seen as the ultimate aims of trade 
unions; however, they are significant means of organization and communication among 
workers from different localities. Defined as a political struggle by Marx and Engels, 
the struggle of trade unions helps workers to be a class in which the proletariat 
consciously recognizes their exploited positions in relation to the bourgeoisie. Through 
class consciousness, trade unions eventually turn into a political party that pursues a 
legislative struggle for the interests of the working class.  
For the ultimate aim, Marx and Engels, in the Manifesto, propose a communist 
revolution for the liberation of the proletariat in order to establish a system in which all 
members of society participate in production. To do so, the Marxist theory emphasizes a 
transformation from ‘class in itself’—the economic subject—to ‘class for itself’—the 
social subject. ‘Class in itself’ refers to its members’ having a common position in the 
mode of production. So as to pass to ‘class for itself’, members have to be organized in 
the pursuit of its own interests by class consciousness. This term is defined theoretically 
by Georg Lukacs (1920), who ideologically theorized Vladimir Lenin’s revolutionary 
practices. In his work, History and Class Consciousness, Lukacs demonstrates “class 
consciousness consists of the appropriate and rational reactions ‘imputed’ to a particular 
typical position in the process of production’’(1920, para.12). This consciousness is not 
a sum of thoughts or feelings of single individuals of the class; however, it is acquired 
based on economic and social circumstances of individuals of the class as a whole. In 
other words, class consciousness is “subjective awareness people have of their class 
interests and the conditions for advancing them” as Wright (1999, p. 27) defines. Only 
if the working class acquires class consciousness, it can be ‘class for itself’ and 
organized for a political struggle (Marx & Engels, 1976). 
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The Marxist ideology has provided a theoretical ground for the Bolshevik 
Revolution of 1917. The leader of the revolution, Lenin, has developed social, 
economic and political practices for the application of Marxism in Russia, which later 
on, has led to the emergence of Leninism. Describing stages to reach communism, in 
the work of the State and Revolution (1917) Lenin sees socialism as the lower stage of 
communist society. Therefore, he proposes a state governed by the democratic 
dictatorship of the proletariat, “as the continuation of the class struggle in the new 
forms”, which will eventually suppress the bourgeoisie and abolish the state (Lenin, 
1919, section A.).  
Apart from the views on the transition from socialism to communism, Leninism 
underlines self determination of nations, while Marx and Engels are not very much 
interested in. Indeed, in the early years of the Revolution, Lenin, in the work of the 
Right of Nations to Self-Determination, recognizes the importance of nationalism 
among the oppressed, suggesting that “We fight against the privileges and violence of 
the oppressor nation, and do not in any way condone strivings for privileges on the part 
of the oppressed nation” (1914b, chap.4). Although he acknowledges internationality of 
the class struggle, Lenin does not actually consider all nationalisms as intellectual 
obstacles or dividing forces for the proletariat revolution, and supports the right to self-
determination of ‘oppressed’ nations in order to break down the bourgeoisie nationalism 
and to strengthen the working class solidarity across the world.  
All in all, the classical approach on class agrees on the social stratification which 
sharply divides a society into two groups; the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Not 
surprisingly, different interpretations of Marxism have been shaped historically, in 
accordance with the circumstances of the era. However, one of the distinctive points in 
the Marxist tradition, nationalism in a class struggle, has substantially affected today’s 
discussions to rethink class and ethnic identity together, which will be deeply analyzed 
later.   
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2.2. Class as an Obsolete Variable 
Beginning with the Marxist tradition, class with its economic ‘base’ can identify 
important mechanisms of politics and social structure. Class interests have highly 
affected politics and ideologies in the 20th century (Kaya & Kaya, 2006). Class is a 
significant actor shaping party programs along with others. Thus, many political parties 
have class related positions in their programs, which affect their political ideologies. It 
has been mostly considered that while the working class is supported by social 
democratic parties, liberals and conservatives prepare programs compatible with middle 
class interests (Lipset, 1960). In order to observe the relations between class positions 
and voting behavior, for example, Lipset made statistical research which showed that 
after the Second World War, the middle class of Britain and the USA was tended to 
vote for right wing parties, whereas lower classes tended to vote for left wing parties 
(Lipset, 1960). 
Some recent statistics, however, suggest that politics is less likely to be 
influenced by class relations in today's world. For example, correlation between voting 
behavior and class interests has substantially decreased, and ties between political 
parties and class has been loosened (Clark & Lipset, 1991). On the contrary to what 
Lipset found in 1960, Clark and he argue, in 1991, that class has become insufficient to 
understand new political and social processes due to the collapse of old hierarchies, 
such as the hierarchy between the  bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The boundaries of 
class divisions introduced by the classical approach have been blurred. The reasons for 
the failure of class are claimed as the rise of the welfare state, which raises affluence, 
diversification of the occupational structure (political rise of the middle class) that also 
creates institutional based class divisions, and changes of political party dynamics 
(Clark et al, 2001). Concerning social sides of those changes, social stratification of the 
West has become more pluralistic, being outside of class relations. The definitions of 
the proletariat and the bourgeoisie have largely lost its validity through a ‘more 
institution based structure’ which is mainly determined by different levels of education. 
Philion (2009), who touches upon the views of Melucci on new social movements states 
that rather than economic class rights, mass education and extended citizenship rights 
are considered as more attractive to individuals in advanced industrialized societies to 
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increase their capacities in order to create their own sense of identities. On the political 
side, in the new pluralistic political environment, class does not provide a sharp contrast 
between left and right wing political parties. Hence, today’s political parties mostly 
concentrate on ‘social value issues’ rather than class, concerning such as ethnicity, 
human rights, or environment, generally accepting the market economy, in accordance 
with the new social circumstances and demands of individuals.  
In a similar way, Pakulski and Waters (1996) in their book The Death of Class, 
by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the decline of socialist ideologies in the West, 
“class is losing its ideological significance and political centrality” (p.1). Hence, the 
right wing parties are more likely to be interested in morality and ethnicity, while the 
left is concerned with gender, environment and human rights. Although the fact that 
class is being disfavored by intellectual and public fashion is not an objective criterion, 
Pakulski and Waters (1996) find it useful to make a broader analysis to explain social 
structure. According to them, classical approaches on class have a consensus that class 
is primarily related with ‘property and/or market relations’, which categorizes people as 
producers, but not consumers, members of ethnic or gender categories, or position 
holders (Pakulski and Waters, 1996). Traditional class analysis, therefore, loses its 
explanatory power in today’s societies in which classes in the classical sense are 
dissolving, through not going far from those economic-productive relations, and not 
explaining current social, political and economic dynamics. These dynamics are listed 
by the authors, very similarly with Clark and Lipset, as, 
• Changes in the structure of work and employment, especially post-Fordist 
forms of flexible specialization;  
• the globalization of market relations and rapid rise of Asian tiger economies 
and dragon societies;  
• the original growth and the current decomposition of the welfare state;  
• partisan dealignment and the demise of corporatist politics, and 
• changing forms of identification and political action, in particular the rising 
tide of new politics (Pakulski & Waters, 1996, p. 151). 
The listed issues that are considered as declining the credibility of the traditional 
class analysis, moreover, loosen class imaginary in the minds, psychologically and 
socially. Politically, they lead class to be incapable of explaining current conflicts in 
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which “national, religious, local, regional, ethnic, gender, racial and sexual preference 
identities are much more important’’ (Pakulski & Waters, 1996, p. 152).  
Agreeing with the emergence of new identities, Hall’s position in the formation 
of identities, to some extent, differs from what Melucci contends concerning desires of 
individuals to formulate the sense of identity which is ‘free of external state or corporate 
coercion’ (Philion, 2009, p. 83). In explaining Marxist theory of identity, Hall agrees on 
the idea that “there are always conditions to identity which the subject cannot construct” 
(1989, p. 11). Since those conditions tend to change by time, the sense of identity of 
individuals accordingly changes, but still in a constructed way. In terms of collective 
identities, this new construction has shaken lots of ‘past’ identities, such as class. In a 
more cautious way than Clark & Lipset (2001) and Pakulski & Waters (1996), Hall does 
not believe that class identity has completely gone away. However, he thinks, 
“The way in which class identities were understood and experienced, the 
way in which people located themselves in relation to class identities, the 
way in which we understood those identities as organized politically—
those stable forms of class identity are much more difficult to find at this 
point in the 20th century than they were 100 years ago”(Hall, 1989, p.13). 
Not going in details of the reasons behind that, he makes a conclusion that all identities, 
including class and the more popular ones (ethnicity and gender), which are mostly 
considered as stable are not stable, indeed. Hence, they are all exposed to construction 
by changes through time. The fact in the 1960s that each social movement had a single 
identity (woman, labor or Black) is not valid today (Hall, 1989).  
2.3. Class Still Matters 
Wright (1996), in his work, “Continuing Relevance of Class Analysis”, 
challenges the ideas of Pakulski & Waters on the death of class. He aims to show how 
the evidences which are introduced by these authors are not sufficient to prove the 
irrelevance of class. In doing so, he starts with the class definition, which is explained 
as a mere economic phenomenon by Pakulski & Waters. According to Wright (1996), 
the class analysis emphasizes that class is also a cultural and political concept. In fact, 
more importantly, he does not agree with the point criticized by Pakulski & Waters that 
class as an economic phenomenon is fundamental in the social structure. Most Marxists 
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do not agree that class as an economic concept is fundamental in organizing and 
structuring social organization. In fact, in the explanation of base and superstructure, 
class is situated in base which constitutes economy. In superstructure, there is 
everything else concerning society which might or might not be related with class 
relations. Class does not have to be the most important predictor, but still provides to 
identify important mechanisms.  
Those important mechanisms are indicated by Wright’s work through analyzing 
other subjectivities—friendship formation and household relations—which are 
emphasized by identity politics in which individual preferences matter. He finds out that 
merely class locations do not produce different forms of subjectivities, but they do 
shape subjectivities in interaction with other processes, such as “institutional 
arrangements, political strategies of parties and unions, historical legacies of the past 
struggles” (Wright, 1996, p. 710). Thus, class is still powerful in explaining many 
aspects of social life. Especially, class boundaries which also affect individual 
preferences continue to constitute real barriers in people’s lives with the unequal 
distribution of the capital.  
Concerning the rise of the middle class, which is considered as a reason for the 
decline of traditional class divisions, Wright (1997) suggests that ‘the new middle 
class’—as mentioned by some theorists—is divided into two groups; skilled and non-
skilled white collar workers. Both of these groups work for big firms (e.g. managers) or 
state institutions (e.g. doctors, teachers). They might be considered as the members of 
the working class, since they sell their labor in order to live. In fact, they can also be 
counted as the members of the capitalist class, because they have the authority to 
control the workers (Wright, 1997). He states that “some positions have multiple class 
character” (Wright, 1985, p.43). Despite various arguments on the conceptualization of 
these categories, it should be admitted that emergence of the new categories have 
created a new dimension in the working class, and they have gained the status of being a 
political subject for themselves. It is, however, less likely that it holds the power for a 
whole political transformation of the society, since the white collar workers are less 
powerful in comparison to the working or the capitalist classes by being in the middle of 
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the two main classes, and due to the uncertainty of their class locations (Kaya & Kaya, 
2006).   
Leaving aside the complexities of the recent conceptualization of the class and 
going back to the classical Marxism, Marx’s categorization of labor includes people 
who are described as the members of the new middle class (managers/doctors). He 
argues, 
“labour-power socially combined and the various competing labour-
powers which together form the entire production machine participate in 
very different ways in the immediate process of making commodities... 
Some work better with their hands, others with their heads, one as a 
manager, engineer, technologist, etc, the other as overseer, the third as 
manual labourer or even drudge. An ever-increasing number of types of 
labour are included in the immediate concept of productive labour, and 
those who perform it are classed as productive workers, workers directly 
exploited by capital and subordinated to its process of production and 
expansion” (Marx, 1976, p. 1039-1040). 
 
As opposed to the claims that educational attainments widen class differentials, 
and have become more important in determining class, Goldthorpe & Marshall (1992) 
argue that there is no reduction of class inequalities through high level of education. 
They demonstrate that if different education levels have diminished class divisions, the 
advantaged classes could pass their family resources to their children through other 
channels, without education. In other words, a child could gain her/his position in the 
advantaged class of her/his family although she/he is not highly educated as his/her 
parents. Hence, education levels that are increased by the rise of welfare state in 
advanced societies do not necessarily challenge class locations in the longer run, on the 
contrary to what Melucci and Clark & Lipset (1991 and 2001) underline education as 
the cause for ‘the failure of class’.  
Namely, the scholars who believe in the important and powerful existence of 
class in today’s politics try to challenge the claims which are proposed as the causes of 
‘the death of class’. Although Wright (1996; 1997) and Goldthorpe & Marshall (1992) 
agree on the impacts of those changes in the social and political arenas, they notably 
underline that class should be thought in consideration with its dynamics which are 
naturally influenced with the circumstances of the era. As opposed to the agreement on 
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dynamism of class relations, the notion of ‘identities in class’ has created a dichotomy 
in Marxism; whether class does/should suppress other identities, or class can contain 
multiple subjectivities.  
 
2.3.1. Class as Suppressing Identities 
After the Communist Manifesto was written in 1848, a committee which Marx 
and Engels joined declared the demands of the Communist Party in Germany. This 
declaration began with the statement that “Workers of all countries, unite!” Although 
this famous statement was written in a declaration which was prepared for Germany, it 
signals the unifying nature of the class concept. For the liberation of the proletariat, 
Marxism offers the working class solidarity in which people from all nations, 
ethnicities, religions or sexes should join the class struggle. The proletariat should not 
let the bourgeoisie weaken their struggle through splitting them by those antagonisms. 
Marx underlines this issue in the discussions of the "Irish Question." In 1870, for 
example, he wrote,  
"The English bourgeoisie has not only exploited the Irish poverty to keep 
down the working class in England by forced immigration of poor 
Irishmen, but it has also divided the proletariat into two hostile 
camps…This antagonism among the proletarians of England is artificially 
nourished and supported by the bourgeoisie. It knows that this scission is 
the true secret of maintaining its power" (Marx and Engels 1972, p. 162). 
 
This approach is interpreted in different ways in the recent politics; class 
suppresses other identities, or embodies them. Bill Mullen (2002), for example, suggests 
that identity politics are incompatible or even harmful for class transformation. In 
accordance with the Marxist tradition, he states that ‘‘the first step toward working-class 
emancipation is the recognition by workers that they must lose, not gain their identity 
and identification with capitalism, nationalism, imperialism, and other capitalist 
processes’’ (2002, p.38). In order to move beyond capitalism, identities are chains 
which should be gotten ridden of. He formulates a similar slogan with the Manifesto 
that ‘‘workers and working-class studies scholars of the world unite! You have nothing 
13 
 
 
to lose but your identities!’’ (2002, p. 41). In the very similar way with Mullen, 
Schocket finds identity politics not only dangerous, but also inherently incoherent for 
class politics, stating, 
 “The identitarian position cannot embrace class in its Marxian sense as 
dynamic and ultimately self-negating, as a set of operations we struggle to 
overturn rather than as a set of voices or, indeed, a ‘‘culture’’ that we 
rediscover and honor. Put as simply as possible, since class can only name 
a relational inequity that is intolerable, it cannot comfortably fit into a 
system that is formulated with the opposite agenda: the positive valuation 
of difference”. (Schocket, 2000, p. 4) 
 
 Sharon Smith, in a speech called “Marxism and Identity Politics” (2008), states 
that the nature of identity politics causes antagonisms between oppressed groups, 
without having no reason to fight with each other. Although she indicates that she fully 
understands the personal experiences of people who are oppressed by being ‘women, 
gay or black’, and supports the movements against racism, homophobia and sexism, 
Smith (2008) thinks that those movements are not enough to change the system.  In her 
analysis, she underlines that identities mostly remain in the personal level, but move 
into the political arena when they become tools for fighting against oppression as a 
strategy for changing society. The point which is undermined by identity politics is that 
people do not have to have personal experiences of oppression to be able to resist it. 
Through emphasizing the idea that people who only experience a particular identity 
based oppression are able to fight against it while the others cannot be a part of the 
solution; because they are the causes of the problem, identity politics do formulate 
antagonism which leads to ignore the systematic oppression. In fact, she states 
"oppression is not caused by the race, gender or sexuality of particular individuals who 
run the system, but is generated by the very system itself—no matter who's running it” 
(Smith, 2008).  
2.3.2. Multiple subjectivities in class 
 While some of the Marxist scholars agree on harms of the identity politics for 
class, but not being very firm or clear in suppressing the other identities, the other 
contemporary Marxists argue that class in the Marxist terminology can contain multiple 
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identities, including a worker identity. As Özselçuk (2006) discusses that worker 
identity is generally formed of 'wounded attachments' to the past and present injuries 
that have morally positive but materially negative sentiments. Internalization of self 
suffering leads to looking back with nostalgia and creates ressentiment. In defense of 
the threatened and suppressed worker identity, workers obtain a site of mourning 
(Özselçuk, 2006) which equates their loss caused by capitalism with pain, self-pity and 
anger due to their failure. Gibson-Graham (2001) moreover underline that '' […] the 
foreclosure of class transformation when, faced with the processes of economic 
restructuring, class struggle retreats to a nostalgic defense of a threatened worker 
identity and confines the scope of resistance to preserving the old ways of being, hence 
deflects any real change from taking place'' (Özselçuk, 2006 p.226).  It is, therefore, 
argued that these wounded attachments simultaneously become the essential 
components of worker identities, which weaken the possibility of transforming those 
conditions, but leading to continuation of capitalism. On the other hand, formation of 
these subjectivities with acknowledgment of pain might be a necessary step for creating 
ties empathetically with injured communities and provides them with consciousness of 
loss to move on the next stage against capitalism.  Even, the multiple subjectivities 
might contribute value to the class politics positively to break with capitalism 
(Özselçuk, 2006). In line with that argument, Althusser (1979) suggests that 
attachments and feeling coming from the past are very constructive and affective as a 
step for organizing new—non capitalist—economic identifications. Although Hall 
(1989) believes in the unpopularity of class identities today, he makes a similar 
argument concerning the sense of identity. He states that “You have to position yourself 
in somewhere in order to say anything about it…People need to honor hidden histories 
from which they come” (p. 18). Hence, it would be wrong to want workers to forget 
their past injuries which are helpful to formulate identities. 
 These past injuries do not have to be related with economic-based experiences. In 
the book, Class and its Others, Gibson-Graham et al. (2000) discuss that class can 
participate in transforming economic and other social relations. Hence, instead of 
ignoring class in non-economic identities or non-economic identities in class, class 
politics should create new forms of politics to respond new desires. Each identity can be 
understood by the complex of “natural, social, economic, cultural, political and other 
15 
 
 
processes” (Gibson-Graham, et al, 2000, p.7). None of these should be considered as 
having fundamental importance alone.  This claim is, moreover, consistent with what 
Wright (1996) underlines that most Marxists do not see class as fundamental, but it 
provides a broader explanation for the social and political structure. Thus, as Gibson-
Graham et al. (2000) state that “we can see class processes being enacted in multiple 
forms and social sites—not just in the capitalist enterprise but in non-capitalist ones 
(including  identities of gender, ethnicity and so on)” (p. 10).  
 Through recognizing the recent concerns of cultural identity, scholars who do not 
undermine the importance of class begin to “focus on how cultural processes are 
embedded within specific kinds of socio-economic practices, exploring how inequality 
is routinely reproduced through both cultural and economic practices” (Devine & 
Savage, 2000, p.193-196). Hence, there is an emphasis on how class is experienced in 
gendered and raced ways (Reay, 1998, p. 272). This academic shift is, for example, seen 
in Wright’s works. In his work Race, Class, and Income Inequality, in 1978, he suggests 
that although the class dynamics (with an economic base) may undermine racial 
differences in the labor market, “To the extent that the working class is divided along 
racial and ethnic lines, the collective power of the working class is reduced, and thus the 
capacity of workers to win demands against capital is decreased” (p.1391). 
 In sum, the concern of identity in the leftist ideology creates an axis between 
revolutionary and instrumentalist politics. While the former believes in the factious 
nature of identities, the latter supports the necessity of considering economic definition 
class with political definition of personal/cultural identities, which needs ‘re-
subjectivation with the past, present and future’ (Özselçuk, 2006,  p.238). 
2.4. Class and Ethnicity Interaction 
In the academic realm of multiple subjectivities in class, ethnicity is one of the 
most important subjectivities which influences today’s politics. Hall (1989), for 
example, gives an emphasis on subjectivation with the past which is fed by ethnic 
identity. In the similar logic with forming a worker identity with the past injuries, 
discussed by Özselçuk, Hall (1989, p.18) demonstrates that “[…] we cannot do without 
the sense of positioning that is connoted by the term of ethnicity. And the relation that 
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peoples of the world now have to their own past is, of course, part of the discovery of 
their own ethnicity”. According to him, the ethnic past which shapes today’s identity is 
constructed politically. Although he does not explicitly underline, economic impacts to 
that construction seem to be inevitable. Thus, it is worthy to discuss how ethnicity finds 
a place in the new definition of class, which affects and be affected by other 
subjectivities. 
In his book, Class, Ethnicity and Social Inequality (1990), Christopher McAll 
describes the importance of thinking class and ethnicity together for social inequality, 
by stating that 
“They are both key concepts in any discussion that takes social inequality 
as the general problem that is being addressed. Ethnicity, for all its 
vagueness, relates to the way in which people identify themselves as either 
belonging or not belonging to particular ethnic groups, and is therefore of 
central importance to the way in which people socialize, vote, fight, 
cooperate or otherwise translate their beliefs into action. At the same time 
we cannot understand social phenomena without classifying, particularly 
in the context of social inequality” (McAll, 1990, p. 4-5) 
This idea brings the claim that one of the forms of social inequalities; ethnic 
conflicts, therefore, are mostly in relation with class conflicts, as well. As Özbudun 
(2010) discusses, each case in which ethnicity is visible (or more or less under tension) 
signals unequal economic-political relations, at the same time.  Thus, ethnic problems 
mostly come to the scene when the minority groups encounter or feel economic-
political discrimination against them (Özbudun, 2010). It is explained due to the fact 
that each ethnic minority, experiencing a historical inequality, has a classified position.  
This argument was discussed much earlier, in the 1930s, to analyze the relations 
between the North and the South in the United States. Conceptualized as ‘internal 
colonialism’, the idea underlines the existent “analogy between the situation of colonial 
domination and the position of racial and ethnic communities within industrial 
societies” (Stone, 1979, p. 278). As the pioneer of the argument, Hechter (1975) claims 
that ethnic tensions arise when minorities are deliberately deprived of social and 
economic advantages by systematic discrimination of the majority, in the fields of 
education, employment and living standards. Thus, classical colonialist system which 
exploits overseas countries materially continues internally in the industrial states in 
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which a stratified system is founded by unequal distribution of power and resources 
among the ethnic groups. The uneven development of capitalism eventually causes the 
fact that “longstanding ethnic resentments by the minority group against the hegemony 
of the dominant group crystallize into a nationalist movement for sociopolitical and 
economic change” (Byrne & Irvin, 2002, p. 59).  
In order to show the relation between capitalism and ethnic conflicts, Çiçek 
(2012) touches upon one of the features of capitalism: unequal development. He argues 
that unequal geographical development of capitalism leads to build a regional 
construction of the capital and different scales of center-periphery relations through 
inter-geographical labor force and transfers of raw materials (Çiçek, 2012). While the 
center has the capacity of high technology and production, the periphery provides raw 
materials, agricultural production and cheap labor force. In this process, capitalism 
produces regional disparities in between developed-undeveloped countries, developed-
undeveloped cities and suburbs in cities (Smith, 1990). It is important to note that 
unequally developed geographies are also cultural geographies. Hence, differentiations 
between economical geographies are, often, intersected with differentiations between 
cultural geographies (Çiçek, 2012). Intersection of class based inequalities and ethnic 
conflicts, therefore, becomes inevitable. In that line, Çiçek (2012) quotes Beşikçi 
(1992); 
“[…] those two realities have thoroughly appeared in the sociological 
studies, 
1. Any analysis which is not done with regard to social classes is not 
meaningful, and cannot be successful in solving problems. 
2. Any analysis which does not take into consideration interregional 
economic and social unbalance, and does not analyze ethnic factors with 
regard to classes is incomplete” (as cited in Çiçek, 2012, p.13)  
 
All in all, although in the Marxist tradition, fist ideology does not underline class 
and ethnicity interaction, it might signal the existence of ethnic identities in class 
struggles by supporting the liberation of the oppressed nations. In the contemporary 
world, theories about multiple subjectivities in class deserve an attention to analyze 
class and ethnicity interactions, since those interactions affect today’s ethnic conflicts in 
accordance with the new definitions of class.  
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2.5. The Conclusion 
 The popularity of class as a predictor which explains social stratification having 
an economic base has risen during some historical moments or declined in some other 
periods. Until the 1980s, the Classical Marxist approach on class has continued its 
popularity in the academic realm. In accordance with the political and economic 
conjuncture of the world, however, it is argued that new indicators which stratify 
society, such as ethnic, religious or sexual identities, have made socio-economic class 
weaken its validity (Clark & Lipset, 1991, Clark et al, 2001, Pakulski & Waters, 1996,; 
Dunn, 1998,; Freidman, 1994,; Melucci, 1985, 1996).  
 Although the Marxist side, after the 1980s agree on the idea that class is still an 
important variable to understand social stratification (Wright, 1996, 1997,; Goldthorpe 
& Marshall, 1992), its influence is somehow ambiguous concerning identity issues. 
While some scholars think that other identities rather than class are factious for class 
movements (Mullen, 2002,; Schocket, 2000,; Smith, 2008), others suggest that class can 
have multiple subjectivities, including ethnic, religious, sexual identities, which might 
be even helpful for a class movement (Gibson-Graham, 2001; Özselçuk, 2006; 
Althusser, 1979).  
 In accordance with the argument of multiple subjectivities in class, the 
relationship between class and ethnicity is worthy to examining. Oppression of the 
proletariat and oppression of the ethnic minorities are mostly intertwined when ethnic 
conflicts, which mostly have an economic side, are considered. Even, some non-
Marxists have recognized that the relationship between ethnicity and class constitutes 
the key to an understanding of ethnic conflicts (Van de Berghe, 1975, p.75), “Oliver 
Cox, even in 1949, had already placed ethnicity within the context of power, political 
ideology and class” (as cited in Bourgois, 1988, p. 328). Class with its renewed 
definitions which do not go very far away from its origin, therefore, is in relation with 
the ‘newer’ dimension: ethnicity.  
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CHAPTER III: TRADE UNIONS AND THE KURDISH QUESTION IN 
TURKEY 
 
3.1. Trade Unions  
The first section of this chapter aims to explain mainly two periods of unionism 
in Turkey; the 1960s-1980s and the 1980s-today through understanding their ties with 
political ideologies and political parties. Giving clues about validity and popularity of 
class in social stratification, this tie will help to comprehend trade unions’ views on the 
Kurdish question which will be deeply analyzed in the second section of the chapter.  
Trade unions are defined, by the Marxist tradition, as means of organization for 
the proletariat struggle which would come to an end by the communist revolution.  
Trade unions have been mostly moved away from this definition and survived in the 
capitalist societies in order to protect and enhance workers rights and working 
conditions today. They have, however, gained a political character, from time to time, 
promoting ‘the working class struggle’ for which unions attempted to take action in the 
fields of economy, politics, and society.  
In the Turkish context, unionism was legalized in 1946 by the abolition of an 
article of the Associations Law of 1924 which prohibited organization based on classes. 
In 1947, however, trade unions which were organized with the help of some socialist 
parties were closed since the government found class unionism dangerously politicized 
(Mahiroğulları, 2003). By the 1960s, unionism in Turkey gained a more powerful 
stance, grounding on workers rather than political authorities in accordance their major 
roles. As unionism attracted more workers, socialist political parties started to have 
closer relations with trade unions. Especially, the left-wing parties of the 1970s in 
Turkey had very powerful ties with the working class, and were effective on worker and 
unionist movements (Şafak, 2013). After the 1980 Military Coup, unionism was 
weakened through the legal limitations and neo-liberal economic policies, and relations 
between political party and trade unions were transformed. In line with the argument 
that ‘class as an obsolete variable’, unionism’s academic popularity has declined after 
the 1980s, too. However, it is not very difficult to claim that some Turkish trade unions, 
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today, have dissidence on political ideologies, which affects their relations with political 
parties and struggle against the capitalist.  
 
3.1.1. Unionism in the 1960s-80s 
 
3.1.1.1. The Background  
 
By the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the Kemalist ideology promoted an 
interventionist role in the economy in order to reach rapid industrialization through 
making reforms, which were designed to control or restrain the working class 
organizations. To do so, by the Labor Code of 1936, the right for workers and 
employers to found unions or associations, particularly in economic sectors was 
abolished. Consequently, forming associations based on class interests was prohibited 
by the Law of Associations of 1938 (Keyder, 1987). In addition, these policies 
supported the industrial growth by low wages and long working hours, which would 
lead to declining the working class support for the Republican People’s Party, the 
CHP1. 
The attempts for democratization2 by introducing multi-party system and the US 
pressures for democratization, the discontent with the single party rule and socio-
economic transformations of Turkey somewhat activated the working class activism 
(Mello, 2007). The opposition parties—especially the Democrat Party (the DP)—tried 
to take an advantage from these circumstances through attracting the working class. 
During the discussions on the Labor Law in the Parliament, for example, the DP 
1 The CHP was founded in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who was the founding 
leader of the Turkish Republic. It grounded its ideology on the six principles; 
nationalism, republicanism, secularism, etatism, populism, reformism, which underlies 
the Kemalist ideology.  
2 During the single party rule governed by the CHP, although parliamentary regime was 
in force, both the government and the parliament were formed by the CHP, without a 
democratic structure in today’s understanding. Beginning in 1919, the single party 
period lasted to 1946 when the Democrat Party, the DP, joined in the elections. 
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passionately advocated the workers’ right to strike which increased its prestige in the 
eyes of the workers (Mahiroğulları, 2003). In response to this support, the CHP 
government, in 1946, removed permission requisites for forming associations, and the 
ban on forming class based associations3 
The first wave unionism was mainly headed by socialist people and parties, such 
as the Socialist Party of Turkey (the TSP) and the Socialist Worker and Peasant Party of 
Turkey (the TSEKP). In 1946, the CHP government, however, suspected those trade 
unions and political parties by accusing them for “being fanatic communists who 
implicitly intended to ruin the order” (Sülker, 1976, p.60), and closed them in the same 
year, 1946. Although the CHP criticized these trade unions for having direct relations 
with the political parties it formed partisan trade unions4 or tried to attract the existent 
unions, after enacting the Trade Union Act in 19475. The DP chose the same way with 
the CHP through founding opponent trade unions6 in spite of the legal ban on political 
activity of trade unions. After the victory of the DP in the general elections of 1950, 
however, it did not even introduce a bill to legalize the right to strike during its ten-year-
governance.  
Despite the dependency of trade unions on the political parties on power, the 
CHP or the DP, important steps for labor movement were taken in this period, 
especially with the foundation of the first national confederation, the Confederation of 
Turkish Labor Unions (TURK-IS), in 1952. In accordance with the political and 
economic atmosphere of Turkey, with the help of the financial support of the US which 
aimed to balance employee-employer relations in industrial societies to prevent 
‘marginalization’—referring to being away from the Soviet system—, the working class 
organizations were strengthened, and TURK-IS had a significant growth in number in 
ten years. However, free unionism was doubtful, since 
3 In accordance with the law no. 4919, 5 June 1946 (Mahiroğulları, 2005, p.53). 
4 For example, İstanbul Labor Unions Association was founded under the guidance of 
the CHP in 1948 (Işıklı, 1995, p.159). 
5 The law no. 5018 on 20 February 1947 (Mahiroğulları, 2005, p.58). 
6 Free Labor Unions Association, founded in 1950 (Mahiroğulları, 2003, p.5). 
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“DP officials recognized the emergence of TURK-IS¸ as an opportunity to 
cut off any militancy of rank-and-file union members and control the 
union movement through ties with its leadership. Subsequently, the DP 
aligned with TURK-IS¸ in a semi-corporatist relationship...In essence, in 
an effort to prevent political action based on class interests, the state, under 
the DP, continued to control and limit the political action of working-class 
organizations” (Mello, 2007, p.216).  
 
Although the DP period provided legislation aimed to benefit the working class 
interests, such as “paid weekends, a minimum wage and extensions of the scope of 
social security” (Koç, 1999, p.36-37), it maintained state dependent unionism, like the 
CHP.  
 
3.1.1.2. The Political Atmosphere and Trade Unions in the 1960s 
 The Military coup of the 19607 ended the DP government undemocratically; 
however, it opened up a way for liberalized governance of Turkey with a liberalized 
constitution. After the Coup, the constituent assembly which included six worker 
representatives prepared a constitutional draft that was adopted on 9 July 1961 
(Mahiroğulları, 2005). The new constitution defined the Turkish state as a social state, 
guaranteeing the protection of freedoms and rights of the Turkish people. Labor 
organizations were also encouraged by the provisions of the right to organize, strike and 
collective bargaining8 (Yazıcı, 2003). The absolute ban on political activities of trade 
unions was loosened, since during the discussion on the 1961 Constitution, it was stated 
that an absolute ban on political activities of trade unions prevented free unionism and 
caused threats for its development (Tuncay, 1981).  
Economic policies after the Coup also shaped the social and political 
environment. Unlike the DP era, economic policies were grounded on a planned base in 
line with the social state understanding, which gave a rise to industrialization and 
7 The 1960 coup took place by the Turkish army under the leadership of Cemal Gürsel. 
Mainly accused of violating the constitution, three statemen, including the prime 
minister Adnan Menderes were executed.  
8 It is important to note that these rights were also acquisitons of big worker 
demonstrations and strikes which put pressure to the government, such as the Saraçhane 
demonstration and the Kavel Resistance that were headed by TURK-IS. 
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caused a social change by modernization and urbanization (Koray, 1994). 
Consequently, the numerical growth of workers by the economic and social 
transformation, and the liberal political atmosphere facilitated workers organizations. 
As Karpat (1973) demonstrates, “the constitutional rights granted to labor, the 
sympathetic intellectual interests in the workers’ problems, the regime of freedom after 
the elections of 1961, and the weak coalition governments from 1961 to 1965 created 
favorable conditions for labor activities” (p. 273). 
In accordance with these developments, the idea of forming a political party to 
advocate workers rights in the Parliament by some unionists9 could be put in practice in 
1961. The first workers’ party was called the Workers’ Party of Turkey (the TIP). When 
it was criticized with not having a clear and sufficient organization plan, the TIP 
decided to attract and call upon such intellectuals as Nadir Nadi, Yaşar Kemal, Mehmet 
Ali Aybar, to have them in the party administration. Consequently, M. Ali Aybar was 
elected as the president of the TIP in 1962. Although the party code of the TIP did not 
have any discourse related to socialism in its first year, its ideology was clearly shaped 
along the socialist line by M. Ali Aybar (Mahiroğulları, 2005).  The foundation of the 
TIP by the unionists and its socialist line brought a new dimension to unionism through 
introducing ideological unionism, which helped the working class to be politicized in a 
socialist manner. The 68 spirit which began in the mid-1960s by the leftist/socialist 
youth movement, moreover, supported the politicization of the working class and 
unionism (Şafak, 2013).  
  Under the leadership of the TIP, a single-handed and socialist class struggle in 
Turkey was aimed. At this point some members of TIP clashed with TURK-IS who 
drafted the axiom of Politics of above Parties and adopted ‘patriotic unionism’10 
(Özuğurlu, 1994, p. 181). TURK-IS accused some TIP members in the confederation of 
9 These union leaders, especially within the body of Istanbul Labor Unions Association, 
were Kemal Türkler, Avni Erakalın, Şaban Yıldız, Salih Özkarabay, İbrahim Güzelce, 
Ahmet Muşlu, Rıza Kuas, Kemal Nebioğlu, Hüseyin Uslubaş, Saffet Göksüzoğlu, 
Adnan Arıkan, İbrahim Denizciler (Koç, 2000, p. 129).  
10 This rhetoric is explained by Özuğurlu  (1994) that TURK-IŞ, actually, did not aim to 
be away from politics. On the contrary, by being closer to the governments, it defined 
itself as patriotic.  
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being communist and rejected their new understanding of unionism, called as 
syndicalism (class unionism), which “advocated pragmatic adoption and use of a mix of 
liberal and socialist ideas, all for the workers’ interest” (Blind, 2007, p. 294-295). These 
ideological clashes and isolations of TIP members from TURK-IS encouraged TIP 
members11 to form a new confederation, the Revolutionary Labor Unions Confederation 
(DISK) in 1967. The main reasons of this split were explained as “first, TURK-IS was 
not a genuine worker organization; second, TURK-IS was based on American aid; and 
third, TURK-IS’s adherence to the axiom of Politics of above Parties did not work as 
intended12” (Blind, 2007, p. 295). In line with the TIP, DISK aimed to and worked for a 
socialist class struggle rather than reconciliatory unionism. 
 Unionism and the socialist left, therefore, went together in the 1960s, which 
strengthened the both. This togetherness improved class awareness of workers, as Mello 
(2007) summarizes that 
“Labor movement activists did interpret the early 1960s as an opportunity 
for advancing movement activism. Taken together, these aspects of labor 
activism in the early 1960s indicate how labor activists expanded their 
effort to link together previously unconnected elements of the Turkish the 
working class, as well as to establish new boundaries of the working class 
solidarity based on socialist ideas” (Mello, 2007, p. 221).  
 
 
 
3.1.1.3. The Era of ‘Active’ Unionism; the 1970s 
 
The rise and improvement of unionism in the 1960s led it to be practiced most 
efficiently and rapidly in the 1970s.  One of the significant actors of this improvement 
was undoubtedly DISK (Şafak, 2013). After its foundation, for example, it was stated 
by a DISK representative that  
 
11 The founding administrative body of DISK consisted of some of the founders of the 
TIP, for example Kemal Türkler, İbrahim Güzelce, Rıza Kuas and Kemal Nebioğlu 
(Mahiroğulları, 2005, p. 190).  
12 This reason was explained in the way that TURK-IS had a tendency of having close 
relations with the parties on power (Sülker, 1969, p. 87-88).  
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“Our confederation’s strengthening of the working class in the country’s 
administration will vanquish slavery and establish an order with the goal 
of equality and brotherhood from every direction, and will guarantee that 
the working class will play an influential role in [solving] the country’s 
problems” (cited in Mello, 2007, p. 222). 
 
In that era, the 15th -16th September (Worker) Resistance in 1970 passed into Turkish 
history as one of the biggest political general strikes. In 1970, the government of the AP 
(the Justice Party) passed a bill to change the 1963 Unions Law, aiming to limit the 
freedom of choosing a union and damage DISK13. Under the leadership of DISK, mass 
demonstrations of workers took place especially in Istanbul, Kocaeli and Ankara. Some 
members of TURK-IS also participated in the march, and the resistance went beyond 
DISK and unionism. The left took lessons from this resistance, and unionist/socialist 
theorization was grounded on the idea that class struggle had to be led by the working 
class (Şafak, 2013). In line with these events, after the TIP’s application to the 
Constitutional Court for the law’s cancellation, the law on higher thresholds for forming 
a federation has been cancelled.  
After the cancellation of the law, the rise of leftist ideologies in unionism took a 
fast phase. In 1974, MADEN-IŞ (the union of mine workers) opened a new way with a 
socialist cadre. Similarly, in 1975, DISK chose İbrahim Güzelce as the general secretary 
and Aydın Meriç who was a member of TKP Politburo (the Turkish Communist Party) 
as the vice general secretary (Şafak, 2013). In the years between 1975 and 1977, the 
TKP dominated DISK and MADEN-IŞ with its revisionist line. Under the dominance of 
the TKP, DISK headed significant mass and political labor demonstrations. It organized 
a big campaign for democratic rights and freedoms, in 1975; provided the 1st May with 
being celebrated legally in 1976; organized a big resistance against state security courts 
in 1976; and educated its members to improve their class and organization 
consciousness (Mahiroğulları, 2005). Although DISK was accused of being responsible 
of the 1st May 1977 demonstration (the bloody 1st May) in which 37 people died; a 
13 The goverment was uncomfortable with the competition between DISK and TURK-
IS, and chosed to close down DISK through setting high theresholds for forming a 
federation (Şafak, 2013, p.125). It was also claimed that TURK-IS cooperated with the 
AP for this bill (Aydoğanoğlu, online http://www.ozgurlukdunyasi.org/arsiv/313-sayi-
245/1095-60li-yillarda-isci-sinifi-mucadelesi-ve-DISKin-kurulus-sureci ) 
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month later, MADEN-IŞ organized the ‘Big Strike’14 against MESS (the Turkish Metal 
Industrialists Union) (Şafak, 2013). The Big Strike lasted for six months with the 
participation of nearly 20 thousand workers in 63 workplaces (Şafak, 2012). However, 
political and ideological divergence in the management cadre of DISK and its member 
unions continued, which led some unionists to be purged. On the one hand, the split15 
among the left provided with diversity, creativeness and efficiency for unionism. In 
these years, collective bargaining in which competition was very effective was 
substantially prosperous. On the other hand, the competition among them—especially, 
the TKP versus the TIP—lead to disunity, damaging the leftist politics and unionist 
movements.  
Aiming a bigger and powerful organization, in 1977, the chairman of DISK, 
Kemal Türkler made an appeal regarding ‘the National Democratic Front’ (UDC) which 
was a political document of the TKP.  It was stating 
 
“The National Front—the rightist coalition in the government—is the most 
reactionary and fascist front of the capitalist. It is an immediate duty to 
gather in the UDC for people in the parliament or in organizations who 
support national independence, democracy, peace and social development, 
in order to prevent the 2nd National Front” (cited in Fuat, 2008, online) 
 
Although this appeal attracted the TKP side in DISK and some other organizations, it 
caused a power struggle among different fractions. Consequently, Abdullah Baştürk—
known as pro-CHP—was elected as the chairman of DISK after the UDC appeal, which 
largely weakened the socialist era in DISK.  
 In spite of the ideological fluctuations in unionism, class and mass unionism came 
into practice in the 1970s, mainly led by the socialist unionists. In the same line with the 
Marxist definition of trade unions, this concept ensured that unions harbored only the 
14 One of the reasons of the Big Strike which is interpreted as a ‘battle’ was to re-hire 
the workers who were fired due to the state security court resistance (Şafak, 2013, p. 
133).  
15 In addition to the splits in the leftist unions, the rightist front formed unions and 
confederations, too. The MHP (the Nationalist Action Party) founded MİSK (the 
Nationalist Labor Unions Confederation) in 1970, and the MSP (the National Salvation 
Party) established HAK-İŞ (the Confederation of Turkish Just Workers) in 1976 (Blind, 
2007, p.295). 
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working class, and took part in the economic, political and ideological struggle of the 
working class. Through adopting class and mass unionism, “DISK, on the one side, 
claimed that all workers regardless of their political opinion, world view, religion, 
language and race could be the part of mass organization; on the other side, it 
demonstrated that unions had to struggle in the light of socialism” (Şafak, 2013, p.131).  
In this direction, mass strikes in the 1970s, which included action collaborations of 
unions from different confederations16 were organized in the process of collective 
bargaining and carried out big strikes. These actions compassed a substantial part or the 
whole of a work line with a very big worker population, being politically, economically 
and socially influential across the country.  
 
3.1.2. Unionism after the 1980s  
 
3.1.2.1. The Military Coup and its Effects on Unionism in the 1980s 
 On September 12, 1980, the military seized the control of the government for the 
third time of the Turkish Republic history17. It shut down all political parties and labor 
unions confederations, except TURK-IS which explicitly supported the coup. All union 
activities were put off until 198418. However, the confederations and unions stayed 
closed for different durations. The ban on activities of HAK-IŞ, for example, was ended 
16 The collaboration of Kristal-iş—a member of TURK-IS—and Hürcam-iş—a member 
of DISK—against glass industrialists was an important example (Şafak, 2013, p. 140).  
17 The coup was held on the grounds of political chaos of the country and economic 
reasons. The rise of class and student movements in 1970s, on the one hand, led to rise 
of a leftist political environment in the country; on the other hand, it was considered as a 
threat to embrace neoliberal economic structure by the Army—and the right-wing 
which was supported by the US (Savran, 1987).  The Parliament was shut down; the 
constitution was removed. For the consequences, see 
http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/459038.asp 
18 Law no. 2821 (Blind, 2007, p. 295).  
28 
 
 
                                                             
after a couple months of the coup, while DISK19 was closed until 1991 (Akkaya, 2002). 
Besides, legal losses of unionism were heavier. Koray (1994) summarizes these as,  
• Forming unions and membership: Only the people who had service contract 
could be a member of a trade union under the condition of informing the 
employer. 
• Union activities: Political activities of unions were substantially limited, 
stating that unions could never pursue political aims; be engaged in political 
activities; and have relations and cooperate with political parties.  
• The authority of collective bargaining: To gain the authority of collective 
bargaining, unions were obliged to represent 10 percent of workers in a 
workplace.  
• Prohibition and delays of strikes: Right strikes, political strikes, general 
strikes and solidarity strikes were banned. The Council of Ministers was 
authorized with the right to delay strikes in the cases of general health and 
national security. 
Hence, the army on power and the 1983 ANAP (the Motherland Party) government 
aimed to depoliticize unionism through limiting their political impact due to the threat 
of a class based unity, which might lead to a huge opposition to the government.  
The neo-liberal economic policies, moreover, affected de-politicization of 
unionism and the working class. The government did not maintain the social state 
understanding, not following reconciliatory politics with unions. On the contrary, it 
reduced wages to provide cheap labor for the capitalist who tented to invest in export. 
So as to downsize the state, privatization was speeded up, mostly disregarding demands 
of unions (Akkaya, 2002). By the 1990s, due to the need for enlivening the domestic 
market, and rising internal pressures, the government raised wages. The increase on 
wages, however, led to firings in the private sector, de-unionization, flexible working 
forms and sub-contracting which was primarily extended in municipalities. In line with 
the economic policies, the anti-union propaganda campaign of the ANAP—under the 
leadership of Özal—“labor’s image was stained in the eyes of the public” (Blind, 2007, 
p. 296). Hence, spread of militancy and socialist ideology in unionism, especially in the 
19 Several DISK members were prosecuted and sentenced (Blind, 2007, p. 295). 
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1970s, was intentionally shown as a cause of the chaos before the coup. Özal who was 
an ex-president of MESS created this perception through using the mistakes of unions, 
which attracted workers.  
Although this ‘chaos’ was somewhat ‘ruled out’ by the coup and the ANAP 
government, it did not prevent some important demonstrations, especially the famous 
‘1989 Spring Strikes’. In that era, the conflict between TURK-IS and the ANAP 
government was observable, as well. For the first time TURK-IS left it’s axiom of 
Politics of above Parties, and openly reacted to the government through the working 
class demonstrations and anti-ANAP campaigns before the elections (Mahiroğulları, 
2005). Pressure from the below in which the working class suffered from harsh 
economic circumstances forced TURK-IS to protest. By the Spring Strikes, the working 
class with its militant and socialist sentiments made its presence felt. Due to the legal 
bans on strikes, “non-strike protest movements such as organizing meetings and 
boycotts, refusing to eat, marching barefoot, setting up roadblocks, and distributing 
press releases became widespread” (Blind, 2007, p. 297). A substantial amount of 
workers in state enterprises also participated in the strikes, which would help the 
foundation of unions of civil servants. The common feature of the strikes was that 
workers went beyond the unions, but TURK-IS embraced them.  
Even if TURK-IS did not have closer relations with the ANAP government, it 
was criticized with being ineffective in advocating workers. In 1989, 19 unions20 from 
TURK-IS declared that “the management of TURK-IS supports a kind of unionism that 
does not represent its member unions and workers, without struggling. Therefore, it has 
to support parliamentary democracy, and embrace the bread and democracy struggle of 
the working class, using the right to resistance” (Petrol-Iş, 1989, p. 338-340).  
Despite the existence of the opponent unions in TURK-IS, it has not shown a 
powerful stand against criticisms. Even if it sometimes has had conflict with the 
governments, it could not escape from being accused of a ‘yellow union’ 
(Mahiroğulları, 2005, p. 409) In the 1990s, as Blind (2007) states, 
 
20 Petrol-iş, Hava-iş, Yol-iş, Genel Maden-iş, Basın-iş, Tes-Koop-iş, Ağaç-iş, Bass, 
Türkiye Maden-iş, Tarım-iş, Harb-iş, Tümtis, Deri-iş, Kristal-iş, Likat-iş, TGS, Haver-
iş, Belediye-iş, Basisen (Koray, 1994, p. 205). 
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“It has continued to experiment time and again with patron–client type 
dealings with the governing parties. When such endeavors have failed to 
give any substantial results, it has then switched to an antigovernment 
stand, mobilizing its rank-and-file and constituting a strong opposition 
bloc questioning the policies in hand, and at times, the overall legitimacy 
of the government”(p. 302).  
 
During the ban on DISK, its members were obliged to join in other unions and 
confederations, especially TURK-IS. The numerical decline of DISK members has 
influenced it negatively21. After its re-opening in 1991, the socialist cadre of DISK has 
been weakened. Hence, it has lost its identity of class unionism in the 1960s and 1970s, 
choosing reconciliatory type of unionism which prefers cooperation with the capitalist 
and the government (Fuat, 2008).  
 
3.1.2.2. Unionism by the 2000s 
 Repressive and deterrent policies of the governments have weakened the working 
class and unionism, beginning with the 1980s. These policies have been supported by 
removal of the socialist cadre of politics and unionism. Neo-liberal economic policies 
which have increased “informal employment, high rates of unemployment, contracted 
employment, insufficient job protection, privatization, part time jobs, and 
subcontracting” (Mahiroğulları, 2002, p.179-186) have fed de-unionization. In the 
1990s, the effects of the 1980 coup have preserved its visibility in unionism; therefore, 
the 1990s passed in the similar way with the 1980s.  
 Being in power from 2002 to 2013, by the AKP (Justice and Development Party) 
government, however, unionization is are lower than the 1980s, through the 
implementations of legislation, regulations, the limited scope of collective bargaining, 
and their effects on political and social life (Çelik, 2012). While the Ministry of Labor 
declares unionization rates of 2013 as 8, 8 percent, the OECD states it as 5, 9 percent22. 
21 In 1992, while TURK-IS had 1.766.535 members, and HAK-IS had 268.035 
members, DISK had only 19.378 (Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanlığı, Çalışma 
Hayatı İstatistikleri, No:24, Ankara 1999, s. 98; calisma. gov.tr) 
22Retrieved from:  http://www.sendika.org/2013/08/en-buyuk-sendikasizlastirma-akp-
doneminde/ 
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Although the OECD countries have had a decline over time, Turkey has the lowest 
unionization rates among them23. 
 A report on anti-busting techniques of the AKP government demonstrates some of 
them as, 
• Firing unionized workers, and hiring the others to weaken unions’ authority, 
• Promoting the perception of unionism as a betrayal to the employer, 
• Provoking workers who have different political ideologies, religious beliefs 
and ethnic origins to prevent organization, 
• Eliminating unionism by informal economy and sub-contracting24 
• Forcing workers to join in pro-government unions 
• Physical and psychological strikebreaking implementations  
• Preparing blacklist of unionized workers and preventing them with being 
employed (Bakır & Akdoğan, 2009) 
 Undoubtedly, anti-government unions are negatively affected by these 
implementations. KESK (the Confederation of Public Laborer’s Unions) has lost 8 per 
cent of members, while Memur-Sen (Civil Servant Unions’ Confederation)—known as 
pro-government—has multiplied its members by fifteen (Çelik, 2012). Despite de-
unionization processes and strengthening of yellow unionism, the 2000s has 
experienced important worker demonstrations and strikes. Began in 2009, the Tekel 
Resistance which organized against privatization25, for example, has go beyond its 
union, Tekgıda-Iş, and been supported by many confederations, such as, TURK-IS, 
DISK, HAK-IS, MEMUR-SEN and KESK. A common ground has been created against 
privatization and anti-labor implementations of the government. Similarly, the 
resistance of Turkish   Airlines workers was held against the ban on right to strike of 
23 OECD Stats, November 3, 2012, Retrieved from: 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=20167. 
24 The total number of sub-contracted workers has nearly become one million 
(Cumhuriyet, 2012). Retrieved from:  http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/?hn=375338. 
25 The resistance of Tekel workers were against privatization of Tekel—the national 
tobacco company—that was sold to the British American Tobacco. Accordingly, 12 
factories were closed and approximately 12.000 workers were deployed to other public 
sector jobs, under a different status, the law known as '4C ' that cuts the payment up to 
40 % and decreases employment rights. Retrieved from: 
http://www.tekgida.org.tr/Oku/225/Tekel-Ozellestirmesinin-Sonuclari 
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civil aviation workers. It lasted for 568 days under the leadership of Hava-Iş (the Union 
of Civil Aviation Workers of Turkey) has been supported by many unions.  
 All in all, control and limitation of unionism in Turkey has not been able to 
eliminate unionism for years. In the years between 1960 and 1980, unionization gained 
a political identity mostly grounded on socialist ideology. Even though this ideology 
created some splits, unionism reached its most efficient era in terms of numerical 
growth of unionization and its social/political effectiveness. The militant and socialist 
atmosphere of unionism influenced other union members and society, shaping the 
political agenda. By the 1980s, sharp political discourse of unions has declined, but 
unions could not break away from politics, and indirectly has taken part in politics, 
being pro-government or opponent. Consequently, ideological divisions among the 
unions continue, today. It is not difficult to claim that in addition to economic 
circumstances, anti-political and weak unionism has weakened class consciousness of 
the working class by the time; however, it is debatable to argue that class perception of 
people along with weak unionism has fully lost its validity, ignoring the recent and 
ongoing strikes. 
 
 
3.2. The Kurdish Question in Turkey 
The Kurdish Question whose roots go back to the foundation of the Republic has 
gained different characteristics over time.  Due to the fact that the new Republic was 
founded on Turkishness, the Kurdish identity could not find a place to survive despite 
rebellions which were strictly suppressed. By the rise of the socialist movement of the 
left in Turkey, the Kurdish movement created a space to be developed, firstly within the 
left, then independently. During its socialist period, the Kurdish movement emphasized 
its socialist revolutionary lines, emphasizing capitalist exploitation of Kurds, in addition 
to the ethnic identity awareness. By the 1980s, however, its ethnic character has become 
more visible in the eyes of the people of Turkey. Rising nationalism in the Kurdish 
movement after the mid-1990s in accordance with the changing political and economic 
conjuncture of the world and Turkey, led the Kurdish question to be read more from an 
ethnic identity-based perspective. However, evaluating the Kurdish question with class 
33 
 
 
and ethnic dynamisms is still effective today, which provides understanding the relation 
between class and ethnicity. 
This section of the chapter will attempt to explain the evolution of the Kurdish 
question in accordance with the political, social and economic circumstances. 
Apparently, the rise of the Kurdish movement coincided with the rise of unionism in 
Turkey, both of them being fed by the same ideology; socialism in the 1960s; and 
influenced by the same political, economic and social transformations. This intersection 
would help to understand how the popularity of ‘class’ has affected both of them, giving 
clues about how the Kurdish question finds a place in unionism, today. 
 
3.2.1. The Evolution of the Kurdish Question in the Early Republican Period  
 The foundation of the Turkish Republic as a nation-state in which minorities were 
determined in accordance with their non-Muslimhood by the Treaty of Lausanne in 
1923 glorified the Turkish ethnic identity, but suppressed the others. The perception of 
‘people’s of Turkey’ which was in line with the multicultural characteristics of the 
Ottoman Empire was abandoned. Any identity based definition of ethnic minorities 
which tended to challenge Turkishness was considered as a threat to the unity of 
Turkey, and “all the ‘now-citizens’ of the Turkish Republic, including Kurds, were 
invited to become Turks” (Yeğen, 2004, p.127).With the definition of Turkish 
citizenship which has [still] an inclusive character, Kurdish identity was desired to be as 
invisible. 
 During the early period of the Republic, however, several Kurdish uprisings took 
place.  The 1925 Sheikh Said rebellion was, for example, interpreted as a reaction to the 
land reform of the Republic which encroached on the power of Kurdish notables in the 
East Anatolia (Ergil, 2000), and as a religious reaction to the secular state formation 
(Brockett, 1998). These explanations or facts helped the denials of Kurdish identity; 
however, the Dersim Rebellion of 1937 had different characters. Firstly, in the region, 
there use to be local resistance to the central power before the Republic, which led some 
tribes to refuse to disarm and give taxes for military recruitment. Secondly, unlike the 
Sheikh Said Rebellion, Alevi Kurds resided in the region had no problem with 
secularism (Orhan, 2012). These features of the rebellion made the region favorable to 
the development of Kurdish nationalism. Although people were not properly organized, 
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and the rebellions differed in regions, it is possible to claim that the first era of the 
Republic had Kurdish rebellions with ethnic sentiments. These rebellions were, though, 
harshly suppressed by the military forces, and “state killings continued until 1939” 
(Orhan, 2012, p. 352), with the signal given by the state that any movement based on 
the Kurdish identity would be prevented. This attitude of the state designated the 
movement space of the Kurdish tribes’ leaders and landlords. Since this space did not 
include doing politics, the Kurdish landlords had to choose to cooperate with and 
support the Turkish state against Kurdish nationalism (Saraçoğlu, 2006).  
 The left in the 1920s and 1930s had various attitudes towards the Kurdish 
question, in relevance with the existing international leftist ideology and the national 
political circumstances. Yeğen (2007) claims that the left, in general, with nationalistic 
and reformist approach by Kemalism, viewed the Kurdish question as a non-reformist 
action against the Republic. For example, the TKP (the Communist Party of Turkey) 
which was the only sizable communist organization of the era, consisting of Turkish 
Marxist intellectuals considered the Sheikh Said Rebel as a battle of feudalism against 
the bourgeoisie. In the party weekly, the TKP stated the rebel as the common enemy of 
both the TKP and the bourgeoisie (Tuncay, 2000). Consequently, the Kurdish question 
could not gain an ethnic identity in the eyes of the left, as well; therefore, Kurds mostly 
associated themselves with the CHP during that period, but not as being “Kurdish” until 
1961 (Oran, 2010). 
 
3.2.2. The Left in the 1960s: the Kurdish Question as a Regional Disparity, and 
Ethnic Discrimination  
 
 The 1960 junta took an oppressive stand towards Kurds from the beginning of the 
coup. Kendal (1993) stated that one of the first implementation of the junta was to 
intern 485 Kurdish notables in a camp, and to expel 55 of them to the Western cities. 
The general amnesty did not include the 49s26 who were sentenced in the DP era. 
26 In 1959, a DP deputy stated that the Kurds in Kirkuk were killing Turkmens, 
provoking retaliation for Kurds in Turkey. Kurdish intellectuals and students reacted to 
the statement. 50 of them were arrested. When one of them, a student, died, these 
people were memoralized as the 49s who would play an important role for the Kurdish 
movement (STMA, 1988, p.2110-2112).  
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Moreover, the Kurdish names of settlements were translated to Turkish. During his 
visits to the Kurdish cities, the leader of the junta and the president of the Republic, 
Cemal Gürsel, demonstrated that “there is no Kurdish nationality in this country and in 
the East….The origin of this country is Turkish” (Cited in Akkaya, 2013, p. 92).  
 Despite its discriminatory and suppressive attitude towards Kurds, the 1961 
Constitution, prepared under the leadership of the junta, created a democratic and liberal 
atmosphere in politics. Consequently, the socialist parties and publications could create 
a political sphere for themselves. The magazine, Yön (The Way), for example, discussed 
‘the Eastern Question’ by focusing on the underdevelopment and endurance of 
feudalism in the East, but shyly stating its ethno-cultural components (Yeğen, 2006). By 
the second half of 1960, however, Yön started to underline the ethnic, linguistic and 
cultural characteristics of the question. Opposing assimilation, especially, Sait 
Kırmızıtoprak and Doğan Avcıoğlu in Yön argued that the economic measures could not 
be sufficient to solve the question, without recognizing ethnic dimensions 
(Kırmızıtoprak et al, 1962; Avcıoğlu, 1966). 
 The foundation of the legal socialist party of Turkey, the TIP—founded by 
unionists who formed DISK—, moreover, provided radical changes in the political 
arena. Founded by twelve unionists, especially by the election of M. A. Aybar as the 
chairman, the TIP gained a very important and determining role in the left of Turkey 
(Samim, 1981). The Kurdish group in the TIP, called as the Easterners27, had an 
effective representation in the top ranks, which had strong influence for the Kurdish 
question to be discussed both in the TIP and the left in general. Identifying the Eastern 
question as a primary concern of the party, in its first congress of 1964, it was stated 
 
“In parallel with the economic backwardness of the region, citizens here are 
socially and culturally backward. Moreover, the citizens who speak Kurdish 
and Arabic, as well as those belonging to the Alevi sect, are exposed to 
discrimination […]. These citizens […] have not been afforded the comforts 
of citizenship that they have earned. […] TIP will treat these groups as full 
citizens”(Bozbeyli, 1970, p.324-325).  
 
27 Some important names of this group were Kemal Burkay, Mehdi Zana, Naci Kutlay, 
Tarık Ziya Ekinci and Canip Yıldırım. 
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In the 4th Congress of the TIP in 1970, substantially clear steps were taken towards 
the Kurdish question which was defined by economic, social and cultural terms. In this 
congress, the existence of Kurdish people in the East and Southeast parts of Turkey was 
accepted. The reason behind the economic backwardness of the region was explained as 
the discriminative economic and social policies of the dominant classes, in addition to 
the law of unequal development of capitalism. Therefore, it was stated that to consider 
the Kurdish question as a mere regional development problem was a chauvinist-
nationalist view of the dominant classes. In order to struggle for the rights of Kurdish 
citizens, it was announced that Kurdish and Turkish socialists should have worked 
together in direction with the struggle of socialist revolution of the working class28. Due 
to these statements, the TIP was closed by the Supreme Court in 1971. However, the 
identification of the Kurdish question as not only a problem of backwardness but also 
an ethnic and national problem opened a new way for the discussion of the question by 
the left as a whole; but it also caused some splits in the TIP and the left.  
 
3.2.2.1. The Independent Socialist Kurdish Movement in the 1960s 
 
 The social and political transformations that led left-wing ideologies to be raised 
among intellectuals and students, called as the 68 generation, Kurds in Turkey could be 
able to form their own organizations separate from or within the left of Turkey. Through 
reading translated publications on socialism, “they perceived the ‘misfortune’ of the 
Kurds as not unique to the Kurdish people but as a systemic outcome of Turkish 
imperialism in the region” (Gündoğan, 2011, p.391). Consequently, the Kurdish 
movement in that era was developed in two streams; the nationalist Kurds, inspired by 
the Barzani revolts in Iraq, who formed the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Turkey 
(TKPD) in 1965; and the socialist Kurds who formed the Revolutionary Cultural 
Hearths of the East (DDKO) in 1969 (Gündoğan, 2011). The first Kurdish nationalist 
party, the TKPD was mostly composed of the Kurdish elite who supported self-
determination program, aiming to support the Barzani movement (Akkaya, 2013). 
However, the transition of the Kurdish movement from the dominance of the elite to 
mass mobility provided Kurdish population with being more active with politics 
28 The full text of the congress is available on http://behiceboran.org/ 
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(Bozarslan, 2008). The determinant momentum of this transition was the Eastern 
Meetings, even if they were not organized by merely independent Kurdish 
organizations. In the years between 1967 and 1969, twelve meetings took place with the 
participation of 10 thousand Kurds (Elçik, 2007). Discussion among the intellectuals 
and university students about cultural and political pressure, regional disparities, and 
neglect of the East found a wide place among ordinary people. The slogans of the 
meetings, such as “We stand together with all those who fight against Fascism and 
imperialism”, “Respect for our language”, and “The destiny of the east is hunger, 
unemployment and disdain” (Cited in Gündoğan, 2011, p. 414) underlined the 
mobilization of the left of Turkey—under the leadership of the TIP—and Kurdish 
people, defining the Kurdish question from an economic, political and cultural 
perspective. 
The second stream of the Kurdish movement, the DDKO was founded through 
the momentum brought by the Eastern Meetings. By being the first legal Kurdish 
organization, it firstly made the question as ‘Kurdish’, rather than ‘Eastern’, inspiring 
many of the future Kurdish organizations (Bucak, 1986).  The foundation of the DDKO 
was a separation point from the left of Turkey and the Kurdish movement in Iraq. It 
went beyond being an elite organization by mobilizing different segments of the society 
and the Kurdish youth. The DDKO with its socialist tendency, unlike the TKPD, 
became a source for the Kurdish socialist line through separating from the left in Turkey 
(Akkaya, 2013). Hence, the process of gaining autonomy of the Kurdish movement 
coincided with the dominance of the socialist ideology on the Kurdish activists. As 
Bozarslan (2008) points out “even if it did not leave classical nationalist themes, the 
Kurdish movement in Turkey gained a post-nationalist character, perceiving itself as a 
part of peasant-worker movement and people who fought against imperialism” (p. 855).  
 
3.2.3. The 1970s: Is Kurdistan a Colony, or not? 
The 1971 coup intimidated both the socialist and Kurdish movements. The 
cadres of the socialist and Kurdish organizations were exiled or arrested. However, the 
leftist and Kurdish movements gained momentum by the 1970s. Unlike in the 1960s, 
though, after the General Amnesty of 1974, Turkish and Kurdish socialists began to 
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organize separately. This separation was grounded on the thesis that ‘Kurdistan is a 
colony’.  
With regards to the Kurdish movement, the thesis of the ‘Kurdistan is a colony’ 
was put forward by Sait Kırmızıtoprak (Dr. Şıvan) who was a writer of Yön. The 
development of the thesis on the Marxist base was carried out by Kemal Burkay, as 
early as 1973 (Akkaya, 2013). By the mid-1970s, all Kurdish organizations29 took the 
thesis that ‘Kurdistan is a colony’ as a base for their struggle. In its discussions, the 
magazine, Özgürlük Yolu (1977), founded by Kemal Burkay, suggested “the working 
class, and other proletarian rank and file in terms of their own interests embraced and 
shaped the national problem” (p.18). Similarly, Rızgarî (1977) stated “the national 
problem of today was not only a problem of getting rid of the national pressure, but also 
a movement of getting rid of imperialism, colonialism and exploitation (p. 11). These 
statements of the Kurdish front intersected the working class exploitation with the 
ethnic/cultural oppression of Kurds. Although the other socialist organizations of 
Turkey made a similar connection between the two, defining the Kurdish question in 
terms of colonization caused disagreements with the autonomous Kurdish movement. 
The disagreement was based on the argument by almost every Turkish leftist 
organization30 was that while Turkey was a semi/new colony, it could not be a colonizer 
(Jongerden & Akkaya, 2013). The magazine, Ürün, published by the TKP, for example, 
blamed this thesis of being a weapon that was used by the separatist bourgeoisie to 
damage the proletarian unity of different nations (in Özgürlük Yolu, 1977). Since the 
TKP did not clearly separate the Kurdish question from the socialist struggle, it believed 
that the proletarian dominance in a socialist system would solve the national questions, 
by itself. The similar discussion regarding the colony thesis, Devrimci Yol (Dev-Yol) 
which was the most aggregate leftist organization of the era, demonstrated that the 
stratification in Turkey was defined in terms of classes, not nationalities; hence, all 
oppressed classes in the country should struggle against the dominant classes, regardless 
29 Akkaya (2013) categorizes these groups in three; the traditional Kurdish nationalists, 
the TKPD-KUK with the TKPD orign; the representatives of autonomous Kurdish 
movements, Rızgari, Kawa, and the DDKD-KIP with DDKO orign; and sourced by the 
socialist movement, the PSK, Tékoşin, and the PKK (p.102).  
30 Kurtuluş was the only Turkish leftist organization which accepted the thesis of 
‘Kurdistan is a colony’ (Yeğen, 2007). 
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of their nationalities (Dev-Yol, 1977a, 1977b). Dev-Yol (1978a) defined the relationship 
between Kurds and Turks as the relationship between the oppressed and oppressor; 
however, since Turkey was dependent to imperialism, it could not have colonial 
relations. Indeed, except the discussions about colonization of Kurdistan, the majority 
of the left approved the national nature of the Kurdish question. Moreover, they 
recognized the right to self-determination of the Kurdish nation, in line with the 
Leninist ideology (Yeğen, 2007). Although they embraced similar ideologies on 
socialism and the Kurdish question, the idea of the Kurdish movement’s being 
independent from the socialist movement in line with the thesis of the ‘Kurdistan is a 
colony’ caused the left going to different directions.  
 
3.2.3.1. The PKK: Socialist, Independent and Kurdish Armed Struggle 
None of the Kurdish organizations in the 1970s rejected armed struggle, 
theoretically; however, most of them was in favor of initial ideological political 
awakening and organization, except the PKK (the Workers’ Party of Kurdistan). Being 
involved in the Kurdish organizations which were inspired by the socialist movement of 
Turkey31, the PKK was organized militarily, beginning in 1977 under the leadership of 
Abdullan Öcalan. After the foundation of the party in 1978, its charter called for a 
Marxist revolution (Philips, 2008), with hammer and sickle signs on its flag. 
Developing around Öcalan’s charismatic leadership, the PKK succeeded to put its 
theory into practice, through not being affected by the negative developments in the 
South Kurdistan; creating its own discourse apart from the socialist countries’; and 
raising professional militant cadres, forming an illegal organization (Akkaya, 2013). 
The success of the PKK in its early years was also explained by the fact that it could use 
the existing conflicts between the landlords and peasants through fighting against 
landlords, which helped it to gain the support of the peasants (Romano, 2006). In 
addition to the Marxist line, it was observable that the PKK’s mass mobilization was 
also fed by Kurdish nationalism, especially after 1980s, in accordance with political and 
economic changes across the world, as Romano (2006) underlines “[w]hat seems to 
differentiate the PKK from its local competitors is a strategy which would appeal to 
31 A founder of the THKP-C, Mahir Çayan supported ‘the Politicized Armed Strategy’ 
which inspired the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan (Akkaya, 2013). 
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people who initially cared little for its Marxist–Leninist ideology or a politicized 
Kurdish ethnic nationalism” (Cited in Güneş, 2012, p. 249). 
 
3.2.4. The 1980s and Afterwards 
 The military regime in Turkey between the years of 1980 and 1983 aimed to crush 
the Kurdish movement, as well as the left and the trade unions. Almost every Kurdish 
political activist was arrested and tortured in prisons (Güneş, 2012). The denial of the 
Kurdish identity continued. In the late 1980s, several southeastern provinces were put 
under the martial law, in addition to the declaration of state of emergency (Philips, 
2008). The broad definition of terrorism in the 1980 Constitution supported 
criminalization of politically active Kurds and any discussion about the Kurdish 
question. In addition to the armed struggle between the PKK and the Turkish army, the 
government maintained political assassination through government-backed deaths of 
‘suspected Kurds’ (Kinzer, 2006). In the years between 1989 and 1996, deaths of more 
than 1500 people remained unsolved32. These policies and implementations were fed by 
social policies, as well. In the years between 1984 and 1999, about 3700 Kurdish 
villages33 were evacuated and, around 1-3 million villagers were displaced.  
 All these acts have led a social transformation to take place in Turkey, which put 
Kurds in a disadvantaged place, politically, socially and economically. While the 
Kurdish movement with the PKK had a socialist core in its first years, by the mid-
1990s, the Kurdish movement over the years has become to be known more of an ethnic 
nationalist movement. The thesis that Kurdistan is a colony, however, is also discussed, 
today.  
 
3.2.4.1. The Kurdish Question as an Ethnic Problem 
 By weakening of the socialist left in Turkey in the 1980s, the organic tie between 
the PKK and the left was almost severed; however, the PKK preserved its Marxist 
discourse in the 1990s. At the same time, the PKK grounded its primary politics on the 
32 Turkish Human Rights Association, Annual Report 2004. 
33 IHD, http://www.ihd.org.tr/index.php/makaleler-mainmenu-125/2484-zorla-yerinden-
etme-uygulamasi.html 
41 
 
 
                                                             
project of an independent Kurdistan34, unlike the Kurdish movement before the 1980s, 
since it tried to articulate nationalism with Marxism (Saraçoğlu, 2006). After the 
collapse of the real socialism in the world, the ideology of the PKK has transformed in 
line with the liberal and conservative directions of the world. Saraçoğlu (2006) explains 
this transformation, grounding on weakening of the socialist based worker movement 
by the 1980s, which led the Kurdish poor in cities to sever its ties with socialism and the 
worker movement. Accordingly, “the PKK, by the mid-1990s, endeavored to clean out 
socialist units in the Kurdish movement” (Saraçoğlu, 2006, p.249). There have been 
several reasons that paved the way for this situation.  
 On the one hand, the domestic changes by the 1980 coup which annihilated the 
left, and neo-liberal economic policies that increased social and economic inequalities 
from which Kurds were mostly affected can be considered as the internal factors of the 
transformation of the Kurdish question with the PKK. The denial of the Kurdish identity 
by the Turkish state which has reduced the issue to economic backwardness or the 
paranoia of foreign forces has fed this transformation as well. The Kurdish movement, 
for example, was not even considered as ‘Kurdish’ before the 1980s (Çelik, 2010), 
ignoring its ethnic character but underlining different scenarios, as Ergin (2012) points 
out,  
“ […] diverse roots [were sought] behind the Kurdish issue: a bunch of 
bandits; a changing constellation of international actors, such as the USA, 
the EU, Turkey’s Arab neighbors or communists, provoking the Kurdish 
issue; or poverty and lack of education causing underdevelopment. Uniting 
this eclectic collection was a denial of Kurdish identity” (Ergin, 2012, p.6) 
 
The chronic denial of Kurdishness, therefore, might have called for a necessity of 
emphasizing the Kurdish ethnicity by the Kurdish movement.  
 On the other hand, international developments have influenced the nature of the 
Kurdish movement. Firstly, the end of the Gulf War created a ‘safe heaven’ for Kurds in 
Iraq (Yeğen, 2006, p.135), which enhanced relations between the Iraqi Kurds and the 
PKK. These relations also made the PKK come closer to the ideology of the Kurdish 
movement in Iraq which put an emphasis on nationalism more clearly than socialism 
(Saraçoğlu, 2006). Secondly, the popularizations of human rights and identity politics, 
34 In 1995, the 5th congress of the PKK called for a ‘democratic and united Kurdistan’ 
(Serxwebûn, January 1995) 
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and the process of the European Union (EU) accession of Turkey have opened a way for 
Kurds to be heard in the international arena. Rising the non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) on human rights or ethnic identities have helped Kurds to sue the state for their 
violated social, political and cultural rights. For example, Çelik (2005, p.986) claims 
that “in late 1990s, the vocabulary of the European Court entered into the lives of those 
who believed that their rights are violated”, by NGOs or individual applications.   
Regarding Turkey’s candidacy of the EU, Turkey has been exposed to deal with human 
right violations and the cultural rights of Kurds (Çelik, 2005). The emphasis on the 
cultural rights has also emphasized the ethnic nature of the Kurdish problem. To sum 
up, Sakallıoğlu (1998, p.73) states “the rise of Kurdish nationalism in the 1990s has to 
do with such international and domestic developments as the 1991 Gulf War, and the 
growing strength of ideas concerning identity, difference, cultural and human rights”.   
 The discourse of the latest pro-Kurdish party, the BDP (the Peace and Democracy 
Party) in Turkey is in this direction, underlining cultural rights of Kurds in a democratic 
autonomous system of governance. The party bylaw defines the BDP as, “libertarian, 
egalitarian, just, peaceable, pluralist, participatory, opposing all kinds of discrimination, 
human and society focused,…, adopting democratic local-horizontal governance,…, the 
left-wing mass party” (the BDP bylaw, Art. 2). Although the BDP defines itself as 
leftist, it avoids from having a radical left discourse, not using the concepts of labor, 
exploitation, or socialism in its bylaw, unlike the Kurdish movement before the mid-
1990s. Rather, it declares that it supports  
 
“a political and social structure which provides exercising individual, 
collective, political, economic, social and cultural rights and freedoms, 
effectively; and it struggles for education in mother tongue for everyone, 
and settlement for the democratic understanding in the fields of the media, 
thought, and art and culture” (the BDP bylaw, Art. 3 (e) ).  
 
Accordingly, today’s Kurdish Movement is mostly interpreted as having an ideological 
change, diverging from its proletarian revolutionary line. Yükselen (2013), for example, 
argues that even if the Kurdish Movement has sustained its existence with the rural and 
urban poor and labor, it cooperated with the Kurdish bourgeoisie at the political level. 
Although it has helped the movement to be heard and discussed politically, it also has 
damaged its class dimension. Yükselen (2013) suggests that it has been forgotten that 
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the abbreviation of the PKK stands for the Workers’ Party of Kurdistan while the 
movement has developed in the national sense, but blurring in the socio-class sense. 
Thus, As Benlisoy (2012) demonstrates that as every movement with national 
characteristic, the political themes of today’s Kurdish movement is more concerned 
with democracy, political rights and self-governance, without politicization of 
Kurdishness with class concepts.  
 
3.2.4.2. The Kurdish Question as a class and ethnic based problem 
 The Kurdish question which has been mostly defined from two separate 
perspectives; merely ethnic based, or merely class based might lead to disregard the 
dynamics between class and ethnicity. Indeed, the national questions are generally not 
merely based on ethnic identities or cultural rights, but these identities contain economic 
suppressed/suppressor relations, and intertwine with class based suppression (Benlisoy, 
2012). Çiçek (2012) also points out “in the context of the Kurdish question, it is 
impossible to understand class relations refrained from ethnicity; nor can one 
understand ethnicity in separation from class relations” (p.11). Class and ethnicity 
interaction-based explanation of the Kurdish question which İsmail Beşikçi was one of 
the pioneers of its theorization is also being discussed, today. This view criticizes the 
Marxist ideology of being insufficient to explain colonization processes that are 
influenced by ethnic dimensions, in addition to class (Loomba, 2000,; Fanon, 1963,; 
Şeriati, 2009). Loomba (2000), for example, argues that on the one hand, colonial 
regimes relate class relations with ethnic and cultural differences in the international 
level; on the other hand, they articulate ethnic and cultural differences in the domestic 
level with the class relations. Similarly, Fanon (1963) also states “in the colonies, 
economy is both base and superstructure. You may be rich, because you are white, and 
since you are rich, you are white” (p.40). Adopting the thesis that Kurdistan as a colony, 
this perspective underlines the dynamics between cultural assimilation of Kurds which 
have served for the development of the capitalism and socioeconomic inequalities 
which deliberately created for Kurds. Hence, Beşikçi (1992) argues that “ethnic and 
socio-economic aspects of the East problem are in total” (p.675). According to him, 
although the Turkish state reduced the problem to merely economic backwardness, it 
has aimed to prevent the Kurdish region from being capitalized through cooperating 
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with the feudal system that has been kept away from Kurdish nationalism. Hence, it is 
not surprising that almost whole parts of the Kurdish region were determined as the 
poorest region of Turkey by a report by the Ministry of Economics in 201235.  
Moreover, by the internal displacement policy, Kurds in metropolis have become the 
cheapest labors in the informal employment (Kaygalak, 2001; Yörük, 2009), creating 
the lowest layer in the working class in terms of wages and working standards.  
 Çiçek (2012) acknowledges that the Kurdish middle class politics tend to reduce 
the Kurdish question to an ethnic identity problem, especially in the years between 1999 
and 2005. The reasons behind that are explained by Çiçek (2012) as the dominance of 
liberal civil society organizations, the rise of the AKP’s and the BDP’s middle class in 
the region, and the dominance of the middle class in the legal Kurdish movement. It is 
interpreted that the new Kurdish middle class tends to focus more on the recognition of 
Kurdish identity in law with a reconciliatory and moderate way rather than a 
confrontational and bitter way (Benlisoy, 2012). This explanation of the Kurdish 
question is in line with the first era of the independent Kurdish movement which was 
fed by socialism. Accordingly, Gündoğan (2011) evaluates today’s Kurdish movement 
by stating that “following their predecessors, today Kurdish activists question not 
merely this reified national territory but also the repercussions of current market-
oriented policies as well as other suppressive practices and ideologies embedded in that 
territory” ( p. 416). 
 Whether does today’s Kurdish movement as a whole embrace this understanding 
or not, the Turkish state’s approach to the Kurdish question is in line with the 
transformed nature of the Kurdish movement.  In contrary with the former policies of 
the Turkish state, the most recent developments regarding the Kurdish question are 
interpreted as the efforts for capitalization of the Kurdish region to integrate Kurds in 
the capitalist system (Küçük, 2013;, Üstündağ, 2013). The AKP government’s Kurdish 
35 The Ministry of Economics, 6 April 2012, Retrieved from: 
http://www.ekonomi.gov.tr/upload/459D1E1B-AD17-FF9A-
A40AC03569331A85/6_Nisan_Sunum_son.pdf.  
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initiative in 2009 and the democratization package of 201336 in the peace process by the 
PKK’s disarmament also tended to response to these cultural and political demands of 
Kurds. Some of these measurements are, in 2009, changing names of towns and cities 
back to their original Kurdish names; lifting a ban on private television channels 
broadcasting in Kurdish37; and in 2013, the right to education in mother tongue in 
private schools; allowing for political propaganda in non-Turkish languages and 
dialects. Concerning the democratization package of the AKP which provides education 
in mother tongue in private schools, Küçük (2013) for example, suggests that it 
supposedly responds the demand of equality of Kurds through privatization and 
commoditization of the right to education in mother tongue. Consequently, it creates a 
division between Kurds as the ones who are eligible to use their right to education in 
Kurdish, and those who are unworthy to enjoy this right: the poor. Moreover, this 
neoliberal logic asserts itself in the meeting of Turkish Prime Minister, Erdoğan and the 
President of the Governing Council of Iraq, Barzani in Diyarbakır38. Aiming to establish 
new alliances for security or new trade agreements on oil and gas, the AKP seeks to 
create a new middle class of Kurds who feel less discriminated by being eligible to 
benefit from both the capitalist system and cultural rights (Üstündağ, 2013), leading to 
individual integration of Kurds. Consequently, the AKP’s new attitude towards the 
Kurdish question can be interpreted as new ways of creating a new middle class of 
Kurds who enjoy cultural rights through provided economic opportunities, and 
integrating the Kurdish poor who has been dispossessed, criminalized, and 
36By the negotiations between the government and the PKK, the PKK decided on 
disarmament to be integrated to the political system. To respond the ceasefire with 
constitutional and legal reforms, on September 30, 2013, a democratization package 
was introduced by the AKP government. The demands of the Kurdish front were mostly 
related with political autonomy of the region, abolition of 10 percent electoral threshold, 
and cultural rights of Kurds. The government responded these demands by only 
providing the right to education in mother tongue in private schools, and allowing for 
political propaganda in different languages and dialects (Alptekin & Tafolar, 2013). 
37 Kurdistan Commentary, 15 November 2009 
http://kurdistancommentary.wordpress.com/2009/11/15/akps-kurdish-initiative/ 
38 The Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan met Barzani in Diyarbakır on November 16, 
2013, in order to accelerate the peace process. For the first time, Erdoğan called the 
Kurdish region as ‘Kurdistan’, and exiled Kurdish artist Şivan Perwer came to the 
meeting. Retrieved from: http://www.zaman.com.tr/dunya_erdogan-barzani-
bulusmasinda-sivan-perwer-surprizi_2166344.html 
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subcontracted in metropolis into the system without the provision of rights. By doing so, 
the Kurdish middle class can be tamed and stop supporting the Kurdish movement 
whose base consists of the poor and the labor. Hence, this approach might lead the 
Kurdish movement to weaken its ties with the working class, and the Kurdish question 
to be considered as a mere identity based problem. 
 In addition, ideological divisions in the left, as it is touched on in the first section, 
have sustained ignorance of the class dimension of the Kurdish question. Benlisoy 
(2012) argues that substantial segment of the left—including the trade unions—defines 
the fight against neo-liberalism through using a patriotic and anti-imperialist discourse. 
This approach in the left paves a way for a nationalistic and discriminative attitude 
towards the Kurdish question, which defines the causes of the question grounding on 
‘imperialist forces’. Moreover, the trade unions’ protests against privatization, which 
are based on the slogan of ‘vatan satılamaz39’, promote a nationalistic discourse, 
alienating Kurds from the left of Turkey and the trade unions. In addition to ideological 
alienation, in the first place, Kurds rarely find a place in unionism due to working in the 
informal economic sector without social security (Benlisoy, 2012). Consequently, the 
separation between the Kurdish movement and the left has been clinched, today, leading 
to mostly disregard the discussion of the Kurdish question grounding on the two 
dimensions; class and ethnicity. Thus, a perspective which discusses class and ethnic 
based nature of the Kurdish question brings a new outlook for the question itself and the 
capitalist system in which class as a determining variable that is disregarded.  
 
 All in all, while rise of unionism coincides with the rise of the Kurdish movement 
in Turkey in the 1960s-70s, they have mostly become detached, today. The political 
conjuncture of Turkey and the world in the 1960s and the 1970s provided both of them 
with showing their powerful existence in the political arena. The socialist line of 
unionism and the left of Turkey helped the Kurdish question to be heard more publicly, 
while the Kurdish movement began to appear in the political scene. However, by the 
mid-1970s, ideological divisions in the left and the Kurdish movement itself caused 
39 It refers to a patriotic slogan, meaning ‘the land cannot be solved’. This statement is 
mostly used against privatization of public properties which is considered as treason 
when they are sold to the foreign capital. As an example, see 
http://sozcu.com.tr/2013/gunun-icinden/ozellestirmeye-karsi-cadirli-nobet-182380/ 
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separations between them. While some segments of the left and unionism began to 
insist on the Marxist approach on class which prioritizes class dimension, directly or 
indirectly leading to suppression of other identities, the Kurdish Movement moved 
towards an approach that defined the question in terms of multiple dimensions; class 
and ethnicity. Over time, this separation has increased. By the 1980s, attacks to the left 
have decreased its momentum substantially whereas the Kurdish Movement’s emphasis 
on the Kurdish ethnic identity has become more visible. Removal of the socialist cadre 
of the unions and limitations on unionization by neoliberal policies of the governments 
has led unionism to be weakened and de-politicized. Through de-politicization of 
unionism—in addition to weakening of the left—the unions ideologically have become 
distant from being interested in the Kurdish question which is more commonly 
interpreted from an ethnic based perspective. It will be analyzed how all these reflect on 
the interpretation of the Kurdish question by the unions.  
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CHAPTER IV: METHODOLOGY 
4.1. The Scope of the Research  
This study is an example of qualitative and exploratory research. Exploratory 
research aims “(1) to scope out the magnitude or extent of a particular phenomenon, 
problem, or behavior, (2) to generate some initial ideas about that phenomenon, or (3) to 
test the feasibility of undertaking a more extensive study regarding that phenomenon” 
(Bhattacherjee, 2012, p.6)  through conducting generally secondary data, in-depth 
interviews or case studies.  This study is also categorized as an explanatory research 
which seeks to answer the question of “How do trade union members—as class based 
organizations—interpret the Kurdish question in Turkey?”, aiming to understand the 
relationship between class and ethnic identities. Unlike an explanatory research, since 
exploratory research does not conduct extensive statistics, it does not tend to generalize 
the findings to population, but works on relatively small groups. Hence, this study seeks 
to analyze specifically two trade unions of Turkey; namely Petrol-Iş and Hava-Iş, 
through using secondary data and structured interviews with union managers and 
worker members in order to find out whether their definition of the working class 
intersects with their perception of the Kurdish question. This study hopes to shed a new 
light on both the discussion of class whose popularity is replaced by identity politics, 
and the Kurdish question which has more popularly been studied from an ethic identity-
based perspective through exploring the dynamics between each other. Although these 
dynamics have been discussed in the literature, this study hopes to be a valuable 
example of research on the Kurdish question which will be asked in trade unions—as 
class based organizations.  
 
4.2. The Research Approach 
4.2.1. Methodology of Data Collection  
In line with qualitative and exploratory research, the study conducted structured 
interviews, using them as the fundamental data, and collected secondary data.  Firstly, 
structured interviews seek to yield insights into a phenomenon, tapping the 
interpretations of those relevant to the problem. They help to compare and contrast 
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participant responses to answer the research question. However, the researcher 
sometimes has to lead participants without affecting the nature of the responses in order 
to get the answer of the question. In this study, all open-ended but different interview 
questions40 were prepared for the union managers and workers; however, their content 
was the same. While the managers were asked to answer the questions in accordance 
with the general stance of the trade union, workers were expected to share their personal 
experiences and opinions within the context. Secondly, secondary data are the data 
which has been collected and assorted by other sources (Bhattacherjee, 2012). These 
kinds of data include newspaper clippings, publications of trade unions, minutes of 
general meetings of the trade unions and data collected by other researches. The 
disadvantages of secondary data analysis are the possible false newspaper reports or 
unrepresentative-ness of publications. However, it is useful in reaching systematic 
information easily. 
The interview questions for both managers and workers composed of three basic 
parts; general questions related to the union, questions on class (specifically the working 
class), and questions on the Kurdish question. For the managers, the first part included 
general questions about the particular trade union, investigating the foundation purpose 
of the union, its activities on different cities, membership criterion, and the profile of the 
members and factors that communized them. This part aimed to find out the mission of 
the trade unions, their stance against the government or employee, and views on 
transformation of unionism in Turkey. Similarly, for workers, it was investigated in the 
first part of the interview why they were affiliated with the union, how much they were 
active, and how they were benefitted from unionization. The second part included 
questions that sought to learn the working class definitions/characters of the unions and 
its members whether they considered themselves as a member of the working class, the 
perception of class identity, and their views on ‘other’ organizations based on identities. 
The first and second parts of the interview also questioned the historical changes of 
unionism and the concept of the working class, and their reasons in order to measure 
how they were familiar with these changes and the results. Finally, the third part 
focused on the Kurdish question to investigate how they defined the Kurdish question in 
terms of its cultural, economic and political aspects, and whether they found the 
40 See Appendix A for the list of the questions.  
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Kurdish question as an obstacle for the unionist movement. Particularly for the 
managers, in this part, it was asked whether they had activities related to the Kurdish 
question. To the workers, it was asked whether they felt dissociation between Turks and 
Kurds in their workplaces. In order to understand workers’ opinions on Kurds’ everyday 
life practices, their views and experiences of speaking or listening to music in Kurdish 
were questioned. The main aim of the interview, on the one hand, was to learn whether 
the members of the trade unions can relate the oppression of the working class to the 
oppression of Kurds if they define the working class on the basis of its suppression, 
considering themselves as its members.  
From each union, one manager participated in the research. I interviewed with 
eight members of Petrol-Iş and eleven members of Hava-Iş. One to one interviews 
managers were conducted in the central offices of the unions while workers were 
interviewed in their working places. All participants were informed about the research 
and their consent on tape-recording of the interviews was received41. To interview the 
managers, I personally took appointments from them. Interviews with the managers 
lasted for more than one hour. I asked them to guide me to their members. Petrol-Iş 
arranged Bayer Chemistry and Medicine Factory in Topkapı, Istanbul which is a 
German company, introducing me with the union representative. In order to wait for 
workers’ shift, I spent four workdays at the working place. In addition to the interviews, 
I also had a chance to chat with workers in the union room for hours. I was informed by 
the union representative at Bayer about the ethnic identities of the participants before 
the interview. Three workers from Bayer were Kurdish. All participants have been 
working under the same status at Bayer, being blue-collar workers, despite having 
different levels of education. In the case of Hava-Iş, I was guided to interview the 
resisters in the Turkish Airlines Strike, since I was informed that workers who did not 
participate in the resistance would hesitate from interviewing due to the pressure of the 
employee. Therefore, I spent two days in the field of strike, at the Atatürk Airport in 
Yeşilköy, with interviewing flight attendants, technicians, and ground attendants who 
had different levels of socio-economic status (white or blue collar workers) and ethnic 
identities. However, in order to avoid biased answers, I personally contacted three non-
41 See Appendix B for the consent form.  
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strikers from Hava-Iş, and interviewed them.42 The process of finding non-strikers was 
hard for me, since some of them suggested that they really were afraid to be blacklisted 
by the employee.  
 
4.2.2. Sampling 
 
In order to answer the research question, I chose two trade unions from the 
Confederation, TURK-IS; Petrol-Iş and Hava-Iş. As it was analyzed in the third chapter, 
TURK-IS, for its foundation, has not hesitated from cooperating with the governments, 
as Blind (2007, p.302) points out “it has continued to experiment time and again with 
patron–client type dealings with the governing parties”. Hence, it was usually debatable 
whether this cooperation was in favor of the working class. As a recent example, in the 
Tekel Strike, Tekel workers resisted against privatization of the company, supported by 
many trade unions and public, Tekgıda-Iş (a member union of TURK-IS) hesitated from 
reacting against the AKP government; therefore, as Özuğurlu (2011, p.182) points out 
in his ethnographic work, '' […] right-wing section of union bureaucracies especially 
made considerable effort to nullify each planned action and consequently we witnessed 
the unusual public revolt of workers against the union bureaucracy''. As in the case of 
the Tekel Strike, TURK-IS could not escape from being accused of a yellow union. 
Consequently, the monitory declaration of 19 member unions—including Petrol-Iş and 
Hava-Iş—signaled the disagreements based on defense of the worker rights, in the 
Confederation, and they formed the Platform of Union of Forces (Sendikal Güçbirliği 
Platformu, SGBP) in collaboration with other trade unions from different 
confederations. This platform in its manifesto states 
 
• “We support class solidarity against neo-liberalism, defining the working 
class without discriminating employed-unemployed, unionized-non-
unionized or white-blue collars, calling for a pluralist, just, democratic, 
secular and social state, 
•  In order to strengthen unionization, our primary agenda is amendment of the 
constitution on the basis of guaranteeing fundamental rights and freedoms.  
We demand a social and democratic constitution which is prepared through a 
42 See Appendix C for the personal information of all participants.  
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democratic—without an election threshold—process in which all democracy 
forces participate, 
• We support independent and democratic Turkey in which identities are not 
excluded and discriminated, nature is not commodified, and gender 
segregation is ended. We consider it necessary to cooperate with 
organizations which support these demands,  
• Today, it is impossible for unionism to be distant from politics. We support 
unionism which is not directed by political parties and governments, but 
intervenes in politics” (SGBP Manifesto, n.d)43.  
 
The opponent formation in TURK-IS, on the one hand, challenges its worker 
representativeness; on the other hand, it signals the effort for class and mass unionism. 
It takes a stand concerning some problems of the country—democratization, gender 
segregation, identity based discrimination—in addition to the working class problems. 
The SGBP does not hesitate to indicate its roles in politics, as opposed to the axiom of 
Politics of above Parties of TURK-IS. It also defines the working class in accordance 
with the Marxist definition. Regarding Petrol-Iş and Hava-Iş as falling under the 
category of class and mass unionism, I aimed to explore how similar ideologies of 
unionism/class reflect on the interpretation of the Kurdish question.  
 
4.2.2.1. Petrol-Iş as a case 
 
Petrol-Iş was founded in 1950 by 23 petrol workers who were working in the 
international petrol companies44. As the manager of the union states, it has 
approximately 27 thousand members, today. Member workers are defined by the 
manager as having higher economic levels in comparison to the standards of Turkey due 
to the union conditions and the petrol sector which has high profit margins. Majority of 
the members are blue-collar workers who work with physical labor. Two thousand of its 
members are women.  Everyone who works in the sector—petrol, chemistry, rubber—
can be a member of Petrol-Iş; however, their involvement in the collective bargaining is 
determined by law. It has sixteen branches in Turkey; Adana, Adıyaman, Ankara, 
43 The publication date of the manifesto is not notified. Retrieved from 
http://www.sendikalgucbirligi.org/?page_id=9 
44 Petrol-Iş Retrieved from http://petrol-is.org.tr/sayfa/tarihce-3212 
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Aliağa, Bandırma, Batman, Bursa, Düzce, Gebze, Istanbul 1-2, Izmir, Kırıkkale, 
Kocaeli, Mersin, Trakya.  
In terms of its class and unionism understanding, Petrol-Iş has been considered 
as the leading one among the opponent formation in TURK-IS, as Blind (2007) states, 
 
“Petrol-Iş, has linked its professional activism to its collaboration with 
intellectuals and active use research, to its inner democratic workings, and 
finally, to the pressure of privatizations and the indispensable need to adapt 
to changing economic conditions. They have done this by generating 
creative multimedia tools, such as brochures, posters, and ads in 
newspapers, radio, and television” (p. 303). 
 
In its magazines and website, class and mass unionization (as opposed to yellow unions) 
is emphasized45. Most of the interviewers from Petrol-Iş agreed on the idea that it was 
one of the best trade unions in Turkey in terms of struggling on behalf of the working 
class and democratic elections of unionists, although they criticized some features of it.  
 In addition to class understanding of Petrol-Iş, it often expresses opinion on the 
Kurdish question by its managers and in their publications. The chairman of Petrol-Iş in 
the years between 1987 and 1994, Münir Ceylan, for example, was sentenced to 20 
months imprisonment due to criticizing the Anti-Terror Law46 (Petrol-Iş, 1993) through 
defining deaths, torture and exploitation in the Kurdish regions as ‘state terror’. 
Moreover, Petrol-Iş is significant in terms of representation of Kurdish workers in the 
Kurdish region of Turkey, Adana, Adıyaman and Batman. Being a BDP partisan47, the 
chairman of the Batman branch, Mustafa Mesut Tekik, for example, blamed TURK-IS 
of being uninterested in the Kurdish question declaring in a meeting of the SGBP in 
Diyarbakır that “we want TURK-IS to be able to explain that the Kurdish question is a 
45 As an example, see http://petrol-is.org.tr/haber/sinif-ve-kitle-sendikaciligi-anlayisi-
yeniden-tesis-edilmelidir-3202.  
46 The Anti-Terror Law of 1991 determined ‘terror’ in a very rigid sense, broadening its 
definition which substantially limited freedom of thought and the right to organizate. It 
has led many people and organizations to be put on trial or sentenced.  Children under 
18 years old have also been affected by this law. Retrieved from: 
http://www.taraf.com.tr/haber/terorle-mucadele-kanunu-ve-cocuklar.htm.  
47 Batman Doğuş, 10 September 2013. Retrieved from 
http://www.batmandogusgazetesi.com/haber-28294-Tekik-ile-dobra-dobra.html.  
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question of whole Turkey and all workers” (Petrol-Iş, 2011). In direction with these 
circumstances, Petrol-Iş can be considered as a sensitive trade union which demands a 
peaceful, egalitarian and democratic solution of the Kurdish question. 
 
4.2.2.2. Hava-Iş as a case 
 
Hava-Iş was founded in 1962 to unionize flight and ground attendants, workers 
in agricultural spraying, and workers in aircraft maintenance and repair departments. It 
has approximately 16 thousand members with five branches; Izmir, Ankara, Antalya, 
Adana and Istanbul. The manager defines its member profile as ‘not classical 
proletarian type’ due to the service sector in which both white and blue collar workers 
work (59, Istanbul, 03.10.2013). The number of women and men members is equal. The 
manager indicates that Hava-Iş organized at every place the Turkish Airlines flights to. 
The Turkish Airlines Incorporation is the biggest company in which Hava-Iş is 
organized. From 1964 onwards, Hava-Iş has been forming collective labor agreements 
with the administration of the Turkish Airlines Inc. (Çelik, 2013). Being the national 
airline company of Turkey, the Turkish Airlines has been very significant for the 
Turkish state, causing the governments being influential in its administration. This 
influence of the governments has often led to disagreements between the administration 
and Hava-Iş.  
Throughout its history, Hava-Iş, has decided to go on a strike for several times 
due to the clashes with the administration and the governments.  The last strike took 
place in the 15th May 2013; however the roots of the conflict went back to May 2012. 
During the tense collective bargaining process of 2012, a law which banned the right to 
strike of workers who worked in the aviation line was passed on May 29, 2012 by the 
Parliament at the request of an AKP deputy, Metin Külünk, who had close relations 
with the Turkish Airlines administration (Çelik, 2013). On the same day, workers from 
Hava-Iş protested this law by not going to work for a couple hours, through 
participating in the press release. As a result of this protest, 305 workers were fired. 
From this date on, Hava-Iş continued its resistance, taking support of other unions, 
including Petrol-Iş, and some organizations. On October 19, 2012, the ban on the right 
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to strike on civil aviation workers was lifted48; however, the 305 workers were not be 
recruited back. Due to the conflicts with the collective bargaining of 2013, Hava-Iş 
decided to go on strike in order to provide the 305 workers with being hired back and to 
enhance working standards of workers in accordance with the international standards. 
According to Hava-Iş, 1500 workers participated in the strike in rotation. When it is 
considered that Hava-Iş has nearly 13 thousand 500 worker members in the Turkish 
Airlines, participation rate—approximately 1 percent—is very low. Although the 
employee and the government have a deterrent role in that, it is obvious that the 
relations between members and the union are limited (Çelik, 2013). However, 
permanence and persistence of Hava-Iş regarding the Strike, has shown that it has a 
different stance from TURK-IS, being not pro-government. The strike, moreover, has 
significance for this research to study on unionist nature of the union and class identities 
of its members, to understand how this reflects on the approach to the Kurdish question. 
The analysis, therefore, aims to search differences between the strikers and non-strikers, 
on the interpretations of the Kurdish question.  
Besides, as an influential trade union in the current strike Hava-Iş is criticized 
for staying far from the Kurdish question by representing ‘white Turks49’ who have 
higher level of socioeconomic status. Unlike Petrol-Iş, it is not organized in the Kurdish 
region, and does not indicate a clear opinion on the Kurdish question. Despite the lack 
of a clear statement ignoring or supporting the Kurdish movement, its president's refusal 
to representatives of the BDP who wanted to visit the strike raises the question of Hava-
Iş's position to Kurdish movement. Sebahat Tuncel’s tweet which stated “Hava-Iş 
rejected our visit due to today’s being May 19, saying that “the process is fragile, 
Kurds, don’t come” (Odatv, 2013) can be interpreted as a sign that the union has a 
discriminative attitude towards Kurds. In accordance with these circumstances of the 
two trade unions, I aimed to explore how Petrol-Iş’s and Hava-Iş’s class definitions and 
48 Sendika.org, October 19, 2012. Retrieved from http://www.sendika.org/2012/10/sivil-
havacilikta-grev-yasagi-kalkti/ 
49 The concept of ‘White Turks’ mostly refers to the bourgeoisie class of Turks who 
have Turkish and Sunni origins (Çalışkan, 4 June 2009).  In the case of Hava-Iş, it is 
thought that only white Turks are eligible to work in the aviation line which provides 
higher economic standards. Thus, Kurds are considered as excluded from this work line 
and the union.  
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the workers’ different levels of self-identification with the working class affect their 
interpretation of the Kurdish question. 
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CHAPTER V: DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS 
This chapter is composed of three sections which analyze secondary data and 
interviews with the trade unions, Petrol-Iş and Hava-Iş. The first and second sections 
are going to focus on the unions separately, whereas the third section will make a 
comparison between the two. The aim of the chapter is to answer the following 
questions: 
• how do unions and their members define the working class in terms of its 
position in economy, society and politics, and who fits into the working 
class? 
• how do they position unionism in class movements? 
• how do they consider the evolution of class concept and unionism? 
• how do they compare class movements with identity movements? 
• how do they define the Kurdish question in terms of its causes and 
consequences? 
• how do they consider everyday practices of Kurds in the working place 
and the union? 
 The first and second sections include the same structure. Firstly, the definition of 
the working class and unionization understanding will be analyzed through using some 
documents of the unions, the interview with the union presidents, and mostly focusing 
on interviews with the union members. Secondly, views on identity movements in 
comparison to class movements50 will be discussed. Thirdly, the definition of the 
Kurdish question and views on every day practices of Kurds in working places and 
unions will be analyzed. The last section of the chapter will make a comparison between 
the two unions.  
 
 
50 It is unquestionable that union movements are not the only means of class 
movements. However, since I studied on unions as representatives of class movements, 
I use the idioms of class movements  and union movements interchangeably.  
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5.1. Petrol-Iş 
 
5.1.1. Unionism and Definition of the Working Class 
 
Petrol-Iş, being opponent to yellow unionism in TURK-IS, has become one of the 
pioneers of the Platform of Union of Forces (Sendikal Güçbirliği Platformu, SGBP) 
which calls for class solidarity against neo-liberalism. It has often taken a stand on the 
issues related to the political, social and economic agenda of Turkey. Even if Petrol-Iş 
does not use a very sharp discourse on the main mission of the unions which was a 
socialist revolution in the 1960s and 1970s, it declares that “it maintains a historical 
struggle of the working class for equality and independence against capitalism which 
creates an unequal and unjust world” in its 26th General Meeting in 2013 (Petrol-Iş 
Web, 2013, p.1). As demonstrated in the same meeting decisions, it also supports the 
idea of a ‘different world’ created with the struggle of union of workers against 
imperialism. Moreover, Petrol-Iş does not hesitate to declare that “it is in solidarity with 
the social and political forces which struggle for these aims” (Petrol-Iş Web, 2013, p.1).  
 The interview with the union manager confirms this view. Concerning the mission 
of the union, he states that 
“It is a trade union that is a pioneer and progressive in unionism, having a 
scientific point of view on class movements, aiming for class struggle, and 
being concerned and taking a stand on democracy and human rights. It is not 
only because of the leadership (of the union), but also the momentum of the 
members” (53, Istanbul, 18.09.2013).  
Thus, on the one hand, it is not difficult to claim that its fight against capitalism in 
theory is clear, signaling to some extent that its discourse is close to the Marxist 
doctrine. On the other hand, underlining some concepts, such as democracy, justice or 
human rights, indicates that the union also cares about these concepts brought by the 
contemporary world. However, ‘the momentum of the members’ is questionable when 
the members’ interviews are considered. The views on the nature of unionism in Petrol-
Iş are various. It is very hard to speak of an existence of homogeneity among the 
workers concerning all questions asked.  
 Despite some critiques on unionism in Turkey and particularly in Petrol-Iş, most 
of the interviews touch upon the idea that Petrol-Iş is one of the best unions in taking 
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side with workers and concerning democratic elections of the unionists. For example, a 
union representative in the factory of Bayer, Ali (44, Istanbul, 19.09.2013) states “I saw 
the democratic structure of Petrol-Iş, and became a candidate to be a union 
representative”. Moreover, while a worker is criticizing unionism in Turkey, he 
compares Petrol-Iş with other unions by arguing that “our union is democratic, in fact. 
In some unions, workers do not know where the union room is” (Murat, 33, Istanbul, 
24.09.2013). Only one of the workers, Salih, criticizes particularly Petrol-Iş due to an 
experience he had. He demonstrates that after he had a work accident and was fired, the 
union did not do anything to hire him back; but he was hired with the help of the 
manager of human resources at Bayer. Therefore, he states  
“I do not trust have in the union […] It exists only on paper. It is an 
instrument. The employee gets benefit from the union. Workers are fired 
despite the union […] Generally, all unions are like this. The top of the 
unions benefits from the pie, the rent. General Presidents rarely change” 
(Salih, 40, Istanbul, 19.09.2013) 
Not surprisingly, Salih does not consider being unionized as beneficial. Moreover, he 
states that “I strung along with the system by being unionized in 2003 [the year he 
started working at Bayer]. If I did not, I would face the opposition of 300 workers at 
Bayer” (Salih, 40, Istanbul, 19.09.2013). However, it is not the case for other 
interviewed workers at Bayer, although most of them do not personally have an 
experience of benefitting from unionization. The benefits of unionization are specified 
as better working conditions such as higher wages, overtime paying, social places in the 
factory (Ali, 44, Istanbul, 19.09.2013), raising awareness of workers and contributing to 
class struggle (Murat, 33, Istanbul, 24.09.2013; Şeyhmus, 30, Istanbul, 24.09.2013), and 
job security (Osman, 38, Istanbul, 27.09.2013). According to some workers, these 
benefits are also based on the nature of Bayer Administration in addition to the union. 
As in the case of Salih who defines the employee as ‘faithful’ since they rehired him, 
the union representative Ali states that “[…] all my friends are treated decently, here. 
This is because of the culture of this factory. The employee is aware that we are 
important actors, and they make us feel that” (44, Istanbul, 19.09.2013). Hence, it can 
be claimed that the culture of unionism at Bayer has helped the union to maintain its 
existence. 
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 Right after its foundation in the 1960s51, the workers of Bayer Chemistry and 
Medicine Factory were unionized. Thus, unionist culture of Bayer has been rooted for 
many years. Bayer workers enjoy mostly acquired rights. It is observed that this culture 
has affected the workers’ views on unionism both negatively and positively. One the 
one hand, trust in the union has been created; on the other hand, it leads the workers to 
be indifferent or passive in unionism. For example, another union representative Uğur 
who is younger than Ali demonstrates “since we are free-riders, it (unionization) is not 
very important to us” (44, Istanbul, 19.09.2013). Similarly, Murat who demonstrates 
that he used to be a member of an illegal political organization states that 
“In time, the union has gained lots of things. The people who had class 
consciousness started unionism, here. The first strike after the 1980 coup 
was started in our factory. Today, not my co-workers, but retired workers of 
Bayer participate in the protests” (33, Istanbul, 24.09.2013). 
This indifference in unionism is explained by the changes in the political, 
economic and social conjuncture of Turkey and the world. When they are asked them to 
compare unionism in the past and the present, all of the eight workers at Bayer agreed 
on the idea that unionism was much better in the past, especially in the 1970s. The 
reasons behind this negative change in unionism are grounded on different factors. 
These are neoliberal economic policies, a-politicization by the 1980 coup, 
individualization, the AKP government policies on the working class, different levels of 
income, and corruption of unionism and decline of class consciousness in line with 
these changes.  
A-politicization after the 1980s is one of the most popular answers concerning the 
decline of unionism in Turkey. Being involved in a leftist political organization, Murat 
demonstrates that  
“After 1980, people start to think that unions which are subordinated to the 
governments are indifferent (to the problems of the country) NGOs […] 
Today, unions only promise for protecting workers’ rights and raising the 
wages. However, the major aim of unions should not be these. They should 
have bigger missions. Unions’ political identities have been removed. In the 
1970s, unions had a political identity. Unions were socialists, Marxists, and 
51 Bayer, Türkiye. Retrieved from: 
http://www.bayer.com.tr/ebbsc/cms/en/BayerTurk/Bayer_Turk_History.html 
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leftists. But now, they are apolitical; consequently, unions are considered 
only as protectors of rights, and workers stay inactive” (33, Istanbul, 
24.09.2013). 
A Kurdish worker who migrated to Istanbul from Elazığ, Hasan also refers to Marx, 
explaining ideological changes in time as; 
“Until the 1990s there was communism. The discourse, such as the rights of 
the workers and exploitation was in this line […] Das Capital52 was read. 
The principle of equality existed. People came together for this purpose. 
After communism collapsed, people began to believe in capitalism. In the 
free market economy, people do all kinds of knavery. People are being 
individualized and degenerated. Unions struggle within the system, but 
against exploitation” (40, Istanbul, 30.09.2013).  
 
In addition to Murat and Hasan, Ali specifically points out the ideological changes with 
their effects on political, economic and social lives, arguing “today, unions, neoliberal 
economic policies, the employee and the media try to individualize people to prevent 
them from being organized” (44, Istanbul, 19.09.2013).  Although all these workers do 
not identify these changes under the name of neo-liberalism, it is understood that they 
are aware of the changes brought by neo-liberalism, such as a-politicization, 
individualization and free market economy.  
Another Kurdish worker Şeyhmus touches upon the similar thoughts related with 
a-politicization from a different perspective. He makes a link between rising Turkish 
nationalism and decline of unionism, underlining the ideological change. He argues that 
“Today’s unionism cannot be compared to unionism carried out by DISK 
(in the 1960s and 1970s). Now, unionism is carried out within the system. 
[…] The 1980 coup made a clear cut. Intimidation policies have been 
implemented, which continue today. […] By the emergence of the Kurdish 
Question after the mid-1980s, people tended to support nationalism which 
was systematically imposed by the state. Since, a perception is created as if 
people are the PKK partisans when they identify themselves as a worker or 
union member. If people adopted their class struggle as much as their 
national feelings, it would not be like that. Now, this generation is a-
political, but we have to be politicized” (Şeyhmus, 30, Istanbul, 
24.09.2013).  
 
52 Das Capital was a famous work piece of Karl Marx.  
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Some workers indirectly relate decline in unionism to rise of education and the 
effects of different income levels of workers. This understanding signals the factors that 
are used as reasons for weakening class as an important variable for social stratification. 
As it is explained in the second chapter, rise of education (Melucci, 1989) and income 
levels (Clark et al., 2001) are considered as the factors which weaken people’s self-
identification with class. These factors indirectly lead unionism to decline, according to 
some workers at Bayer. For example, one of the union representatives, Uğur argues that 
the workers at Bayer are not from the poor, which hardens unionization since the rich is 
not interested in unionization. Similarly, the resentful worker Salih (40) divides the 
working class into their economic levels, stating that  
“There are elite workers, for instance. When I went to Ankara for a protest, I 
saw that we were very well dressed; the brands were Nike, Adidas. The 
others, for example, the workers came from Zonguldak53 had no coats but 
old shoes, torn shirts. We see ourselves superior; we cannot create 
coherence. I think peace will never come. If that man (a worker from 
Zonguldak) earns three thousands Turkish Liras, he immediately changes” 
(40, Istanbul, 19.09.2013). 
The manager of Petrol-Iş also identifies different levels of income which have been 
caused by neo-liberal policies as factious in the working class. He states that 
“Due to the division of sectors, workers have different levels of income. 
Moreover, neo-liberal policies, declining of wages and costs, increase of 
cheap labor, and the employee attack (focusing more on profits, exploiting 
the working class more, by the neoliberal policies) by the mid-1990s have 
led workers’ wages to be lower than the older workers’. This sometimes 
causes separation among workers”(53, Istanbul, 18.09.2013). 
I have, moreover, encountered discussions about different income levels of workers 
who work in the same conditions, but have different wages due to the years they enter 
the work. While Salih explains why unionism is not successful in organizing workers to 
join in a protest, he says “people are saying at Bayer: he gets three thousands TL, I get 
one thousand, then he should go (to the protest)” (40, Bayer, 19.092013).  
In addition to economic-based divisions, rise of education among workers, in 
general, is thought as not positively influential in the rise of unionism. This indirect and 
53 Zonguldak City mostly has mine workers who work in very harsh conditions with 
low wages.  
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relatively negative effect of higher education levels is explained through comparing 
unionism in the past and the present. It is important to clear out that the manager and the 
workers do not identify rise of education among workers as leading them to be less 
interested in unionism; however, they mostly express that although education degrees 
were lower in the past, workers were more sensitive about their rights and unionism. 
Therefore, rise of education is not considered as a direct factor which weakens ‘class’ or 
unionism, but a fact brought by the new social, political and economic conjuncture in 
which unionism is damaged. For example, while Ali explains negative changes in 
unionism, he expresses the following: 
“In the 15th -16th September Resistance, the working class was graduated 
from primary or secondary schools. But, these workers including other 
workers from different confederations stopped life in Istanbul. Or think 
about the May 1st 1977 event to which more than one million people 
joined. Now, we have difficulties to persuade workers to join together on 
the 1st May although it is a holiday. We think ourselves as more educated, 
but do not know how to view life from our class perspective. Their 
(workers in the past) class consciousness was more advanced” (44, 
Istanbul, 19.09.2013).  
As it is understood, Ali does not consider rise of education as a reason for decline in 
unionism, but he also does not identify higher levels of education as a means for 
spreading class consciousness. He relates decline of unionism to the ideological changes 
in politics, economics and society, as it is quoted above.  
In direction with these changes, Ali and many other workers criticize the AKP 
government’s policies on workers and unionism. It is commonly thought that by the 
AKP governance yellow unionism has become widespread through emergence of pro-
government unions (Ali, 44, Istanbul, 19.09.2013; Murat, 33, Istanbul, 24.09.2013). As 
a result, unions are considered as far away to acknowledge class concept (Şeyhmus, 30, 
Istanbul, 24.09.2013), and people’s trust towards unions have declined (Ali, 44, Bayer, 
19.09.2013). In direction with the statistics, workers are aware that unionization rates 
have declined by the economic policies of sub-contracting and privatization. (Osman, 
38, Istanbul, 27.09.2013). Moreover, workers who support politicization of unions 
argue that unionization has been marginalized in the eyes of the people (Murat, 33, 
Istanbul, 24.09.2013; Şeyhmus, 30, Istanbul, 24.09.2013; Ali, 44, Istanbul, 19.09.2013). 
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Therefore, as a result of all these factors, today’s unionism in general is considered as 
weaker than in the past to protect workers and shape the political agenda of the country.  
Regarding the definition of the working class, the manager of the union defines 
the union’s perspective as “being in accordant with the general sociological definitions” 
(53, Istanbul, 18.09.2013):  
“The working class does not highlight any differences, but perceives them 
as richness. We think that the major difference is between the oppressed and 
the oppressor or exploiter and exploited” (53, Istanbul, 18.09.2013) 
It can be claimed that this definition of the working class is in accordance with the 
Marxist definition which stratifies society as the proletariat (the oppressed/exploited) 
and the bourgeoisie (the oppressor/exploiter). Concerning ‘the other differences’, it 
seems that the manager’s view is also close to the classical approach on other identities 
than class, prioritizing class identity. Although he does not claim that other identities 
should be oppressed, he considers class identity is the major one.  
 In order to learn whether the manager considers a difference on the definition or 
range of the working class by the time, as some scholars (Pakulski and Waters, 1996; 
Clark & Lipset, 1991) suggest, it is asked whether he sees an evolution of the concept of 
the working class. The answer is 
“The range of the working class cannot change, in fact. For instance, even if 
white collar workers do not consider themselves as workers, it does not 
change the reality that they are workers; because class of a person is 
determined with her/his position against means of production. Hence, you 
can be a doctor in a hospital who gains a very high wage, but you are still a 
worker. We have also strived for unionizing all workers in a factory or an 
office. Unqualified workers who are sub-contracted and qualified workers 
who are told that they are not workers are tried to be separated from unions. 
However, there is no difference in our perspective” (53, Istanbul, 
18.09.2013).   
As it is seen, the manager of Petrol-Iş defines the working class in accordance with 
people’s position against the means of production, as Marxism argues. Consequently, he 
includes white collar workers who participate in production with their labor in the 
working class. He, moreover, underlines that there is an effort to prevent workers from 
identifying themselves as workers.  
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 Regarding the workers of Bayer, they have different definitions and different 
levels of self-identification with the working class. Some workers define the working 
class in accordance with the managers’ definition, which is close to the Marxist 
doctrine. Many of them touch upon the idea that the working class is oppressed. All 
these workers also name themselves as a member of the working class. The Kurdish 
worker Şeyhmus, for example, agrees with the manager in the definition of the working 
class which includes white collar workers demonstrating, 
“Unfortunately, the majority of the people in Turkey, who maintain their 
life as workers, do not consider themselves as workers. Firstly, they should 
make themselves believe that they are workers, although they have 
differences. They should form a class. If we do not organize the working 
class against the employee and the state, our struggle becomes 
meaningless. In the global world, everyone who goes to work in the 
morning is a worker. In our factory, the managers also clock on; so they 
are workers, too” (Şeyhmus, 30, Istanbul, 24.09.2013).  
In terms of the suppression of the working class Osman and Cüneyt clearly define the 
working class as oppressed. Osman, for example, says “the the working class is a team 
of laborer (amele) […] It is oppressed by the employee. The capitalist is always at the 
top” (38, Istanbul, 27.09.2013). Similarly, Cüneyt suggests that “the the working class 
is an oppressed class. It undertakes all burdens of the production”(43, Istanbul, 
02.10.2013). Many other workers who do not specifically touch upon the suppression or 
range of the working class also affirm what Şeyhmus, Osman and Cüneyt say. However, 
only two of them, Salih (40) who does not believe in unionism and Uğur who is a union 
representative at Bayer do not define the working class referring to its suppression and 
who workers are. As it is quoted above, Salih sees the working class as divided with 
their economic status, naming himself as an elite worker. However, it is surprising that a 
union representative, Uğur (33, Istanbul, 19.09.2013) states that “there is no the 
working class, and I am not from the working class […] it is something like saying that 
I am a socialist when there is no socialism”. Although his duty is to organize workers as 
a union representative, he relates his pessimism about unionism and the working class 
with unconsciousness of workers, claiming that “no one is aware that they are workers; 
they excessively embrace the employee” (Uğur, 33, Istanbul, 19.09.2013) In accordance 
with their the working class definitions and views on unionism, Salih and Uğur hesitate 
naming themselves as workers or members of the working class.  
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 In fact, pessimism of Uğur is shared by many other workers, concerning 
unconsciousness of the working class.  When workers are asked to define the working 
class, they mostly touch upon unconsciousness of the working class of today, rather 
than defining what it is. It is due to the fact that many workers associate the concept of 
the working class with organization/unionization. The older union representative Ali, 
for example, defines the working class as “unaware of their class values and not capable 
of adopting them”, specifying conscious workers as organized/unionized (44, Istanbul, 
19.09.2013). Along the similar line with Ali, politically active worker Murat says that 
“the the working class in Turkey is unconscious with no aims” (33, Istanbul, 
24.09.2013). The reasons behind this ‘unconsciousness’ are the same with the ones that 
lead unionism to be weakened, according to the workers. Although they agree on the 
idea that they are members of the working class that lacking class consciousness in 
Turkey, the factors which affect their self-identification with the working class is 
various, mostly depending on their personal backgrounds.  
 When it is asked which factors affect workers’ self-identification with the 
working class, workers mostly refer to their political ideologies rather than economic 
and social status. In order to give specific information about the workers’ backgrounds, 
which helps to understand how their personalities affect views on class, more examples 
will be given. The union representative Ali, for example, states that 
 
“I used to talk with my friends about the working class, labor and the 
working class revolution during my university years. My political view 
grounds on the working class […] I am a victim of the 1980 coup. My 
brother was in jail; I experienced these difficulties. I have a leftist 
background. If economic status was effective (in self-identification with 
the working class), all of the poor would become unionized and 
strugglers”(44, Bayer, 19.09.2013). 
Another worker Murat also thinks that self-identification with the working class is not 
linked only to economic levels of people, arguing that  
“I am a member of the working class, having goals. I have supported many 
worker protests […] I saw class divisions in Turkey when I was a member 
of an illegal political organization at my 16. I have a goal, and tried to reach 
it […] I recognized that there was a line. You have to decide which side of 
the line you belong to. You read books and create a different world and 
utopias in your mind. When you realize this reality, you try to think how 
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you can make this ideology real […] If I agreed with my family, I would 
support the AKP […] Economic level was not effective for me. My family 
has a business; they have a higher economic status than the neighborhood” 
(Murat, 33, Istanbul, 24.09.2013).  
Kurdish worker Şeyhmus touches upon politicization which shapes his identification 
with the working class, Kurdishness and Alevi-ness. He argues that 
“I support all worker struggles. I have also supported other unions, such as 
Hava-Iş. I am from a political family. All of them live by their labor. It is 
related to their view of life. I have not grown up in very difficult conditions. 
My father is a migrant from Dersim. My grandparents always talk about 
how they lived there. I have always lived as a stranger in this country. In the 
3rd grade of primary school, my teacher from Kars encouraged me to sing a 
Kurdish song. Then, my friends scared me with saying that the police would 
attack me. This is related to the process you have lived through. Until I was 
thirty years old, my Kurdish, Alevi and opponent identities have been 
effective” (Şeyhmus, 30, Istanbul, 24.09.2013).  
While Ali, Murat and Şeyhmus do not strongly associate economic status with self-
identification with the working class, underlining political ideologies which are 
acquired by experiences or family backgrounds, Osman points out that being a worker is 
a form of suppression, which teaches self-identification with the working class. He says 
that “I did not know anything about unions before. I have learned by being suppressed, 
here” (Osman, 38, Istanbul, 27.09.2013). Another Kurdish worker Cüneyt also 
emphasizes personally being suppressed that influences self-identification: 
“I am absolutely from the oppressed class. As a person who is excluded 
and has lived in poverty, I am a worker. Regardless of people’s religion, 
ideology, race or rank, they are workers. It is much easier for people who 
have lived in a closed society to adopt unions. These people are more 
courageous, I see that. Workers from the bourgeoisie origin are not like 
that. Workers who know how difficult to earn bread are closer to unions” 
(43, Istanbul, 02.10.2013). 
Cüneyt does not clearly underline that his Kurdishness influences his belonging to the 
oppressed class; however, he points out that his exclusion is also linked to the place 
where he was grown up, the Kurdish region. Hence, the Kurdish workers Şeyhmus and 
Cüneyt directly or indirectly suggest that their Kurdishness has played a role in defining 
themselves as part of the oppressed class. This oppression has two common sides for the 
two workers, being a Kurd and being a worker. Regarding the Turkish workers, it is 
hard to single out a common point for all three, Ali, Murat and Osman. While Ali and 
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Murat emphasize personal political views which might be acquired by experiences, 
Osman only touches upon what he experiences.  
 All in all, the discourse of Petrol-Iş members about unionism and the definition of 
the working class is close the Marxist discourse, according to its by-law and the 
manager’s speech. In the factory of Bayer, some workers also touch upon the Marxist 
ideology in defining the working class or unionism before. All of them agree on the idea 
that unionism was better in the past, being aware of the economic, social and political 
changes. Except Salih and Uğur, all workers define the working class referring to its 
suppression, naming themselves as workers and consider unionism as beneficial. Their 
self-identification with the working class is affected by their political ideologies, 
economic levels and experiences. The two of the Kurdish workers, Şeyhmus and Cüneyt 
link their suppression to double effects, Kurdish-ness and worker-ness.  
5.1.2. Unionist Identity and Identity Politics 
 
 In order to understand the nature of the unionist identity, it is asked to the 
manager and the workers whether they consider unionist identity as a unifying one. Not 
surprisingly, the manager argues that being a unionized worker is a unifying identity. It 
is explained by the argument he states below: 
 
“People’s behaviors are class-based if they are not manipulated […] When 
you act in accordance with your class and you are unionized, then, you are 
fired. Then, you feel the difference between ‘us and them’, automatically. 
The union backs these workers morally and materially. It gives theoretical 
education to make this consciousness permanent. Workers become aware of 
that in life. Actually, it is not difficult; on the contrary, there is a deception 
effort which prevents people from feeling as part of the same class. The 
system, the hegemony is based on stupefying people” (53, Istanbul, 
18.09.2013). 
 
Referring to the concept of ‘false consciousness’ in Marxism, the manager of the union 
sees the working class/union identity as unifying. Moreover, he once again touches 
upon the effort which tries to alienate people from identifying themselves as workers, as 
in the case of white collar workers.  
 Workers have different opinions on ‘unifying’ identity of unionism/class. Ali who 
does not think that economic levels of people affect their self-identification with class 
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suggests that “workers are only sensitive about wages and physical working conditions, 
but it is difficult to organize them from a class perspective by politicizing” (44, Istanbul, 
19.09.2013). By arguing so, he means that it is not sufficient to only act in accordance 
with workers’ economic advantages; because being a part of the working class requires 
more, which is politicization. Şeyhmus agrees with Ali on unifying nature of unionism 
when workers and unionism are politicized, naming unionism “as a chance to unite the 
working class” (30, Istanbul, 24.09.2013).  Although Murat is one of the supporters of 
politicization of unionism, he argues that political differences harm unionism because of 
workers’ lack of class consciousness, stating that 
 
“Unionism is not unifying; because there has been differentiation for years. 
In the last elections, for example, the Alevis make their candidates be 
elected while in Aliağa54 the leftist candidates are elected. Today in Batman, 
Hizbullah55 is powerful; however, I learned that no one could be elected 
apart from the PKK’s candidates five years ago. Political identity is very 
important. This causes a separation. People ask if the union only belongs to 
Kurds or the leftists. Political differences damage unionism. In the recent 
years, unions are established in accordance to the political trends; such as 
HAK-IŞ […] Unions do not have a single discourse; there is no Türklers56 
anymore. A person from HAK-IŞ talks about Allah while we are concerned 
with the working class. By the 1980s, an Islamic social structure has 
formed, which lead people to alienate from the working class” (33, Bayer, 
24.09.2013).  
 
The union representative Uğur and the Kurdish worker Cüneyt touch upon similar 
arguments that unions cannot be united on the basis of the working class, due to the 
different political ideologies of them. Thus, it can be claimed that many workers are 
pessimistic about unifying nature of unionism although they think that it should be. The 
reasons behind this are mostly explained by different ideologies’ factious effects. 
According to them, since today’s political trend of Turkey is closer to Islamic 
conservatism by the AKP government; political differentiations are mostly shaped 
around this circle. 
54 Aliağa is a district of Izmir where Petrol-Iş is unionized.  
55 It is a Sunni Islamic group which is also organized in the Kurdish region, being 
against the PKK. Retrieved from: http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/180/turkish-
hezbollah-hizbullah-kurdish-hezbollah.html 
56 Kemal Türkler is a founder member of DISK.  
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 So as to learn how the union and the workers of Bayer view identity-based 
organizations whether they prioritize class movements or identity movements, it is 
asked whether they consider identity movements as harmful for class or not. While the 
manager of Petrol-Iş does not identify identity movements as harmful for class 
movements, workers’ answers are mostly linked to their ideologies. The manager argues 
that 
 
“Identities based on sexuality, ethnicity and religion are the sources of 
richness unique to Anatolia. The only difference in the society is the 
difference between the oppressor and the oppressed. The other differences 
are sub-identities. If you ask whether they need these identities; it depends 
on personal preferences. They (identities) should be protected and 
guaranteed. If they are left alone, they will not be harmful; why would they? 
We watch the news; it is said that ethnic or denominational differences will 
cause conflicts in some countries. I do not understand this. It is not normal. 
It is absolutely provoked. Does a person stab a neighbor only because he/she 
does not like himself/herself? Differences do not cause a danger by itself, 
but they are turned into (a danger) […] Our union always thinks like that, 
and we dignify differences (53, Istanbul, 18.09.2013).  
While the manager identifies social stratification, he refers to the economic one, 
defining ethnic, sexual and religious identities as having secondary importance. Being 
in the line with the classical approach in class, it is, however, hard to claim that he 
supports suppression of other identities in class. By saying that the identities should be 
protected, and they are not dangerous for class movements, the manager acknowledges 
the importance of these identities and movements; however, he makes a hierarchy 
between them. 
 Workers, on the other hand, have opposing views on the subject. While one union 
representative Ali argues that ethnic or denominational differences are not factious in 
Petrol-Iş, another union representative Uğur suggests that they do. Ali says that 
“In the Central Office of Petrol-Iş, people from different segments come 
together. One of them is from Batman, for example. There is an equal 
distribution. I believe in a different sect than the majority. I am an Alevi; 
however, I am elected as the union representative for the second time. When 
a proper perspective is provided for the working class, the ethnic or 
religious identity of representatives is not important” (44, Bayer, 
19.09.2013).  
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However, Uğur considers identity movements as unnecessary and states that “these 
identities should not harm unionism, but they do. People vote or do not vote in 
accordance with being an Alevi or Kurdish. It damages class consciousness” (33, 
Istanbul, 19.09.2013). Although Salih claims that different identities do not divide the 
working class, he criticizes politicization of these identities, saying that 
“I see people from different identities in the worker protests. For instance, I 
saw people coming from Batman; they acted politically by showing 
Öcalan’s posters. I cannot consider those as my worker brothers. We went 
there for the pension law; we cannot be united like that” (40, Istanbul, 
19.09.2013). 
Osman agrees with Salih on the politicization of identities, especially of Kurds. 
Although he claims that there is no discrimination in the union and at Bayer since the 
union unifies people from different identities, he does not support identity movements, 
referring to the Kurdish movement, by asking  
“Why are they organized? I live in Okmeydanı57. Why does a person set fire 
a bus he/she gets on? I am not against Kurds; I have many Kurdish friends. I 
am affected by the pepper gas thrown there, as well. I join in the protests.  
the last May 1st 58, I was extremely exposed to pepper gas. Why do we do 
that? We do for job security and worker rights. People need to be hurt to 
protest. You should be so hurt that you can respond to that. I do not 
understand these people” (Osman, 38, Bayer, 27.09.2013) 
Although Osman joins illegal protests to which the police attack, he does not have an 
empathic attitude towards the Kurdish protests in Okmeydanı. It is due to the fact that 
he does not consider Kurds as having valid reasons to protest while workers, including 
him, are right to do.  Osman is closer to the idea of suppression of ethnic identities in 
class, without making a connection between oppression of workers and oppression of 
Kurds.  
57 Okmeydanı is a district of Istanbul where Kurdish political protests frequently take 
place.  
58 In the 1st May of 2013, some workers and unions came together in Taksim Square 
where was banned by the AKP government. During the day, clashes between workers 
and the police took place. Retrieved from: http://www.bianet.org/bianet/yasam/146326-
1-mayis-2013-kunye-ve-bilanco 
72 
 
 
                                                             
 Active workers in unionism like Osman, Ali and Murat do not agree with him. 
Both of them think that the Kurdish movement contributes to class movements. Ali 
explains its reason as the following:  
“Kurdish people are politicized due to the Kurdish Question. In the factories 
which mostly Kurds work, Kurdish workers who join the Kurdish 
movement are also participating in the class movements. It is because they 
are supported by socialist, leftists groups and workers. Deri-Iş, for example 
is a union in which Kurdish workers are the majority, and it is a very 
powerful union” (44, Istanbul, 19.09.2013).  
Murat adds 
“The Kurdish movement strengthens class movements or even any 
movement in Turkey; because their struggle has provided them with many 
things in practical and intellectual senses […] If class struggle was more 
powerful in Turkey, we would recognize these identities more easily. Since 
there is no proper class struggle in Turkey, we have problems with political 
and ethnic differences” (33, Istanbul, 24.09.2013). 
 
By claiming so, Ali and Murat make a link between the struggle of Kurds and workers. 
The common point of these two workers is their leftist political background and active 
roles in class movements.  
 All three Kurdish workers, moreover, agree on the point that identity movements 
are not dangerous for class movements and the working class. Hasan and Cüneyt 
suggest that when the point is to earn bread, other differences do not cause any harms. 
Şeyhmus, moreover, adds  
“Kurds, Alevis and workers are very right to organize. When they are 
unified, very important developments will happen in Turkey. They do not 
cause any harm. It becomes ridiculous to expect all people to be unionized, 
or only join in the Alevi or Kurdish movements. It is beneficial for each 
community to organize” (30, Istanbul, 24.09.2013). 
 
Şeyhmus interprets identity movements and class movements separately; however, he 
does not think that they harm one another. By supporting their cooperation, he stands 
for multiple subjectivities in class.  
 To sum this part up, there is not a strong correlation between supporting unionism 
and supporting identity movements. Some workers cannot have an emphatic perspective 
on identity movements although they participate in class struggle. Workers who have 
political identities highly support identity movements, and consider them as beneficial 
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to class struggle. The Kurdish workers do not identify identity movements as factious 
for the working class, either.  
 
5.1.3. The Kurdish Question and Every day Practices of Kurds  
 Petrol-Iş is one of the unions that is concerned with the Kurdish question. As it is 
explained in the fourth chapter, it has tried to attract to the issue through its reports, 
magazines and education of workers59. In 1993, for example, led by the president of 
Petrol-Iş, Münir Ceylan, a report was prepared on the Kurdish question after a trip by 
some unionists from TURK-IŞ to the Kurdish districts; Erzurum, Ağrı, Van, Bitlis, 
Batman, İdil, Cizre, Şırnak, Nusaybin and Diyarbakır (Kapmaz & Gökçe, 2007). 
Although it did not suggest solutions to the question, it provided information about the 
demands of the local community. Under the title of ‘the East and Southeast Reviews’, 
the report pointed out both economic improvement of the East and Southeast Turkey 
and improvement of cultural rights of the Kurdish people. In the same year, Münir 
Ceylan was sentenced to imprisonment due to his criticisms of the Anti-Terror Law of 
1991. He identified extrajudicial executions, mass arrestments, losses in custodies and 
killings of people by soldiers in the Kurdish region as ‘state terror’. The decision of his 
imprisonment got big reactions, and he was highly supported by Petrol-Iş through 
formal objections, publications and hunger strikes (Petrol-Iş Yayın-64, 2000).  
Signaling significant points on the issue in those years, Petrol-Iş, moreover, published a 
booklet in 1997, called as ‘Peace is in our hands’ which identified the Kurdish question 
as one of the important problems of Turkey with its economic, political and social sides. 
 In accordance with the political conjuncture, the discourse of Petrol-Iş about the 
Kurdish question has been shaped. While it viewed the question from a class 
perspective, highlighting imperialist and capitalist forces in the Kurdish question in the 
late 1990s, it began to emphasize democratization and the peace process by the mid-
2000s. For example, in a report of 2000, it is stated that ethnic differences and conflicts 
(identified as ‘superficial’) were used deliberately by the capitalist forces to prevent a 
bigger class movement; therefore, workers’ unitary force is able to solve the question 
59 Ali, Murat and Şeyhmus have told that Petrol-Iş gives an active membership 
education in which the Kurdish question is one of the discussion topics.  
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(Petrol-Iş Yayın-86, 2000, p. 111). However, in the last General Meeting in 2013, it is 
stated that “the solution is to follow the path which aims for democracy, peace and 
social togetherness without compensating unitary nature of our country” (Öztaşkın, 
2013, p.4), leaving aside the idea that class struggle is the only solution for the question. 
Although it is not a very sharp transformation, it can be interpreted that some political 
developments; such as the 2009 Kurdish Initiative and the Peace Process started in 
2012, and the election of Mustafa Mesut Tekik— the chairman of the Batman branch—
for the Central Office of Petrol-Iş might be effective in underlining democracy and 
peace rather than economic factors.  
 The manager of Petrol-Iş also underlines democratic and peaceful solutions of the 
problem, emphasizing recognition of the Kurdish ethnic identity, in addition to the 
economic sides of the question. The manager views the reasons of the problem as 
failures of the nation-state structure. It is explained by the manager that this structure is 
based on firstly, the standardization of people, and secondly, the single market. By 
standardization, he refers to the assimilation/suppression of people. By the single 
market, he touches on the effects of feudalism in the Kurdish region. Although he 
argues that ethnic conflicts mostly have economic factors, he underlines the importance 
of national problems and cultural demands, stating that 
“If you say that people joined the guerilla because they were unemployed, it 
means you did not understand the problem. Even if people have had 
economical welfare in the region, they would still have national problems 
and cultural demands. Their way of struggle might be different. If people are 
humiliated, de-identificated, and unemployed, their style of struggle can be 
different” (the manager, 53, Istanbul, 18.09.2013).  
The above quote shows that the manager develops an empathy with the Kurdish 
movement which includes the armed struggle. He, moreover, hesitates from reducing 
the Kurdish question to an economic one, through acknowledging both sides of the 
problem. His suggestions to the solutions are in the same direction: 
“Kurdish people have fundamental rights. These rights should be respected, 
and the state should abandon denialist and assimilationist policies. Under 
the condition of non-violent actions, all kinds of rights and freedoms should 
be advocated. We think that whatever they want about their identities—for 
example, education in mother tongue—should be guaranteed by the 
constitution […] All nations living in that region should be able to live in a 
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country where they take decisions with their own free will. I think the class 
side of the question should not be ignored. Today, Turkey and the world 
capitalists consider the region as a field to be exploited in terms of raw 
materials and cheap labor. If they encourage peace to suppress people 
economically and to capitalize more, blow it! […] Today, the old feudal 
structure in the region is weakened. Although we do not approve, it is 
related with the guerilla. For example, by the existence of women forces in 
the guerilla, men-women relationships have modernized, but its costs are 
very heavy. We support the end of war, not pursuing the goals of the 
capitalist but for a peaceful, just and equal environment” (the manager, 53, 
Istanbul, 18.09.2013).  
As it is seen, the manager of Petrol-Iş proposes solutions through taking both class and 
identity sides of the question into consideration. He also signals his support to self-
determination of nations in accordance with the Leninist ideology.  
 The manager is not the only person who refers to the self-determination of nations 
in Petrol-Iş. The political union representative Ali also touches upon this principle of 
Leninism in a conversation with a worker in the union room. While a discussion on the 
Kurdish question is being made, some workers in the room criticize the ‘secessionist’ 
demands of Kurds, by stating that acceptance of their demands leads all minorities to 
separate from Turkish territories. Ali responds to this argument by asking “have you 
ever heard about the right to self-determination of nations?” (44, Istanbul, 19.09.2013). 
Hence, being supportive of this principle, Ali points out the identity-based side of the 
question, but also considering the identity politics not efficient for solution, arguing that 
“It is not logical and humane to forcibly teach Turkish to a kid who does not 
know Turkish in the primary school. Our friends used to listen to Kurdish 
music, secretly. […] We should support their demand for learning Kurdish 
[…] I support peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question. It contributes to 
the democratic movements of Turkey. We, the Kurdish and Turkish 
workers, are exploited equally. If it (the Kurdish movement) underlines only 
Kurdishness, the ultimate point (for the resolution process) will not be 
successful” (44, Istanbul, 19.09.2013).  
In defining the Kurdish question, he addresses cultural rights of Kurds; however, he 
does not find the Kurdish ethnic identity as the mere point that should be touched upon 
for the resolution: 
 “I should view the Kurdish question as a human, not as a Turk. Kurds also 
should look from the point of international norms, rather than the Kurdish 
nationalistic point of view. We look at the working class from a class 
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perspective, but it is a very broad term. Ethnic identities provide a very 
narrow range”(Ali, 44, Istanbul, 19.09.2013).  
Hence, he tends to consider the class struggle which fights against the oppression of the 
working class in which both Kurds and Turks are exploited as more preferable than 
identity politics which is less broad than the class movements. 
 The other workers who have political backgrounds, Şeyhmus and Murat identify 
the reason of the Kurdish question as de-recognition of identities in Turkey. Moreover, 
Murat’s not being Kurdish does not prevent him from having an emphatic approach to 
the issue. He argues that 
“There is a fascistic approach to different ethnic identities in Turkey. You 
are whether a Turk, or nothing. People cannot speak Kurdish, are deprived 
of service, and cannot have education in their mother language. You are a 
child, and your goal posts are made of palettes of tanks. If I were, I would 
be hostile towards the Turkish state and soldiers” (Murat, 33, Istanbul, 
24.09.2013).  
Şeyhmus completely agrees with Murat on assimilation of ethnic identities, including 
Kurdish ethnic identity, identifying this assimilation as “a way of genocide” (30, Bayer, 
24.09.2013). He, moreover, adds that 
“The system has used this problem so good that it is reflected to the working 
class. The system considers the Kurdish question equal with the unionist or 
the Alevi movement. They are related to each other; however, the Kurdish 
movement has been used to divide the others […] In fact, democratization 
of Turkey is tied to freedom of the Kurdish nation. The state cannot use the 
Kurdish movement as a trump […] The system which causes the Kurdish 
question is the same with the system that oppresses the working class. I am 
trying to explain this to people. I am asking them whether they see a martyr 
funeral in a high class neighborhood. The system that kills eleven workers at 
Marmara Park60 is the same which bombs thirty five people in Roboski61. I 
do not only want Kurdistan to be free; the West also should be free. Being a 
socialist requires this understanding”(Şeyhmus, 30, Istanbul, 24.09.2013). 
60 In the construction of the shopping mall, Marmara Park, eleven workers were burned 
to death. The construction company was the subcontractor (Bianet, 2012). Retrieved 
from http://www.bianet.org/bianet/insan-haklari/136861-11-isci-santiyede-yanarak-oldu 
61 In the frontier village, Roboski, 35 Kurdish civillians were bombed by the Turkish 
army on December 28, 2011. Retrieved from: 
http://www.ihd.org.tr/index.php/baslamalarinmenu-77/ortak-baslamalarinmenu-
80/2491-roboski-katliami-raporu-03-ocak-2012.html  
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Şeyhmus criticizes the capitalist system which oppresses both Kurds and the working 
class. As he says before, being a Kurd, an Alevi, a worker and a socialist helps him to 
have an emphatic perspective to the other identities or movements. Şeyhmus also 
touches upon a critique of identity politics, which is argued by Smith (2008). Identity 
politics remain at the personal level, because they undermine that a person does not 
have to have personal experiences of oppression to be able to question it. In this line of 
thinking, Şeyhmus points out the ways of emphatic approaches to the other movements: 
“It is not necessary to be a Kurd to understand the Kurdish question. It is 
related with one’s perspective. If you look at it from an ethnic and 
nationalist perspective, you cannot find a solution. If I were a Sunni, I 
would question why only mosques are built with the taxes taken from 
Alevis. Otherwise, peace and democracy will not be reached”(Şeyhmus, 30, 
Istanbul, 24.09.2013). 
 Another Kurdish worker, Cüneyt defines the Kurdish question mostly on the basis 
of his experiences. Like Ali, Murat and Şeyhmus, he thinks that the problem has started 
with de-recognition of the Kurdish identity by the foundation of the Turkish Republic. 
However, he finds the AKP initiatives as positive for resolution. He shares his 
experiences and agrees with Şeyhmus on the point that people do not have to be 
Kurdish to understand the issue, arguing that 
“I can never forget that I could not enter my village. Since I was a soldier in 
the Kurdish region, I know very well how people were arrested without a 
reason, how they were thrown in holes, and all other fascists approaches” 
(Cüneyt, 43, Istanbul, 02.10.2013).  
 Regarding internal displacements, Cüneyt argues that migration took place due to 
the suppression of the army which evacuated villages and murdered people in the years 
between 1986 and 1996, putting the responsibility on the Turkish army. At that point, 
another Kurdish worker Hasan who refers to Marx in explaining unionism does not 
agree with Cüneyt and other workers who believe in the suppression of Kurds, although 
he has experienced the war between the Turkish army and the PKK in Elazığ. He argues 
that Turks and Kurds do not have problems with each other; however, “the capitalist” 
writes a scenario to divide the society.  Hasan states that  
“Ask Kurds why they migrated; they do not say that we migrated to live our 
culture in a better way. They came here to work, for food, for better 
economic standards. The ones who participate in protests claim that they 
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want cultural rights, but when it is asked they firstly want a job […] I do not 
consider the Kurdish question as an ethnic problem. They say that Kurds are 
suppressed and their cultural rights are ignored. When the socialist ideology 
of the PKK was gone, they went towards cultural rights. If they developed 
their culture, they would be able to live it. Two hundred languages have 
disappeared in the world, who oppresses them?” (40, Istanbul, 30.09.2013).  
 The approaches of Salih, Osman and Uğur are similar to Hasan’s. Osman who 
participates in illegal demonstrations of workers says that 
“This problem cannot be solved even if they have all territories of Turkey or 
their pockets are filled. They do not live in Istanbul for their Kurdishness 
but for their bread […] Some of them join in the protests. All their costs are 
paid with our taxes. No need for this!” (Osman, 38, Istanbul, 27.09.2013).  
Resentful worker, Salih, and the other union representative who does not define himself 
as a member of the working class, Uğur claims that there is not a Kurdish question in 
Turkey. Both of them identify the reason of the conflict as stemming from the 
manipulation of the international forces and economic and intellectual backwardness. 
Salih, for example, says that  
“The international forces fund them […] If there was a sport centre or a 
shopping mall in there, no one would join the guerilla. If they do not like 
Turkey, they should work without social insurance. They are deceived 
because their education levels are low. 80 percent of them are ignorant […] 
If a person says to me that he is a fan of Abdullah Öcalan, I have to attack 
him physically” (Bayer, 19.09.2013).  
Thus, the common points of workers who have an emphatic approach towards the 
Kurdish movement are firstly, having active roles in class struggle; secondly, defining 
the working class with reference to Marxism, and thirdly; having leftist political 
backgrounds. These workers, moreover, define the issue in terms of its ethnic and 
economical sides. However, being active in unionism and defining the working class 
grounding on their suppression do not always require being emphatic to the Kurdish 
movement. Some workers who address the oppression of the working class and support 
the unionist struggle do not make a link between the oppression of Kurds and the 
oppression of the workers. It is also seen that being a Kurdish is not sufficient to 
acknowledge the identity-based side of the Kurdish question and having an emphatic 
approach to the Kurdish movement. When the ones who are practically and theoretically 
distant from class movements are considered, their common feature is being 
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discriminative against Kurds—referring to their low education levels—, having a 
reductionist discourse on the causes of the Kurdish question. 
  As a result, all these approaches reflect the views on the everyday practices of 
Kurds in the working place and the union. Not surprisingly, the workers who have 
emphatic approach to suppression of Kurds are very comfortable with the use of 
Kurdish in the factory and respect the workers who prioritize their Kurdish ethnic 
identity. All of the workers state that there is no discrimination against the Kurdish 
workers at Bayer. However, the reason behind this is explained by Ali as such: 
“None of the Kurdish workers who forcibly migrated here work in 
unionized factories. How many Kurds work at Bayer, which employs four 
hundred workers? The reasons of this might be only ethnic identity or low 
education levels; however, big businesses do not hire people from the 
Kurdish region for years. Thus, they work in the sub-contracted factories. If 
sub-contracted factories are unionized, Kurds will be included in unionism 
more” (44, Istanbul, 19.09.2013).  
The Kurdish worker Cüneyt confirms Ali that he got hired by means of his uncle. He 
also states that 
“Here in Bayer, workers are hired under the hegemony of a group. During a 
worker recruitment, the half of the applicants are Kurdish and graduated 
from the best universities, but none of them get hired. It is not the fault of 
the German management of Bayer. If they know, they will be angry. It is the 
fault of bad-minded Turks at the top” (43, Bayer, 02.10.2013) 
 In Bayer which has few Kurdish workers, all workers argue that there is no 
grouping between Kurdish and Turkish workers or discrimination against Kurds, in 
practice. The reason behind this is explained by Kurds’ being minority in Bayer, the 
necessity of getting along well with each other in the factory and the union. However, 
two of the Kurdish workers, Cüneyt and Şeyhmus claim that although there is no visible 
discrimination against them in the factory and the union, they feel that the majority of 
the workers subconsciously have discriminative sentiments to them62. When it is asked 
to Cüneyt whether he can speak Kurdish in the factory, he says the following: “We have 
not come to that point yet. I speak Kurdish at home, but it does not happen here because 
62 As I observed, workers were very comfortable while they were introducing the Roma 
workers, calling them as şopar. However, it was not the case for the Kurdish workers. 
Most of them stayed in silence when I asked them to introduce a Kurdish worker.  
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of the rooted oppressive understanding” (43, Istanbul, 02.10.2013). The discourse of 
some workers who does not believe in the existence of the Kurdish question confirms 
that they do not approve speaking Kurdish in the factory. Salih, for example, says “They 
can listen to Kurdish music or speak Kurdish at their homes. If you do this in front of 
other people, it provokes them. It is not appropriate in the factory; I get angry. Maybe, 
he says something bad about me, who knows?” (40, Istanbul, 19.09.2013).  
 All in all, in accordance with its reports and the interview with the manager, 
Petrol-Iş defines the working class and unionism with reference to the Marxist ideology. 
The social, political and economic changes by the time which have affected these 
definitions are explained in line with the scholars’ arguments which suggest the decline 
of class popularity in social stratification. However, the general opinion of the manager 
and the workers does not indicate that class is a forgotten variable, but is an ignored 
one. The causes of this ignorance are generally linked to the neo-liberal economic, 
political and social policies which lead people to a-politicized, individualized and being 
indifferent. In addition, Petrol-Iş does not isolate itself from the Kurdish question and 
often indicates that it supports the peaceful resolution of the issue. Although the 
manager considers class identity is broader—more important in a sense, he does not 
support the suppression of identities which are thought to be factious in the working 
class. Regarding workers on the Kurdish question, it is seen that being active in class 
movements and referring to the suppression of the working class might not create a link 
between being emphatic to the oppression of Kurds. It is also observed that being a 
Kurdish worker might not be a factor for empathizing with the cultural or economic 
demands of Kurds. However, when the workers who have leftist political identities, it is 
seen that all of them have an emphatic approach to the oppression of the Kurdish 
movement. Moreover, it is observed that none of the workers who are distant from class 
struggle are emphatic to Kurds’ oppression. Thus, being able to make a link between the 
oppression of Kurds and oppression of the working class is somewhat affected by the 
political ideologies of workers and their level of affinity to the class movements.    
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5.2. Hava-Iş  
   
5.2.1. Unionism and Definition of the Working Class 
 
 Being a member of the Platform of Union of Forces (SGBP) like Petrol-Iş, Hava-
Iş is also one of the opponent unions within TURK-IS. Even though the participation 
rate in the Turkish Airlines strike is very low, the union’s persistence and determination 
in pressuring the government and the administration of the Turkish Airlines Inc. signals 
it being distant from yellow unionism. In this direction, the president of the union 
defines unions as “class and mass organizations” (59, Istanbul, 03.10.2013). He states 
“We have a different point of view towards unions. Unions are class and 
mass organizations. They are the organizations in which people from 
different religion, language, ethnicity and sects are easily organized. 
Therefore, unions should be political. On the one hand, they should look 
after workers’ benefit to raise them to power. On the other hand, they should 
play active roles for politicizing class struggle. They should speak about 
each problem the country has, being a pioneer of public opposition” (59, 
Istanbul, 03.10.2013). 
 
The discourse of the president of Hava-Iş on unionism is very much compatible with the 
Marxist ideology which considers unions as means for the working class struggle. In 
order to pave the way for the class struggle, unions’ necessity to politicize workers is 
inevitable. By claiming so, the president clearly confirms the union’s stance towards 
politicized unionism and class politics.  
 During the interviews with the workers who participate in the strike, it is clearly 
observed that their opinions on unionism are very much related to their experiences in 
the strike. Out of the eight workers who joined the strike, three of them suggest that 
they used to be indifferent to unionism before the resistance. A Kurdish woman who 
used to work as a hostess before she was fired, Sinem, for example, indicates that 
 
“I did not even know the managers of the union before. I did not have any 
activity in the union until the march on the May 29th. To protest the ban on 
the right to strike, I joined the march by shifting off. I saw the president 
there, and was impressed by his being trustful and democratic. Then, I 
participated in unionism. […] During the resistance, I made translations 
voluntarily to attract the world public opinion. Supports of our brother 
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workers made me very happy. I am proud of what I am doing now” (28, 
Istanbul, 24.10.2013).  
Like Sinem, the other workers who used to be passive in unionism before, Emre and 
Fatih suggest that while they were working, they were not interested in the union. After 
they were fired and got involved in the unionist movement, Emre claims that he has 
improved his general knowledge, broadening his perspective not to be deceived by the 
employee or the governments, while Fatih suggests that he highly benefits from the 
union materially and morally63 after he got fired. It is seen that these three workers do 
not touch upon the benefits of unions or the roles of unions for the working class; 
however, they point out their personal acquisitions by being active in unionism. 
Although these acquisitions are not directly related to class struggle, it helps them to be 
familiar with what unionism means or how it should work. The president confirms this 
familiarity with class struggle gained by the strike, as follows: 
“We talk to the friends. They admit that they can hereby understand workers 
on the streets who make protests against privatization, the YOK, or a topic 
related to the Kurdish question” (59, Istanbul, 03.10.2013).  
When the three interviewees, Metin, Erdi and Koral who did not participate in the 
resistance are considered, it is observed that they are more distant from the concept of 
class struggle. On the one hand, they claim that they became a member to protect their 
rights which were acquired by the union; on the other hand, they are not interested in 
the ways to enhance these rights. Therefore, they remain passive in unionism, or define 
unionism on the basis of merely practical rights, not pointing out the importance of 
workers’ organization. Koral, for example, argues that unions become more powerful 
when they involve in politics; however, this involvement leads unions to go beyond 
their aims (24, Istanbul, 08.11.2013). By arguing so, Koral limits the aims of unions 
with workers’ rights which are practically beneficial for them; such as high wages or 
long holidays, since politics in unionism is considered as unpleasant. 
 The active workers in unionism touch upon the political nature of unions while 
they are explaining the changes in unionism by the time. Since all of them have suffered 
from the harsh consequences of the resistance from which they consider the responsible 
63 I was informed that the union pays some money to the fired strikers as long as they go 
to the field of strike everyday (Metin, 33, Istanbul, 22.11.2013). 
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as the AKP government, they—including the president of the union—mostly evaluate 
these changes as before the AKP and after the AKP. One of the active workers who 
joined the strike after it was legalized states that 
“The power of unions has been declined by the AKP government. The first 
thing for capitalism is to attack the working class. Thus, while a substantial 
amount of workers were able to go on a strike easily in the past, through 
privatization, political bans on unionization and attacking to workers, 
workers are assimilated today” (Bengisu, 34, Istanbul, 26.19.2013). 
Most of the active workers refer to the changes by the 1980 coup. As in the case of 
Petrol-Iş, they argue that these changes have affected unionism in a negative way. They 
agree on the idea with Bengisu that workers are assimilated and dismayed due to 
political pressures, but not directly pointing out neo-liberal economic and social 
policies. Due to her older age, Gizem tells her experiences before the 1980s, by saying 
that 
“I remember the days before the 1980s. I remember that workers, doctors, 
public servants, all people, joined in protests when a right (concerning 
workers’ right) was withdrawn. I miss those days, because I think workers 
are needed to be powerful by organizing. Today, the statics shows that 
unionization rates are too low in comparison to the past. Today’s workers 
are beware of losing their jobs since politics suppresses workers through 
violating human rights and attacking workers’ rights” (Gizem, 48, Istanbul, 
26.10.2013).  
To this, another member of Hava-Iş, Zeynep adds the following: 
“People had traumas after the 1980 coup. People who joined in the struggle 
were imprisoned, murdered or exiled. All people were influenced by these 
traumas. Consequently, they have been suppressed and a-politicized […] 
Today, people are so scared that they worry whether they are penalized just 
because they join in a public release” (32, Istanbul, 26.10.2013).  
As it is seen, these workers underline the political suppression of workers which 
hardens unionism more than their economic suppression in their explanation of the 
causes of changes in unionism. Unlike the workers from Petrol-Iş, they do not touch 
upon ideological changes in the political conjuncture of Turkey without referring to the 
socialist structure of the unions in the past. 
Regarding the three workers who did not join the resistance, they confirm what 
Zeynep tells about the fear they have, which is one of the reasons not to join the strike. 
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Metin says, for example, that he had two reasons: firstly, not trusting the president of 
the union, secondly, the fear of getting fired. He argues that “we were afraid, but had 
reasons for that. The working conditions of the Turkish Airlines are very good; we did 
not want to lose them. The firings of 305 people scared us very much” (33, Istanbul, 
22.11.2013). Concerning their opinions on the changes of unionism, all of them state 
that they are uncomfortable with unionism today; however, their discomfort is related to 
the claim that especially Hava-Iş does not adopt reconciliatory unionism, without 
compromising, which leads collective bargaining to have deadlocks. Erdi, for example, 
states “there are two kinds of unions today. The first one tends to immediately 
compromise with the employee; the second one leaves the table in the first minute. Both 
of them are useless” (26, Istanbul, 08.12.2013). Metin, moreover, argues that 
“Before, workers were used to get benefits from the state, more. However, 
at that time, I think the state was exploited. Regarding the Turkish Airlines, 
there was a perception that devletin malı deniz, yemeyen keriz64. I do not 
agree with this. Yes, it is good for workers to have rights, but it is 
meaningless to become like Greece or Spain through exploiting the state” 
(33, Istanbul, 22.11.2013).  
By stating so, Metin suggests that when workers have ‘too much’ rights, they 
excessively use resources of the state or the employee, which exploits them. Through 
supporting reconciliatory and apolitical unionism, Metin, Koral and Erdi do not 
consider decline of unionism resulting from political pressures, unlike the strikers do.  
 In terms of the definition of the working class and self-identification with that, 
this difference between the strikers and non-strikers is also visible. The strikers define 
the working class mostly as slavery, working with their labor, and fighting for their 
bread. They agree on the idea that the working class is oppressed by the employee. 
Bengisu, for example, defines the working class as follows: 
“The stance of the working class vis-a-vis the capitalist is slavery. Thus, the 
capitalist never remunerates with workers. Workers are always oppressed 
and slaves […] I think, the majority of the society is workers. Doctors, 
engineers or teachers are also part of the working class” (34, Istanbul, 
26.19.2013). 
64It is an idiom which means that resources of the state is so endless that people who do 
not benefit from these are suckers.  
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This definition of the working class, which includes different jobs that might have 
higher economic status, is touched upon during the interviews of all strikers. Regardless 
of being a flight attendant or a technician, all strikers include these jobs as part of the 
working class, and identify themselves as workers. Moreover, they criticize some of 
their co-workers who do not consider themselves as workers because of having a high 
wage. This point is also addressed by the president who defines the working class in 
accordance with their positions against means of production—in reference to 
Marxism65, while he explains the difficulties of unionizing people in the Turkish 
Airlines. He suggests that 
“People who work in the service sector generally have a sickness of not 
identifying themselves as workers. Most of pilots and hostesses say that 
they are not workers. The understanding of the system, the governments and 
employee keep them away from this identification. In these circumstances, 
we have difficulties to explain economic and political struggle of the 
working class to our members” (59, Istanbul, 03.10.2013).  
The three non-strikers who work as a flight attendant and marketing experts challenge 
this argument in a sense, while approving in another sense. All of them agree that the 
working class has a weaker position against the employee. Erdi and Metin blame unions 
of being insufficient to strengthen the working class, not defining this weakness based 
on economy. Both of them connote the working class with mine workers or workers 
who only work physically. Although they consider themselves as workers, the reason 
behind that is explained as working too much. Koral, however, grounds weakness of the 
working class on lack of means of production. While he explains the changes of this 
definition, he argues that the concept of the working class has taken new meanings, 
saying “previously, the view of the oppression of the working class was imposed, but 
today, workers are thought into believing that they are not oppressed through setting 
small goals for them, such as firstly, buying a house, then a car, etc.” (Koral, 24, 
Istanbul, 08.12.2013). By arguing so, he refers to being deceived; a critique of the 
capitalist system. When he is asked how he acquired self-identification with class, he 
refers to his intellectual development and education.  
65 In defining the working class, in order to refer to the economic deprivation of 
workers, he quotes a famous slogan of the Communist Manifesto “The proletarians have 
nothing to lose but their chains” (the president of Hava-Iş, 59, Istanbul, 03.10.2013). 
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 The strikers’ self identifications with the working class mostly depend on their 
family backgrounds and the union. Gülçin, Gizem and Samet, for example, argue that 
some of their family members were used to be unionists, which shape their political 
ideologies. Bengisu also claims that education given by her family helped her to be 
‘conscious’ about the working class and unionism. Zeynep relates her consciousness to 
her economic class, education and the union. The workers who used to be passive in 
unionism before the resistance underline the importance of Hava-Iş to raise awareness 
of identification with the working class. Emre, for example, states that he realized he 
was a worker after he was fired. “Through learning very much in this process”, Emre 
considers the union as the most effective factor for himself to feel as a member of the 
working class (27, Istanbul, 24.10.2013). It is obvious that these workers’ experiences 
shape their views on unionism and the working class.  
 All in all, the definition of unionism and the working class of the members of 
Hava-Iş is in line with the Marxist ideology, in theory. Regarding the workers, the 
effects of the resistance on the perception of unionism and the working class are clear-
cut. The non-strikers support reconciliatory unionism, unlike the strikers. Workers 
mostly touch upon political pressures and a-politicization which have led unionism to 
decline, not addressing economical changes and political ideologies. While the strikers 
define the working class underlining its oppression, the non-strikers associate workers 
with working physically. The majority of the strikers claim that their self-identification 
with the working class is acquired by their family backgrounds and education. The 
strikers who used to be passive in unionism suggest that the resistance and the union are 
influential in their self-identification with the working class.  
5.2.2. Unionist Identity and Identity Politics 
 
 All the strikers and the president of the union agree on the idea that the 
unionist/class identity is unifying. Very similar to the manager of Petrol-Iş, the president 
considers class identity broader in comparison to the ‘other’ identities by stating that 
 
“The class identity is always a unifying identity since it includes different 
elements; it is broad and collectivist. We saw that in the Tekel Resistance. A 
87 
 
 
Kurdish and leftist worker from Diyarbakır and a nationalist worker from 
Trabzon ate together and slept in the same tent” (59, Istanbul, 03.10.2013). 
All the strikers also suggest that the unionist identity is a unifying identity since 
unions are the best means to organize for workers. According to them, when people do 
the same work, identities do not matter. Bengisu, for example, argues that “the class 
movements should be one, because being together brings success. People say that I am a 
Laz, but I listen to the Kurdish music. Any language, race or preferences cannot have a 
chance to divide us” (34, Istanbul, 26.10.2013).  In this direction, they support 
organization based on identities under the condition of being exposed to suppression. 
Emre, for example, argues that “all kinds of organizations are good, if they are 
organized against injustice” (27, Istanbul, 24.10.2013). Similarly, Zeynep looks towards 
identity politics empathically, suggesting that 
 “People were suffered and suppressed so much that they chose to organize 
[…] After I listened to their stories and looked from their perspectives, I 
think that I would also organize if the same things happened to me […] If 
they are against their suppression and exploitation, I support them” (Zeynep, 
32, Istanbul, 26.10.2013). 
When his views on identity politics are asked, the president does not touch upon ethnic 
differences, but denominational and ideological differences among the members of 
Hava-Iş. He suggests that these differences cause divisions among workers, leading 
class identity to be weakened. As another critique of the AKP government, the president 
claims that people working in the Turkish Airlines are divided as the partisans of the 
AKP and the others. According to him, none of the AKP partisans joined the resistance, 
as “in our work line, we cannot make people from the Cemaat66go on the strike. We 
could not organize those who look at the issue from this perspective” (59, Bakırkoy, 
03.10.2013).  
In response to the question whether identity politics harms unionism, the answer of 
many strikers is negative. The Kurdish worker, Sinem, for example, touches upon the 
necessity of different identities in the unionist movement for a democratic environment, 
stating that “I like differences, because you see that democracy and freedom exist there. 
66 The president refers to Gülen Cemaati  which is a religious and social movement, but 
known as influential in the recent politics of Turkey.  
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Homosexuals should be able to express themselves easily. In such an environment, I 
feel more comfortable” (28, Istanbul, 24.10.2013). Another Kurdish worker, Fatih 
claims that Hava-Iş embraces everybody; Kurds, Alevis and women. Samet confirms 
this claim, by saying that “for instance, a friend in this tent is from Samsun. He is an 
Alperen67. I am Kurdish, but we get along well” (36, Istanbul, 26.10.2013). However, 
some strikers argue that the differences of political ideologies sometimes cause 
divisions in the union. Gülçin, for example, points out some disagreements among 
strikers, arguing that 
“After the strike began, some political groups and unions visited us. I was 
not interested in their political views; but their support was important to me. 
For some reason, it bothered some people who argued that the strike was not 
political. However, you see that the company is supported by the 
government; thus, the strike is political in addition to struggling for rights” 
(36, Istanbul, 24.10.2013) 
It is claimed by Gülçin that political nature of the strike and visits of some political 
groups to the strikers disturbed some non-strikers. Metin, for example, argues that 
“TIKKO68 came to the field of strike, which rebels against the state by firing gun or 
bombing molotoves. What are they doing there? […] We were opposed to the visit of 
the BDP, as well. The president of the union attracted antipathy by welcoming these 
kinds of groups” (33, Istanbul, 22.11.2013). Metin does not directly criticize 
politicization of the strike; however, he wants politicization to be limited, excluding ‘the 
rebellions’. His argument on identity politics is along the similar lines. While he 
demonstrates that he supports democratization, he argues that identity politics should 
remain in the limits of Turkish traditions; otherwise, different identities damage the 
working class. Hence, he states that “there are people whose sexual preferences are 
unknown to the Turkish Airlines. We cannot approve them” (Metin, 33, Istanbul, 
22.11.2013). Referring to the homosexuals, Metin does not have an emphatic attitude 
towards different identities, and does not consider the unionist identity unifying due to 
the political nature of Hava-Iş. The other non-strikers’ opinion on unionist identity is 
similar with that of Metin. Erdi and Koral also think that different political ideologies 
67 Alperen Ocakları is a youth organization which is known as Turkish nationalist and 
Islamist. 
68 The armed wing of the Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist. 
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prevent people from feeling a belonging to the union. Different from Metin, they 
support identity politics if people need them due to their suppression. However, unlike 
the strikers, they evaluate identity politics and unionism separately, without touching 
upon the interaction between them. For example, Koral says that 
“I think they are completely independent from each other. Workers have the 
chance to change their job, but identities based on ethnicities cannot be 
changed. I think togetherness of the working class is weaker than the 
identity based organizations. Because of that, workers who have different 
identities can oppose each other in a union; because unionist identity is not 
so powerful” (24, Istanbul, 08.12.2013).  
Thus, the three non-strikers do not consider unionist identity as unifying due to two 
reasons: First, they claim that identities based on ethnicity, religion or sexuality tend to 
cause divisions among unionists, since the unionist identity is weaker than the other 
identities to unify workers on the basis of class struggle. The reasons of this weakness 
are linked to the failure of the unions. The second argument is that different political 
ideologies have a factious nature, damaging the union’s ‘reputation’. On the contrary, 
the strikers think that the unionist identity has the power to include all different 
identities, uniting on the basis of the working class struggle without suppressing them. 
Although the strikers agree on this argument, it is clear that some disagreements on 
different political ideologies among the members of Hava-Iş came to light during the 
strike.  
5.2.3. The Kurdish Question and Everyday Practices of Kurds  
 
 In the General Meetings of Hava-Iş, the Kurdish question does not specifically 
find a place, unlike those of Petrol-Iş. Hence, the interviews will be the only data for the 
analysis of the Kurdish question.  
 The president of the union starts his speech about the Kurdish question through 
underlining his personal experiences as a Kurdish unionist. He states that 
“In 1989, I said that there was a Kurdish question which was an obstacle for 
democratization and liberation of this country; the state put me in jail. I said 
that this state would eventually bargain with Apo; the state put me in jail. I 
said that nations should have decided their future with their own will; I was 
imprisoned for 19 months” (the president of the union, 59, Istanbul, 
03.10.2013).  
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In those years, his imprisonment was inevitable while the state denied the Kurdish 
question or even Kurds’ existence as an ethnic group. For this reason, the president’ 
views on the Kurdish question referring to the concept of ‘self-determination of nations’ 
of Leninism can be interpreted as significant for the nature and resolution of the issue. 
He maintains his arguments today through suggesting that the Kurdish question is the 
primary question of Turkey, which should be resolved by the participation of all parties 
of the question. He argues that one of the parties should be the unions, since workers 
can only use their rights in an environment where equal opportunities are provided by 
the state. By suggesting so, the president refers to the economic and cultural suppression 
of Kurds, beginning with the foundation of the Republic. He, moreover, touches upon 
the support of Kurds to the resistance by stating that 
“We always say that the Kurdish question intertwines with the unionist 
movement. When we look at the people who came here to support the 
resistance, they were mostly Kurds. We see that their sensibility towards the 
national question is intertwined with the class problems. They are able to 
correlate these two, but aware of prioritizing the class identity”69 (the 
president of the union, 59, Istanbul, 03.10.2013)  
His underlining interaction between the class movements and the Kurdish question 
signals that he supports multiple subjectivities in class. In terms of personal identities, 
however, as a Kurdish unionist, he prefers to prioritize the class identity.  
 Most of the strikers agree with the president on the Kurdish question. The general 
view of the strikers who have different ethnic backgrounds and economic status is that 
Kurds have been deliberately deprived of the economic and cultural rights. A flight 
attendant who defines herself as an atheist, feminist and anarchist, for example, touches 
upon the right to self-determination of Kurds, like the president, states that 
“Kurds are struggling to survive. They were killed only because of being 
Kurdish. There are a lot of painful stories. In the forums (organized by the 
strikers), I met Cumartesi Anneleri70 and the people who were forcibly 
69 He explains the differences in unionism in the East and the West, grounding on the 
same reasons that “people from the East are more sensible to the problems of the 
country. They can draw a parallelism between national and class questions” (the 
president of the union, 59, Istanbul, 03.10.2013) 
70 Cumartesi Anneleri is a community which is composed of relatives of people who 
were lost in costudies or murdered by unknown assailants.   
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migrated. I realized that we did not know anything about these. I support 
Kurds to live in the ways they like and their right to self determination. 
However, I do not care about borders; hence, I prefer to live together. They 
should be able to develop their culture. It is richness. I want to be together, 
but they should decide that, because they have been always told what to do. 
They have been looked down; considered as imperialist henchmen and 
ignorant. This is very bad” (Zeynep, 32, Istanbul, 26.10.2013).    
Zeynep, pointing right to self-determination, acknowledges the suppression of Kurds. 
Moreover, she underlines that organizing forums by the strikers of Hava-Iş in which 
various organizations involve, makes her be aware of the painful experiences of Kurds.  
 None of the strikers consider the Kurdish question as a mere economic problem; 
however, they agree on the point that Kurds have been economically suppressed, in 
addition to the cultural suppression. The Kurdish worker Fatih, for example, states that 
“The Kurdish question dates back to the foundation of the Turkish Republic. 
Some say that it is economic; some say that it is political; others say that it 
is a national problem. All of these came together, and created the Kurdish 
question […] The state has not invested in the East. In addition, terrorist 
incidents and the attacks of the army made people migrate to the West” (36, 
Istanbul, 24.10.2013).  
Labeling the PKK as a terrorist group, Fatih is not the only striker who touches upon the 
distinction between the PKK and the other Kurdish people who do not support the PKK. 
Although Gülçin underlines the economic and cultural deprivation of Kurds, she also 
makes a distinction between the PKK and the demands of Kurds, disregarding their 
interrelatedness. She argues that “I was grown up with Kurdish neighbors in Malatya. I 
do not have personal problems with them. However, I dislike the PKK. I am opposed to 
the foundation of the independent Kurdistan within our territories. We should live 
together, sisterly” (Gülçin, 36, Istanbul, 24.10.2013). Relating her peaceful sentiments 
to Kurds with her childhood experiences, she does not have a discriminative attitude 
towards them; however, she makes a distinction between Kurds and the PKK. Similarly, 
another striker Gizem underlines Misak-ı Milli Sınırları71, supporting living together. 
Defining ethnic identities as sub-identities, she states that 
71 The borders of Turkey which was defined in 1920 by the last term of the Ottoman 
Parliament.  
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“This question is not only due to the economical reasons. The state denied 
and humiliated them […] For instance, everybody is obsessed with Kurdish 
education.  I do not understand why. I studied in a French school […] I 
highlight that the mother tongue of the Turkish Republic is Turkish, but why 
do not they learn Kurdish in the schools? There is no problem when children 
learn German, Italian or French. Where is democracy? Where is equality?” 
(Gizem, 48, Istanbul, 26.10.2013).  
Although Gizem supports the integrity of the Turkish nation-state, this view does not 
prevent her from being emphatic to the cultural demands of Kurds.  
 Only one of the strikers, Emre, who used to be passive in unionism before, does 
not present an opinion on the causes and results of the Kurdish question, stating that “I 
cannot say useful things for you since I do not have an intellectual background on this 
issue” (27, Istanbul, 24.10.2013). However, when his opinions on every day practices of 
Kurds in the working place and the union are asked, he claims that he has no problems 
with the Kurdish language, opposing discriminative reactions to Kurds. Thus, it can be 
claimed that there is homogeneity among the strikers concerning the views on the 
Kurdish question, regardless of their ethnicities and socio-economic statues. 
  It is, however, not the case for the non-strikers. It is difficult to refer to the 
homogeneity among the non-strikers; nevertheless, the common point they share is that 
their empathy towards the demands of Kurds is limited. Koral, for example, argues that 
“It is unpleasant to call it the Kurdish question. It has been caused by wrong 
policies which otherized Kurds. I think that they can speak Kurdish, take 
Kurdish education or broadcast in the state television. They are not a 
problem for me. It creates a problem when a terrorist joins the guerilla72, 
he/she is a traitor” (Koral, 24, Istanbul, 08.12.2013). 
He, moreover, keeps his ‘tolerance’ for speaking Kurdish or listening to the Kurdish 
music in the working place as long as “these practices do not aim political propaganda 
to provoke people” (Koral, 24, Istanbul, 08.12.2013). Hence, Koral opposes the 
politicization of the Kurdish identity, which limits his empathy. While Koral defines the 
causes of the issue as social otherization, the other non-striker, Metin tends to reduce the 
problem to having economic deprivation which has been caused by ‘terror’. He argues 
that 
72 The exact saying is dağa çıkmak. 
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“We are Kurdish, but we support different views. As a Kurdish citizen, I 
never want them to fight against the state […] In fact, as a Kurd; I do not 
think that Kurds are oppressed. It was put forward to divide the country.  
There is no Kurdish question […] They made it a problem through creating 
a state of terror for 30 years, which prevents people and the state from 
making investments […] Children were grown up as ignorant in that region. 
They are given molotoves; all these harm the state. People are deceived […] 
Everyone should live within the borders of Turkey. In our identity cards, 
‘Turkish’ should be written” (Metin, 33, Istanbul, 22.11.2013). 
As it is observed, Metin considers the causes of the problem as the Kurdish movement. 
He argues that ignorance and economic underdevelopment of the region—caused by the 
Kurdish movement—have created this problem. In terms of the cultural demands of 
Kurds, he states “unfortunately, the Kurdish language should be taught, because we 
cannot communicate (with people who do not know Turkish)” (Metin, 33, Istanbul, 
22.11.2013). He links this ‘unfortunate’ to not understanding his grandmother, who 
does not speak Turkish due to the lack of education facilities in the region. Hence, he 
does not identify Kurds as suppressed, having a discriminative attitude towards people 
who join the Kurdish movement, while he does not have problems with the use of 
Kurdish language in public. 
 The third non-striker, Erdi who labels himself as apolitical does not touch upon 
the Kurdish movement. He distinguishes the demands of the Kurdish people into two: 
Firstly, he argues that the causes of the problem are primarily based on the economics 
for the poor segment of Kurds. According to him, economic underdevelopment of the 
region has led Kurds to be deprived of state services and industrial investments, such as 
education. He states that “except education, there is a huge gap even in terms of internet 
access. If a house in Diyarbakır had internet access as much as I had, we would not be at 
this point” (Erdi, 26, Istanbul, 08.12.2013). By suggesting so, Erdi refers to the 
ignorance of the Kurdish poor caused by lack of education as if this ignorance led them 
to disregard their cultural rights, but emphasizing their own economic deprivation as the 
primary cause of the question. Thus, he evaluates the causes of internal migration as 
economic. Secondly, he suggests that the Kurdish middle class has cultural demands, 
such as use of language, stating that “they might feel a longing to name their children as 
Rojin73”(Erdi, 26, Istanbul, 08.12.2013). However, he argues that this question comes to 
73 A Kurdish name.  
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an end when all Kurds be able to have equal economic opportunities—which the 
Kurdish middle class already has, arguing that  
“A generation who benefits from good opportunities is needed to be grown 
up. Hence, 20 or 30 years should pass. Think of a Kurdish child whose both 
parents have a job. This kid will get education in a better school; he/she will 
have internet access; he/she will hang out with his/her boyfriend/girlfriend, 
then this problem will end” (Erdi, 26, Istanbul, 08.12.2013). 
As seen, Erdi links the resolution of the problem with the rise of welfare among Kurds. 
Although this view ignores the political and cultural sides of the issue, Erdi, as a non-
striker, does not have a discriminative discourse towards Kurds.  
 Regarding everyday practices of Kurds in the union, all strikers and non-strikers 
argue that there is no discrimination against Kurds. In the working places, however, 
some Kurdish strikers, such as Sinem and Fatih claim that they sometimes feel 
‘disfavored’ when they talk about their ethnic origin. The Turkish strikers, on the other 
hand, suggest that they, personally, do not have problems with the use of the Kurdish 
language. So do the non-strikers; however, they sometimes limit their ‘tolerance’ as it is 
discussed. Although all of them agree that there is no discrimination, some of the 
strikers claim that the Kurdish workers sometimes hesitate from introducing themselves 
as Kurds. Bengisu, for example, argues that “there are Kurds here, but they do not 
reveal their identities. I have a friend who says recently that he is from Tunceli. They 
keep it as a secret” (34, Istanbul, 26.10.2013). However, many strikers claim that Kurds 
are more comfortable in the union with their Kurdish ethnic identities. They attribute 
this to the unions’ being leftist or intellectual. Concerning some disagreements on the 
visits of some political organizations during the strike, Bengisu admits that they 
experience some reactions to the Kurdish political organizations in the forums, but she 
claims that the leftists do not react to them. The Kurdish striker, Samet, for example, 
shares an experience he had during the resistance, which confirms these kinds of 
reactions. He argues that while they were dancing halay, someone said “Allah’ın 
şemmamesiyle halay mı çekiyorsunuz?”74 After a discussion, Samet claims that the 
74 Halay is a traditional Kurdish dance which is popularly performed accompanied by 
the Kurdish song, Şemmame. The person who says that “Allah’ın şemmamesiyle halay 
mı çekiyorsunuz?”, has humiliating discourse towards the dance and the song.  
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person who reacted to the traditional dance in a humiliating way was persuaded with 
what Samet told. Samet also thinks that the majority of the strikers in the field of the 
strike do not think like in that way, since they are intellectuals, linking empathy towards 
the Kurdish movement/Kurd’s oppression to higher level of education.  
 These kinds of reactions are confirmed by the president of the union, as well. It 
was reported in the news75 that during the strike, the visit of a deputy of the BDP, 
Sebahat Tuncel was rejected by the managers of Hava-Iş. When it is asked to the 
president the reasons behind it, he claims that there were some strikers who did not want 
him to visit the field of the strike. He, however, argues that these strikers were provoked 
by the employee to damage the strike; because he says that there was no any negative 
reaction to Sebahat Tuncel, when she came before. Since he could not risk losing these 
workers, he argues that he was obliged to delay the visit. Although none of the strikers 
interviewed opposed to the visit of the BDP, two of the non-strikers confirm this 
opposition. Defining the BDP’s partisans as ignorant Kurds, Erdi’s negative reaction to 
its visit is touched on. In addition to Erdi, Koral also states 
“In the march on the Istiklal Street, there were people from the union who 
were holding Apo posters and BDP flags. I do not want to be under the 
same roof with these people who let this discrimination and make the union 
an instrument for their political aims; because; they do not defend my rights, 
but their political interests” (24, Istanbul, 08.12.2013).  
Hence, politicization of the Kurdish movement disturbs the two of the non-strikers, 
Metin and Koral, while most of the strikers do not oppose the Kurdish movement. 
Although the two of the strikers, Gülçin and Gizem underline their preference to live 
within the same territories with Kurds, all of the strikers do not have discriminative 
discourse against Kurds and the Kurdish movement, defining the question grounding on 
the suppression of Kurds. As it is analyzed, their common point is the strike which helps 
them to identify themselves as the members of the class struggle. Their jobs—white 
collar or blue collar; education levels or ethnic backgrounds do not affect their views on 
the Kurdish question. In the analysis of the non-strikers, it is harder to find homogeneity 
among them in terms of the topics that are covered. However, they agree on the idea 
75 Odatv, May, 22, 2013. Retrieved from: http://www.odatv.com/n.php?n=bdp-isci-
sinifina-neden-kizdi-2205131200 
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that unionism is weak to organize the working class who are defined without reference 
to classical approach on the working class. Although their views on the Kurdish 
question do not include ethnic-based discrimination, their empathy is limited, without 
emphasizing the suppression of Kurds.  
 All in all, the members and the president of Hava-Iş define unionism and the 
working class very much in line with the Marxist doctrine. Similarly with the president, 
the strikers underline the cause of changes in unionism and the working class as 
political pressure beginning with the 1980 coup and increased by the AKP government. 
Some of the strikers suggest that the union and the resistance help them to acknowledge 
their class positions; while the other strikers argue that self-identification with the 
working class is acquired by education and family backgrounds. The non-strikers do not 
define the working class emphasizing its oppression, and consider unionism as 
beneficial. It is due to the fact that the non-strikers do not perceive the class identity as 
powerful enough to organize workers, while the strikers suggest that the unionist 
identity is unifying. In terms of their views on identity politics, the president and the 
strikers argue that different identities are included in the unionist movement; however, 
they underline that political divisions—the AKP versus the opposing—harm the class 
movement rather than ethnic differences. Politicization of these ethnic differences 
generally does not disturb the strikers, while the non-strikers are uncomfortable with 
some political parties. This discomfort for the non-strikers is observable during the 
strike which is also supported by the BDP members. Regarding the Kurdish question, 
the strikers underline the oppression of Kurds, making a link between the oppression of 
the working class. As for the non-strikers, they mostly define the Kurdish question 
grounding on Kurds’ economic deprivation, having a limited empathy towards their 
demands, without underlining their oppression. Thus, it can be claimed that the strikers 
who have class perspectives are more capable of having an emphatic attitude towards 
Kurds than the non-strikers whose class identity is absent.  
5.3. The Comparison between Petrol-Iş and Hava-Iş  
 
 Petrol-Iş and Hava-Iş have very similar definitions on unionism and the working 
class as the interviews with their managers show. Both of them consider unionism as 
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‘class and mass unionism’ which supports economic and political struggle of the 
working class, as opposed to yellow unionism. They define the working class with 
reference to the Marxist ideology, on the contrary to the perception which divides the 
working class in accordance with their jobs or social status. Regarding the changes on 
unionism and the definition of the working class, the managers underline neoliberal 
economic policies, such as subcontracting and cheap labor, and political pressures, 
while the president of Hava-Iş emphasizes the AKP government’s oppressive policies  
towards unions and the working class, more. Despite their different ethnic backgrounds, 
both managers perceive the unionist identity is broader or more important than other 
identities; however, they do not tend to suppress identities in class and identity 
movements. Both of them underline the economic and cultural sides of the Kurdish 
question, supporting peaceful resolution of the question.  
 The opinions of the Petrol-Iş and Hava-Iş workers, however, are different in 
‘class’ sense. The strike of Hava-Iş has a determining role in this difference. While the 
interviewees from Hava-Iş who join the strike have more common points on the topics 
discussed, Petrol-Iş workers’ answers mostly depend on their individual characteristics 
which are shaped by their experiences, family backgrounds or political ideologies. 
Workers in Petrol-Iş who have leftist political backgrounds underline the necessity of 
politicization of the unionist movement while they develop emphatic attitude towards 
Kurds and the Kurdish movement, defining the Kurdish question as an economic, 
political and social problem. The other workers—not defining themselves as political, 
but being active in unionism—define the working class as suppressed; however, they do 
not consider Kurds are suppressed or define the Kurdish question as a mere economic 
problem. A Kurdish worker who identifies himself as having class consciousness is also 
included in this segment. Moreover, the workers who do not define the working class by 
emphasizing their suppression have also discriminative discourse towards Kurds’ every 
day practices and the Kurdish movement. Hence, being a Kurdish or being active in 
unionism—defining the working class with reference to Marxism—might not help 
workers to look at the Kurdish movement and Kurds’ every day practices from an 
emphatic perspective. Moreover, it is seen that the nature of Petrol-Iş—in terms of its 
views on unionism and the Kurdish question—might not be sufficient to make workers 
being emphatic to Kurds’ suppression, since workers’ political ideologies which have 
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the working class perspective are more influential for their views on the Kurdish 
question as a whole.  
 It is not the case for the strikers of Hava-Iş. Their experiences with the strike have 
a powerful effect on their definition of the working class, unifying nature of unionism, 
and self-identification with the working class. All these tend to influence their views on 
the suppression of Kurds. Their ethnic origins, socio-economic status and education 
levels do not make a difference on their views, since all of them tend to prioritize their 
class identities. They make a link between the suppression of Kurds and suppression of 
the working class. All of them develop empathy towards the suppression of Kurds. The 
ones who acknowledge the political nature of their strike do not have a discriminative 
point of view against the Kurdish movement although they do not personally support it. 
The non-strikers, however, have difficulties to define the working class from the 
classical Marxist point of view, identifying the working class with working physically. 
Accordingly, they do not consider unionism as beneficial. Although some of them 
consider identity movements as necessary, their definition of the Kurdish question and 
empathy towards the suppression of Kurds are limited, opposing politicization of the 
Kurdish identity. Therefore, while Hava-Iş workers whose class identities are prioritized 
are more emphatic to the suppression of Kurds, Petrol-Iş workers’ empathy is more 
associated with their political ideologies, which has a class consciousness.  
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION 
 The Kurdish question has been one of the hot topics of Turkey, for years, having 
substantial effects on political, social and economic arenas, which affects its popularity 
in the academic realm. In parallel with the political conjuncture, the Kurdish question 
has been discussed through various approaches, focusing on its ethnic, class or security 
dimensions. On the other hand, trade unions’ popularity—along with class’ 
popularity—has not always been at the same level in the academic discussions. In fact, 
discussion of class—having the concept/practice of trade unions—has included 
discussion of the Kurdish question, beginning in the 1960s. Although this class and the 
Kurdish question interaction have been blurred over time, the discussion of the Kurdish 
question from a class based perspective still exists today. Therefore, in this study, we 
wanted to understand how this interaction between class and ethnicity finds a place in 
the trade unions, aiming to answer whether class interacts with other forms of 
suppression, or not.  
 According to the classical approach on class, ethnic identities should not be 
emphasized, since the most important dimension in social stratification is between the 
oppressed and the oppressor in the economic sense. As Mullen says for the working 
class “you have nothing but your identities” (2012, p.41), other identities are considered 
as factious for the unity of the working class. Accordingly, in our study, some members 
of the unions have an antipathetical discourse towards Kurds’ demands or the Kurdish 
movement, as in the case of some Petrol-Iş workers who play active roles in unionism, 
but opposing the Kurdish activism. At that point, it is important to clear out the 
distinction between the forms of suppression in class. For the classical Marxist theory, 
this suppression—undermining the other identities—should take place for the sake of 
the class struggle in which the class identity is the prominent one. However, in our 
study, it is seen that nationalistic sentiments are determining for the discriminative 
discourse towards the Kurdish movement, rather than the idea that the identity 
movements distract the class movements. While the classical approach on class is closer 
to the claim that the identity movements, taking all attention, might distract the 
importance of class as a variable and the class movements, the nationalistic stance, 
which leads the demands of Kurds to be ignored, is not very compatible with the 
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classical Marxism in theory. Thus, although the workers who have discriminative 
attitudes towards the demands of Kurds touch upon the Marxist doctrine in explaining 
the working class, they oppose the Kurdish movement because of their nationalistic 
sentiments, which is not an argument of the classical Marxism.  
 All approaches on class do not argue that the class identity should suppress other 
identities, but it includes multiple subjectivities which are shaped by itself through 
interaction with other processes (Wright, 1996). In the process of political socialization, 
the workers of Petrol-Iş and Hava-Iş are different in the ‘class’ sense. Although all 
workers from Petrol-Iş are blue-collar workers who are perceived as ‘more proletarian’ 
than white-collar workers, some of them do not define themselves as workers. In the 
case of Hava-Iş, on the contrary, the workers’ being white-collar workers do not prevent 
them from considering themselves as part of the working class. Thus, the study shows 
that socialization with the strike and the union is the determining factor for the Hava-Iş 
workers for self-identification with the working class. It is seen that Hava-Iş workers 
who joined the resistance not only gained a class identity, but also an empathic 
perspective to the other social problems, such as the Kurdish question. Regarding the 
Petrol-Iş workers, social processes that are individually experienced have become more 
influential for linking the suppression of Kurds to the suppression of the working class. 
As Gibson-Graham et al. (2000) state that class processes are enacted in multiple forms: 
the capitalist (economic) and non-capitalist (individual) ones, the workers’ economic 
suppression is perceived by themselves through their individual characteristics.  Hence, 
socialization with class has been affected mostly by their political ideologies (Wright, 
1996) and past injuries (Özselçuk, 2006). In other words, this socialization, includes 
politicization and individual experiences in the case of the Petrol-Iş workers, while the 
Hava-Iş strikers are socialized and politicized more through the strike which is not only 
an individual experience, but also a unifying one with the class identity created by the 
union.  In general, the workers whose ideologies are grounded on class, and the workers 
who personally experience oppression of being a worker and a Kurd are able to make a 
connection between two kinds of oppression: class and ethnicity. 
 In the analysis of the interviews, it is also observed that solely being a Kurdish 
worker does not necessarily provide the workers with an understanding of all kinds of 
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oppression. A Kurdish worker might not consider being a Kurd as a form of suppression 
although he emphasizes the oppression of the working class; or, he/she might not 
acknowledge both kinds of oppression. Regarding the nature of identity movements, 
which links the ability of understanding oppression with being personally experienced, 
the study shows that it is not always the case. While a Kurdish worker does not define 
Kurds as suppressed, another worker, regardless of being Kurdish or Turkish, can 
support all kinds of movements, including identity or class based ones, if these 
movements fight against different forms of suppression. At that point, as it is explained 
above, individual or collective politicization becomes determining. However, it is 
important to note that this politicization is in line with the socialist ideology which has a 
working class perspective. The workers from both unions who develop empathy 
towards the Kurdish movement are active in the unionist movement. Thus, these 
workers’ position is in line with the era of the 1960s-1970s when the class struggle and 
the Kurdish movement were discussed together. Although the workers do not point out 
this togetherness in this era, some of them underline the intersection of both kinds of 
oppression.  
  Namely, it can be concluded that the working class identity, directly or 
indirectly, helps to create a link with other forms of oppression. This conclusion 
confirms the argument of multiple subjectivities in class. Gibson-Graham (2000) 
suggests that each identity—class and ethnic based—can be understood as the complex 
processes, none of which should be considered as having a fundamental importance 
alone. While some of the workers agree with this point, both managers of the unions 
subject to this research tend to prioritize the class identity.  However, it does not 
necessitate supporting the argument of suppression of identities in class. It is due to the 
fact that the managers do not claim that different identities or identity movements—
separate from class movements—distract the unionist struggle. On the contrary, they 
support the discussion of the Kurdish question in the unions, being a part of the 
resolution process. Moreover, they oppose nationalistic attitudes which lead Kurds to be 
discriminated. Therefore, although the arguments of both the managers are closer to the 
classical approach on class, prioritizing the class identity, they are supportive for the 
claim of multiple subjectivities in class. It is observable among the Kurdish workers 
from both unions. Although prioritization of class identity might lead alienation of 
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Kurds from the unionist movement, as Benlisoy (2012) argues, it is not the case for the 
Kurdish workers of Petrol-Iş and Hava-Iş. Besides, it is stated by some workers that 
Kurdish workers are more enthusiastic to be active in unionism. The reasons behind that 
can be explained by two arguments: First, the two forms of suppression—being a Kurd 
and being a worker—are connoted in the perception of these people. Secondly, the class 
identity is unifying enough to embrace the Kurdish workers, without alienating them 
through prioritization itself. Hence, class might not distract the other identities.  
 The factors that are considered as weakening class are also asked to the workers. 
Many workers from each union list these factors as, changes in the structure of work 
(white or blue-collar) (Pakulski & Waters, 1996), rising affluence (Clark & Lipset, 
1991), and mass education (Melluci, 1989). Although they think that all these factors 
have affected unionism to be weakened—in addition to the effects of economic and 
political pressures by the neoliberal understanding—most workers do not consider the 
working class as invalid but one that is ignored. This ignorance—caused deliberately by 
the capitalist system—is criticized by the active workers in unionism. Moreover, 
especially as in the case of Hava-Iş, it is seen that different occupations, socio-economic 
status and education levels of workers are not influential in self-identification with the 
working class and their views on the Kurdish question. Thus, it is observed that the 
factors given by the scholars (Pakulski & Waters, 1996; Clark & Lipset, 1991; Melluci, 
1989) are influential for class/unionism to be disregarded, but not sufficient for the 
discussion of ‘death of class’.  
 When every day practices of Kurds in the working places are analyzed, it is 
unfortunately seen that discrimination against Kurds continues. Although empathic 
workers to the demands of Kurds support cultural practices, most workers suggest that 
Kurds who prioritize their ethnic identities or speak Kurdish in public can be exposed to 
discriminative reactions. The workers mostly relate this discrimination to the political 
conjuncture of Turkey; however, insufficiency of the unions in promoting 
ideological/theoretical knowledge to their members are also observable, when active but 
‘non-emphatic’ workers are considered.  
 All in all, theoretical divisions of the left—suppressing identities versus multiple 
subjectivities in class—are practically visible in the leftist ideologies of Turkey, today. 
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Although the majority of the active workers from Petrol-Iş and Hava-Iş who are 
subjects of this research does not support the suppression of the Kurdish identity, 
existence of workers who support suppression of the Kurdish identity should not be 
disregarded. Hence, the unions should ‘speak Kurdish’ more through involving in the 
discussion of the Kurdish question and promoting awareness among their members.  
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APPENDIX A 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
For the workers 
Genel 
1. Sendikaya kaç yılında, hangi amaçla üye oldunuz? 
2. Sendikal çalışmalarda aktif rol oynuyor musunuz? Oynadıysanız, ne tür çalışmalar 
yapıyorsunuz? Sizce bu çalışmaların ne gibi yararları var? 
3. Dünden bugüne sendikal harekette bir değişim görüyor musunuz, varsa nelerdir? 
Sınıf 
4. İşçi sınıfı deyince aklınıza neler geliyor? Sermaye karşısında nasıl bir duruşu 
vardır? (Bunların dün/bugün farkı var mı?) 
• Kendinizi bu sınıfa mensup olarak görüyor musunuz? 
• Görüyorsanız, bu bilinci oluşturmada neler etkili oldu? (Ekonomik, 
sosyal durum ve sendikal hareket) 
5. Sizce sendikal hareket işçi sınıfını birleştiren bir hareket midir?  
6. İşçi sınıfı ve sendikal hareket haricinde, kimlik bazlı (etnik, dinsel, cinsel) 
örgütlenmeler hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz? 
• İşçi sınıfındaki farklı kimlikler (etnik, dinsel, cinsel) sendikal 
harekete/sınıf mücadelesine tehlike yaratır mı? 
Kürt Meselesi  
7. Kürt meselesi hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz? (Nedenleri, sonuçları?) 
• İç göçün bu sorunda yeri var mı? Varsa, bu işçileri ve sendikalaşmayı 
nasıl etkiledi? 
• Sendikada ve iş yerinizde farklı kimliklerden işçilerle (Kürt x Türk) 
sorun yaşıyor musunuz? Ya da buna tanık oluyor musunuz? 
• Kürt ve Türk işçiler arasında bir gruplaşma/ayrışma seziyor musunuz? 
Varsa, nedenleri nelerdir? Yoksa, sizleri ortaklaştıran nelerdir? 
Kürt ise; İş yerinizde ve sendikada anadilinizde konuşmanız nasıl karşılanıyor? 
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Kendinizi Kürt kimliğinizle tanıttığınızda sorun yaşıyor musunuz? 
Türk ise; Kürt işçilerin Kürtçe konuşması ya da Kürtçe yayın okuması, müzik dinlemesi 
hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz? 
Kürt kimliğini ön plana çıkaran işçiler hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz? 
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For the managers  
Genel 
 
1. Sendikanız kaç yılında ne amaçla kuruldu? 
2. Üye profiliniz (yaş, cinsiyet, eğitim durumu, gelir düzeyi), (aralarındaki farklar)  
• Üyelik kıstaslarınız nelerdir?  
• Hangi illerde ve hangi iş kollarında üyeleriniz var? 
• Farklı meslek grupları sendikanıza üye olabiliyorlar mı? Sizce bu 
grupları ortaklaştıran ya da ayrıştıran etkenler var mı? 
3. Kuruluş tarihinden itibaren günümüze kadar olan bir değişim ( misyon ve üye 
profili bazında) var mı, varsa nasıl açıklarsınız? 
 
Sınıf 
4. Sendikanız İşçi sınıfını nasıl tanımlıyor? 
• Bu tanım kuruluştan itibaren değişim gösterdi mi? 
• (Eğer gösterdiyse bu değişimin nedenlerini nasıl açıklarsınız?) 
• Bu değişimlerin arasında Orta sınıfın yükselmesini, eğitim düzeyinin 
artmasını, refah devletinin yükselmesini gösterebilir misiniz? 
5. İşçi sınıfı kimliği (sınıf bilinci) oluşturmada sendikanın bir rolu var mıdır?, Varsa 
bu aşamada sendikanız nasıl roller üstleniyor? 
• Bu kimlik birleştirici / homojen bir kimlik midir? 
6. Sendikanızın kimlik polikaları (etnik, dinsel, cinsel kimlikler) hakkındaki görüşü 
nedir? 
• Farklı kimlikler sınıf bilinci ya da sınıf mücadelesi için bir tehlike yaratır 
mı? 
• Sendikanızda farklı kimliklerden üyeler bulunmakta mıdır? 
Kürt Meselesi 
7. Kürt Meselesi’ni tasıl tanımlarsınız? 
• Bölgesel ekonomik eşitsizliklerin bu sorunda yeri nedir? 
• Kürt etnik kimliğinin bu sorunda yeri nedir? 
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• İç göçün (kırsaldan sanayi bölgelerine) bu sorunda yeri nedir? 
i.e. göçle gelen işçilerin diğer işçilerle ilişkileri nasıldır? 
• Bu durumlar (ekonomiik eşitsizlik, etnik kimlik ve iç göç) işçi 
mücadelesini nasıl etkiler? 
8. Kürt Meselesi ile ilgili çalışmalarınız var mı? 
• Varsa, bu çalışmalarda başka sendikalarla ya da STK’larla iş birliği 
içinde bulundunuz mu? 
• Sendikal hareketin doğu-batı farklılıkları var mı? Nasıl? 
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APPENDIX B 
Görüşme Protokol Formu 
 
Sanat ve Sosyal Bilimler Fakültesi  
Avrupa Çalışmaları Master Programı 
Master Tezi Araştırması: Sınıf ve Etnisite Bağdaşımı: Türkiye’de Sendikalar ve Kürt 
Meselesi 
Görüşme Protokolu       Tarih: 
Görüşme yapılan kişi: 
Görüşmeyi yapan kişi: Hazal Altunkulp, Sabancı Üniversitesi Avrupa Çalışmaları 
Master öğrencisi 
Kısımlar: 
1. Sendika hakkında genel bilgiler 
2. Sınıf 
3. Kürt Meselesi 
Röportaj sonrası yorumlar ve gözlemler:        
             
             
          
Tanıtıcı Protokol 
Not almayı kolaylaştırmak için, görüşmemizi kayıt altına almayı rica ediyorum. Bu 
kayıt sadece benim tarafımdan dinlenebilecek ve analizden sonra silinecek. Verdiğiniz 
tüm bilgiler gizli kalacak. Gönüllü katılımınızı kendinizi rahatsız hissettiğiniz zaman 
durdurabilirsiniz. Bu görüşme size zarar vermeyecek.  
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Röportajın yaklaşık 30 dakika süreceğini tahmin ediyorum. Eğer zamanımız soruları 
cevaplamaya yetmezse sizi durdurup başka sorular sorabilirim. 
Giriş 
Sizinle sendika üyesi olarak görüşüyorum. Bu araştırma genel olarak sınıf ve etnise 
bağdaşımını sorgulayarak, Türk sendikalarının Kürt Meselesi’ne bakış açısını analiz 
etmeyi amaçlıyor. Bu doğrultuda, araştırmamın iki merceği bulunuyor. Birincisi, 
sendikanızın işçi sınıfı olgusuna nasıl baktığıdır. İkincisi ise, Kürt Meselesi’ni nasıl 
yorumladığınızdır. Bu bağlamda sınıf ve etnisitenin bir ilişkisi olup olmadığını 
öğrenmeyi amaçlıyorum. Çalışmamda bilgi düzeyinizi ölçmeyi asla amaçlamıyorum. 
Araştırma konum hakkında, sadece neler düşündüğünüzü ve neler deneyimlediğinizi 
öğrenmek çalışmam için çok değerli olacaktır. Katılımınız için teşekkür ederim. 
Görüşmeci Hakkında Ön Bilgiler 
Yaş: ......................... 
Etnisite: ...................... 
Eğitim Durumu: ........................ 
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APPENDIX C 
The Personal Backgrounds of Interviewees 
1. Petrol-Iş  
NAME EDUCATION ETHNICITY JOB AGE 
The manager 
of the union 
High school Turkish The manager 
(a former 
worker ) 
53 
Ali University  Turkish 
(Alevi) 
Worker  
(the union 
representative) 
44 
Salih High school Turkish Worker 40 
Uğur High school Turkish Worker  
(the union 
representative) 
33 
Murat University Turkish Worker 33 
Şeyhmus University  Kurdish 
(Alevi) 
Worker 30 
Osman High school Turkish Worker  38 
Hasan High school Kurdish Security 
officer  
40 
Cüneyt  High School Kurdish Worker  43 
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 2. Hava-Iş 
 
 
NAME EDUCATION ETHNICITY JOB AGE 
The president 
of the union 
High school Kurdish 
(Alevi) 
The president 
(a former 
worker) 
59 
Sinem* University Kurdish Flight 
attendant  
28 
Emre* High school  Turkish Technician  27 
Gülçin  University Turkish Flight 
attendant 
36 
Fatih* High school  Kurdish Technician 36 
Gizem  University Turkish Flight 
attendant 
48 
Zeynep*  University Turkish Flight 
attendant 
32 
 
Samet*  
High school  Kurdish 
(Alevi) 
Technician 36 
Bengisu  High school  Laz Shipping 
personnel 
34 
Metin**  University Kurdish Flight 
attendant 
33 
Koral** University Turkish Marketing 
Expert 
24 
Erdi**  University Turkish 
(Alevi) 
Marketing 
Expert 
26 
 
*These workers are fired workers. 
**These are the ones who did not join in the resistance.  
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